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Resumo 
Esta tese pretende estudar os efeitos da promoção da flexibilidade à margem, através da 
facilitação do uso dos contratos a termo, no mercado de trabalho português. Para tal, 
apresentam-se três ensaios onde se analisam empiricamente os efeitos de uma alteração 
de legislação que ocorreu em 2004 e que aumentou a duração legal máxima dos 
contratos a termo certo de três para seis anos. Dada a elevada segmentação do mercado 
de trabalho e a representatividade dos contratos a termo, considera-se que estes estudos 
podem contribuir para a definição de políticas públicas no futuro. A análise empírica é 
realizada utilizando a base de dados Quadros de Pessoal para o período compreendido 
entre 2002 e 2011. 
Os resultados dos três ensaios sugerem que os contratos a termo podem 
desemprenhar papéis diferentes no mercado de trabalho, como processos de seleção e de 
ajustamentos quantitativos, e que isso deve ser tido em consideração quando se 
analisam os efeitos de reformas assimétricas da protecção ao emprego. Após controlar 
por diversas variáveis micro e macro, encontra-se evidência de que a possibilidade de 
utilizar o contrato a termo por um maior período de tempo teve efeitos negativos na 
probabilidade de conversão do contrato e contribuiu para aumentar a desigualdade 
salarial entre trabalhadores com contratos sem termo ou contratos convertidos em sem 
termo e trabalhadores que não obtiveram uma relação de emprego mais estável. Para 
além disso, mostra-se que esta alteração de legislação não se traduziu num aumento do 
crescimento do emprego e que teve inclusivamente um efeito negativo na criação de 
emprego com contratos a termo, devido principalmente ao efeito da não conversão dos 
contratos.  
Esta tese sugere que se deve combater a segmentação do mercado de trabalho 
português e promover medidas para estimular a conversão dos contratos a termo em 
contratos sem termo.    
Palavras-Chave: Contratos a termo, Legislação de Proteção ao Emprego, Qualidade do 
Par Trabalhador-Empresa, Fluxos de Emprego, Salário Relativo, Endogenous Switching 
Regression Model, Modelo de Vetores Autoregressivos, Regressão de Quantis 
JEL Classification: J31, J41, J68, C21, C24, C33 
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Abstract 
This thesis aims to study the effects of the promotion of flexibility at the margin in the 
Portuguese labour market through the facilitation of the use of fixed-term contracts. We 
present three empirical essays that assess the effects of the 2004 change in legislation 
that extended the maximum legal duration of fixed-term contracts from three to six 
years. Given the high labour market segmentation and representativeness of fixed-term 
contracts in the Portuguese labour market, we consider that these studies may contribute 
to the design of future public policies. The empirical analysis is conducted using the 
linked employer-employee database Quadros de Pessoal for the period between 2002 
and 2011. 
The results of the three essays suggest that fixed-term contracts may play 
different roles in the labour market, namely as screening devices and quantitative 
adjustment tools, and that this fact should be taken into account when the effects of 
asymmetric employment protection reforms are analysed. After controlling for several 
micro and macro variables, we find evidence that the extension of the fixed-term 
contract for a longer period had negative effects on the probability of conversion of the 
contract and contributed to increase the wage inequality between workers on permanent 
or converted fixed-term contracts and those that did not obtain a more stable 
employment relationship. Besides, we find evidence that this change in legislation did 
not contribute to increase employment growth and decrease the rate of creation of fixed-
term jobs, especially due to the effects of the proportion of non-converted fixed-term 
contracts.  
This research suggests that labour market segmentation should be tackled and 
policy makers should promote measures aiming to stimulate the conversion of fixed-
term into open-ended contracts.  
    
 
Keywords: Fixed-term contracts, Employment Protection Legislation, Worker-firm 
Match Quality, Job Flows, Relative Wage, Endogenous Switching Regression Model, 
Vector Autoregressive model, Quantile Regression 
JEL Classification: J31, J41, J68, C21, C24, C33 
 
Acknowledgements
After four years of intensive work, the contribution of some people and institutions
to the present thesis should be acknowledged.
I deeply thank both my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Helena Lopes and Prof. Dr. Luís
Filipe Martins, for all their continuous guidance and enthusiastic support. This
work greatly beneted from their comments, suggestions and critical analysis and I
am indebted to them for all their generous teachings and advices.
I thank the O¢ ce for Strategy and Studies (GEE), Ministry of Economy and
Employment for allowing access to Quadros de Pessoal and DINÂMIACET-IUL
for providing the conditions to do so. I am especially thankful to Prof. Dr. Fátima
Suleman and Prof. Dr. Sérgio Lagoa, for their availability and guidance with the
database.
I gratefully acknowledge the nancial support of the research center BRU-IUL,
which allowed me to present two chapters of this thesis in international conferences.
Chapter 2 was improved by the comments of Prof. Dr. Mário Centeno, Prof.
Dr. José Varejão, Michael Greinecker, an anonymous referee and the participants
of the 29th Congress of the European Economic Association, 26th Conference of
European Association of Labour Economists, Spring Meeting of Young Economists
2014, 8th Annual Meeting of the Portuguese Economic Journal and 10th Edition of
the Seminar Day of the Doctoral Programme in Economics of University of Porto.
I thank Michael Abrigo and Prof. Dr. Matthew Baker for the clarications on the
Stata packages and Prof. António Monteiro Fernandes for the clarications on the
Portuguese labour market legislation.
The nancial support of Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) through
the Doctoral Grant SFRH/85924/2012 is gratefully acknowledged.
I thank Prof. Dr. Emanuel Gasteiger, Prof. Dr. João Leão and Prof. Dr.
Vivaldo Mendes for their support in the decision to enroll in the Ph.D. in Economics.
v
Finally, I am deeply thankful to my family, in especial to my parents- Custódia
Silva and Mário Silva, for all the unconditional dedication and support throughout
this entire journey. This work is the result of the dedication and e¤ort that I learnt
from them.
I also thank my colleagues- Paulo Marques, Ricardo Barradas and Ricardo
Correia- for the warm welcome to the Ph.D. Program and for the many moments in
which we shared our enthusiasm and di¢ culties.
vi
Contents
Acknowledgements v
List of Tables x
List of Figures xiii
1 Introduction 1
2 Asymmetric labour market reforms and wage growth with xed-
term contracts: does match quality matter? 12
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 The Portuguese Employment Protection Legislation . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3 Learning about Match Quality in Two-tier Systems . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.1 The Role of Fixed-term Contracts in Two-tier Systems . . . . 15
2.3.2 The Measurement of Match Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Empirical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.1 Determinants of the Conversion of Fixed-term to Open-ended
Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5.2 Wage growth of Converted and Non-converted Fixed-termCon-
tracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5.3 Wage Growth Di¤erential Between Non-converted and Con-
verted Fixed-term Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.5.4 Robustness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix A Description of Variables 46
vii
Appendix B Tables 48
3 Job Flows and Flexibility at the Margin 64
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.2 The Portuguese Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.3 Employment Protection Legislation and Job Flows . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Data and Empirical Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4.2 Measurement of Job Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4.3 Measurement of Flexibility at the Margin . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.4 Econometric Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.4.5 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5.1 Job Flows and Flexibility at the margin . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5.2 Components of the Index of Flexibility at the Margin and Job
Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5.3 Employment growth pattern and the impact of exibility at
the margin on job ows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5.4 Robustness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendix C Figures 97
Appendix D Tables 104
4 Wage inequality between permanent and xed-term contracts: a
rm-level analysis 110
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.2 The Portuguese Labour Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.4 Empirical Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.4.2 Econometric Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
viii
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.5.1 Estimation using an adaptive Markov chainMonte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.5.2 Robustness Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Appendix E Tables 138
5 Conclusion 151
References 157
ix
List of Tables
1.1 Evolution of the Portuguese employment protection legislation on
xed-term contracts: 1976-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 Determinants of the conversion of xed-term into permanent contracts 30
2.2 Determinants of the wage growth of non-converted and converted
xed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Direct and indirect impact of the change in legislation on the wage
growth of non-converted and converted xed-term contracts . . . . . 38
2.4 Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential . . . . . . . . 41
B.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
B.2 Distribution of open-ended and xed-term contracts by wage and
wage growth decile (%) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B.3 Determinants of the growth rate of base wages and regular benets
of converted and non-converted xed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . 51
B.4 Threefold decomposition of the wage (base wages and regular bene-
ts) growth di¤erential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
B.5 Determinants of the growth rate of base wages of converted and non-
converted xed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
B.6 Threefold decomposition of the base wage growth di¤erential . . . . . 54
B.7 Impact of the change in legislation on probability of conversion of the
contract without rms in construction sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
B.8 Determinants of the wage growth of converted and non-converted
xed-term contracts without rms in construction sector . . . . . . . 56
B.9 Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential without rms
in construction sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
x
B.10 Impact of the change in legislation on probability of conversion of the
contract without rms with 11-20 employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
B.11 Determinants of the wage growth of converted and non-converted
xed-term contracts without rms with 11-20 employees . . . . . . . 59
B.12 Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential without rms
with 11-20 employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B.13 Impact of the change in legislation on probability of conversion of the
contract for rms with a higher proportion of xed-term contracts . . 61
B.14 Impact of the change in legislation on wage growth for rms with a
higher proportion of xed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
B.15 Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential without rms
in construction sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1 Estimation of the weights of the index of exibility at the margin . . 79
3.2 Variance decompositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
D.1 Job ows by sector of activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
D.2 Job ows by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
D.3 Job ows by rm size category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
D.4 Job ows by rm age category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
D.5 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
D.6 Dynamic relationship between job ows and exibility at the margin . 106
D.7 Variance decompositions for the model with the proportion of non-
converted xed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
D.8 Variance decompositions for the model with the proportion of xed-
term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
D.9 Variance decompositions for the model with the average duration of
xed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
D.10 Variance decompositions for shrinking sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
D.11 Variance decompositions for expanding sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
xi
4.2 Quantile estimates of the elasticity of substitution between open-
ended and xed-term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.3 Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.4 Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage using an adaptive MCMC algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . 133
E.1 Mean estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the relative
wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
E.2 Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage without covariates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
E.3 Full quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
E.4 Quantile estimates of the elasticity of substitution between open-
ended and xed-term contracts using an adaptive MCMC algorithm . 145
E.5 95% Condence Intervals of the quantile estimates using an adaptive
MCMC algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
E.6 Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage for rms with xed-term contracts before 2004 . . . . . 147
E.7 Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on an
alternative variable of the relative wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
E.8 Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage excluding agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
E.9 Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage interacted with a dummy for rms with 11 to 20 employees150
xii
List of Figures
11 Proportion of xed-term contracts in the Portuguese labour market
and EPL reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
21 Hourly wage growth of converted and non-converted xed-term con-
tracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
22 Average marginal e¤ect of the change in legislation at years of tenure 29
31 Index of exibility at the margin and its components . . . . . . . . . 80
32 Response of job ows to a shock in exibility at the margin . . . . . . 84
33 Response of permanent job ows to a shock in the creation of xed-
term jobs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
34 Response of exibility at the margin to a shock in job ows . . . . . 86
35 Impulse response functions of aggregate job ows and exibility at
the margin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
36 Response of job ows to a shock in the proportion of xed-term contracts 89
37 Response of job ows to a shock in the average duration of xed-term
contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
38 Response of job ows to a shock in the non-conversion rate of xed-
term contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
39 Response of job ows to a shock in exibility at the margin in shrink-
ing sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
310 Response of job ows to a shock in exibility at the margin in ex-
panding sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
C.1 Proportion of xed-term contracts, non-conversion rate and average
duration of the contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
C.2 Job ows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
xiii
C.3 Persistence of a shock in exibility at the margin and its components 98
C.4 Response of job ows to a shock in the index of exibility at the
margin with the index last in the Cholesky decomposition . . . . . . 99
C.5 Response of the index of exibility at the margin to a shock in job
ows with the index last in the Cholesky decomposition . . . . . . . 99
C.6 Response of job ows to a shock in the index of exibility at the
margin with exogenous weights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
C.7 Response of the index of exibility at the margin with exogenous
weights to a shock in job ows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
C.8 Dynamic relationship between exibility at the margin and relative
wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
C.9 Response of job ows to a shock in relative wage . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
C.10 Response of relative wage to a shock in job ows . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.11 Dynamic relationship between exibility at the margin and employ-
ment growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
C.12 Response of job ows to a shock in the index of exibility at the
margin including employment growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
C.13 Response of the index of exibility at the margin to a shock in job
ows including employment growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
41 Quantile plot of the relative wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
xiv
List of Abbreviations
CI Condence Interval
EPL Employment Protection Legislation
FTC Fixed-term Contract
GLS Generalized Least Squares
GMM Generalized Method of Moments
IMR Inverse Mills Ratio
IRF Impulse Response Function
LABREF Labour Market Reforms database
MCMC Markov chain Monte Carlo
OEC Open-ended Contract
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OLS Ordinary least squares
VAR Vector Autoregressive Model
xv
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is composed by three essays that empirically study the e¤ects of the
promotion of exibility at the margin through regulations on xed-term contracts.
Since the 1980s, a large number of reforms on employment protection legislation
(EPL) have been implemented in European countries, out of which more than half
were two-tier reforms (Boeri, 2011). The use of temporary contracts1 was facilitated
in approximately two thirds of the OECD countries where EPL has changed during
the 1990s, although this gure dropped to 50% at the beginning of the following
decade (OECD, 2004). Therefore, labour market exibility was achieved mainly by
widening the asymmetries between temporary and regular contracts, for which the
regulations su¤ered little changes (Kahn, 2010; OECD, 2004). This kind of labour
market exibility, introduced by reforms directed to a certain groups of workers
such as temporary workers, has been referred to in the literature as exibility at the
margin2. Consequently, it is not surprising that regulations on temporary contracts
account for a large share of the cross-country variability in the OECD EPL index
(OECD, 2004) and that the index on temporary contracts shows greater within-
country variance than that on regular contracts (Kahn, 2010). This type of policy
has contributed to raise the proportion of temporary workers (Kahn, 2010; OECD,
2004) and gave rise to highly segmented labour markets.
The prevalence of this type of labour market reforms can be explained in the
spirit of the insider-outsider theoretical framework (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988),
such as in Saint-Paul (1993). EPL, and notably the type of contract, may inuence
1Note that, according to OECD, temporary contract is a broader term than xed-term contract,
since it includes not only xed-term but also temporary agency work. Both concepts are often used
interchangeably in the literature but in the proposed analysis we focus specically on xed-term
contracts.
2See, for example, Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Mertens et al. (2007), Sala et al. (2012).
1
workersbargaining power3. This is such that high-tenured workers on regular con-
tracts, protected by substantial labour turnover costs4, receive higher wages and are
insulated from the competition of xed-term workers5. Consequently, policy makers
may nd social and political obstacles when they try to implement broader reforms
promoting labour market exibility (Saint-Paul, 1993). If incumbents represent the
majority of voters, broad reforms reducing ring costs will be derailed since they
are expected to reduce the utility of permanent workers due to a larger ring rate.
Thus, according to Saint-Paul (1993), reforms that increase exibility at the margin
are more likely to gather the necessary political support and may be considered a
transition phase until the necessary conditions to implement complete reforms are
achieved. In this setting, the conversion clause of xed-term contracts, establishing
that the contract has to be terminated or converted to an open-ended contract after
a certain time period, helps to build the political support to implement reforms at
the margin by ensuring the continuous insiders representativeness.
The above mentioned suggests that the regulations on xed-term contracts, such
as their maximum legal duration and number of renewals, are important tools
that governments may use to promote or reduce labour market exibility (Saint-
Paul, 1996). According to the Labour Market Reforms database (LABREF), some
European countries have allowed the maximum duration of xed-term contracts to
be extended for an additional period of time over the last two decades, such as in
Belgium in 2002, Romania in 2005, Latvia in 2006 and Romania, Slovakia, Czech
Republic in 20116. This type of regulations may have important e¤ects on the per-
ceived job security of temporary employees (OECD, 2014). Consequently, we believe
that it is crucial to better understand the e¤ects of facilitating the use of xed-term
contracts. This is especially relevant after the 2008 economic and nancial down-
turn that led to a severe job crisis and gave rise to the idiosyncratic responses of the
3See Lindbeck and Snower (2002) and Bentolila and Dolado (1994).
4According to Lindbeck and Snower (1988), labour turnover costs may be divided in
"production-related" (e.g. screening costs) and "rent-related" costs (e.g. severance pay and lack
of insiderscooperation with outsiders).
5Evidence on the wage di¤erential between permanent workers and xed-term workers can be
found in Booth et al. (2002) and OECD (2014) for example.
6https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/labref/public/result.cfm (consulted on 31/05/2016).
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OECD labour markets (OECD, 2010). The e¤ects of this crisis were particularly
felt by temporary employees (OECD, 2010) who are used as a source of employment
adjustment in countries such as Portugal, where the hiring and separation rates of
temporary workers are more responsive to changes in employment than those of
permanent workers (Carneiro et al., 2014).
Although the Portuguese unemployment rate showed an increasing trend since
the early 2000s to 2014, it registered an unprecedented increase of approximately
67% between 2008 and 2012 (OECD, 2012). During the downturn, the adjustment of
the Portuguese labour market was achieved more through employment reductions,
which especially a¤ected temporary contracts, than through wage cuts (Martins,
2016). This is mainly due to the fact that rms stopped hiring new employees and
did not renew temporary contracts (Martins, 2016). This phenomenon is particularly
relevant if we bear in mind that almost one fth of total employees are on xed-
term contracts (Figure 1.1) and that this type of contract represented 80% of all new
hires in the Portuguese labour market, between 2011 and 2012 (e.g. OECD, 2014).
Hence, there is a non-negligible share of workers vulnerable to economic shocks and
legislative changes.
Since 1976, when xed-term contracts were rstly regulated in Portugal, import-
ant changes concerning their maximum number of renewals and, consequently, their
maximum legal duration were implemented; the circumstances in which rms can
hire workers on this type of contract and the severance payments due in case of
dismissal were also altered (Ribeiro, 2012; de Campos, 2013). We summarize the
main changes in EPL on xed-term contracts in Table 1.1.
Although we cannot assume any causal e¤ect between legislative changes and
the proportion of xed-term contracts from the simple observation of Figure 1.1,
the latter seems to react with some lag to the changes in legislation described in
Table 1.1. After the 1989 change in legislation that restricted the situations in which
a worker could be hired under a xed-term contract, the proportion of xed-term
employees sharply decreased and only started to recover in mid 1990s. Since then,
we observe an increasing trend, disrupted since the 2008-9 downturn, as discussed
above.
3
Figure 11: Proportion of xed-term contracts in the Portuguese
labour market and EPL reforms
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Source: Pordata (extracted on 31/05/2016) and Ribeiro (2012). Note: The vertical lines indicate changes in EPL (see Table 1.1)
According to Table 1.1, the maximum duration of the contract and number of
renewals have been subject to at least four changes: in 20047, 2009, 2012 and 2013.
From all of these legislative changes only that of 2009 intended to restrict the use
of xed-term contracts. Therefore, studying the e¤ects of reforms increasing the
maximum duration of xed-term contracts is of special relevance to inform policy
makers about their practical e¤ects and contribute to the design of e¤ective labour
market policies.
For the above reasons, all the Chapters of this thesis focus on the Portuguese
labour market and have as common thread to provide a complementary analysis of
the e¤ects of the 2004 change in legislation that extended the maximum duration of
xed-term contracts from three to six years. We focus in this change in legislation
instead of the more recent ones not only because it was the one that most increased
the maximum duration of the contract but also due to data availability constraints.
We study the e¤ects of the 2004 legislative change on four central labour market
7Although the extension of the contract was included in the 2003 Labour Code, it was only
actually implemented on August 2004.
4
variables: the probability of conversion of xed-term contracts, the wage growth
experienced by xed-term workers, job ows by type of contract and the ratio of
permanent wages to xed-term wages at the rm level. For that purpose, we use a
rich database on the Portuguese labour market - Quadros de Pessoal - for the period
between 2002 and 2011.
The present thesis lls a few gaps in this strand of literature. Firstly, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the rst comprehensive study of the e¤ects of this type of
legislative change in Portugal. Secondly, not enough attention has been given so far
to the fact that workers and rms may be heterogeneously a¤ected by the promotion
of exibility at the margin depending on the main use assigned to the xed-term
contract. We address this concern by allowing the e¤ects of the legislative change
to di¤er between xed-term workers with converted and non-converted contracts
and between rms with di¤erent wage policies regarding xed-term contracts. This
calls attention to the need to be careful when extrapolating some of the conclusions
reached in studies for countries with di¤erent institutional characteristics.
In the remainder of this Chapter, we describe the way in which the thesis is
organised and briey present the motivation for each of the three essays that compose
the thesis.
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Structure and Main Goals of the Thesis
This thesis comprises three essays, each corresponding to one Chapter8. Chapter
2, entitled "Asymmetric labour market reforms and wage growth with xed-term
contracts: does match quality matter?"9 addresses the impact of the legislative
change on the wage growth experienced by workers on xed-term contracts. We
start by arguing that, since xed-term contracts can play di¤erent roles in the labour
market - they can be used as screening devices and as bu¤er stocks for permanent
contracts - the e¤ects on their wage growth should be heterogeneous depending on
match quality. As argued by Jovanovic (1979), a worker-rmmatch is an "experience
good", whose quality is only observed a posteriori. Fixed-term contracts may be
considered an extension of the probationary period used to evaluate the quality
of the match, which would be reected in the conversion of the contract into an
open-ended contract. We, therefore, test three hypothesis: i) whether extending
the maximum duration of the contract inuences the wage growth of xed-term
contracts; ii) whether converted xed-term contracts are rewarded with higher wage
growth, and iii) whether the extension of the contract penalizes more non-converted
matches than good matches converted to an open-ended contract. In order to
put these three hypothesis to test, we estimate an endogenous switching regression
model, which allows us to study the wage growth of converted and non-converted
xed-term contracts separately, while correcting for the propension of the contract
to be converted. In the second part of the analysis, we study the sources of the wage
growth di¤erential between both groups using a threefold decomposition, which
allows us to estimate how this di¤erential was a¤ected in the period in which the
change in legislation was in force. This essay is, to the best of our knowledge, the
rst empirical study of the e¤ects of this type of employment protection reform
on the wage growth di¤erential between converted and non-converted xed-term
contracts. It contributes to the literature by presenting evidence that supports that
8Given this organisation choice and the fact that each chapters analyses di¤erent e¤ects of the
same change in legislation, there are a few repetitions throughout the Chapters.
9This Chapter is published as a Working Paper entitled: "Asymmetric labour market reforms
and wage growth with xed-term contracts: does learning about match quality matter?", Working
Paper 15-04, Business Research Unit, ISCTE-IUL (co-authors L.F. Martins and H. Lopes).
This article was also submitted for publication on 30 June 2015 and is currently under revision.
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if xed-term contracts are used to assess the quality of the match, the e¤ects of
asymmetric employment protection reforms may be heterogeneous among workers
on this type of contract.
We then turn to the study of how the change in legislation a¤ected job ows by
type of contract. In Chapter 3 - "Job Flows and Flexibility at the Margin" - we
introduce a novel index of exibility at the margin, built following Alexandre et al.s
(2010) methodology, and estimate a panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. This
study contributes to understanding the employment adjustment process that results
from the promotion of exibility at the margin by considering the e¤ects of the latter
on job ows by type of contract. Moreover, since we adopt a disaggregated unit of
observation - resulting from the crossing of rmssectors of activity, rms region and
rms size and age classes - we are able to capture rms heterogeneity, which has a
relevant contribution to job ows dynamics (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999). Finally,
by introducing the index of exibility at the margin, composed by the proportion of
xed-term contracts, the share of non-converted contracts and the average tenure
of workers on xed-term contracts, we are able to test the exogeneity of the index
of exibility at the margin and draw conclusions about not only how employment
dynamics are a¤ected but also whether and how they a¤ect changes in EPL.
In Chapter 4, entitled "Wage inequality between permanent and xed-term con-
tracts: a rm-level analysis", we study how the within-rm relative wage between
permanent and xed-term contracts is a¤ected during the period in which the xed-
term contract was allowed to be extended. Although the wage gap between xed-
term and open-ended contracts has been widely studied in the literature, we do not
know much about the determinants of the relative wage at the rm level and how
the latter is a¤ected by the legislation extending the use of xed-term contracts.
This is mainly due to the lack of data on the average wage by type of contract at
the rm level. We take advantage of a rich dataset and address this topic. However,
since the within-rm wage gap may also reect the way in which rms use xed-term
contracts, rms with larger wage di¤erentials between both types of contract may
react di¤erently to the legislative change under study when compared to rms that
do not pay wage premiums to open-ended contracts. Because of that, we estimate
10
a quantile regression with nonadditive xed e¤ects (Powell, 2016), to infer about
the impact of the change in legislation on the conditional distribution of the wage
ratio of permanent to xed-term workers at the rm level. Finally, in an attempt to
understand the importance that xed-term contracts may have in the employment
reallocation from the non-tradable to the tradable sector, we assess whether the
e¤ect of the change in legislation on the relative wage is homogeneous across rms
in both sectors.
The general conclusions are discussed in Chapter 5, where we also present the
main policy recommendations arising from the results of the empirical analysis con-
ducted in the three essays.
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Chapter 2
Asymmetric labour market reforms and
wage growth with xed-term contracts:
does match quality matter?
2.1 Introduction
The productivity of a worker in a given rm depends on the quality of their match,
which is learned over time by both parties (Jovanovic, 1979). The cost and the
facility with which unproductive matches are terminated depend on the strictness
of some labour market institutions, such as the EPL.
In recent years, EPL was reformed in some European countries in order to in-
troduce some exibility in the labour market mainly at the margin by relaxing the
restrictions on the use of xed-term contracts instead of reducing the protection
of open-ended contracts (Kahn, 2010; Boeri, 2011). Prior evidence indicates that
xed-term contracts tend to bear the adjustment cost of legislation that widens the
employment protection gap between open-ended and xed-term contracts due to
employment and wage levels. Namely, xed-term contracts become less likely to be
converted into permanent (Boeri, 2011; Centeno and Novo, 2012) and these workers
may su¤er a wage penalty resulting either from reforms that increase the protec-
tion of open-ended contracts (Centeno and Novo, 2014) or reforms that reduce the
restrictions on the use of xed-term contracts (Pérez et al., 2016).
Notwithstanding, previous contributions have neglected the fact that xed-term
contracts can play di¤erent roles in the labour market and, therefore, asymmetric
employment protection reforms may have a heterogeneous impact. Following Jovan-
ovic (1979), who classies a worker-rm match as an "experience good", xed-term
contracts may play a crucial role by allowing rms to experiment di¤erent matches
12
before o¤ering a permanent contract. Thus, if xed-term contracts are used to ex-
tend the probationary period, their conversion into permanent contracts and the
subsequent wage growth should reect the performance of the match (Wang and
Weiss, 1998; Loh, 1994). Good matches, i.e., matches that go from a xed-term
contract to an open-ended contract should be compensated through higher wage
growth. They should also su¤er less from the adverse impacts of reforms that widen
the employment protection gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts.
This article aims to provide further evidence of the impact of these institutional
reforms by studying how they a¤ect wage growth experienced by workers on xed-
term contracts given the learning process about match quality such contracts permit.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical study on the sources of the
wage growth di¤erential between non-converted and converted xed-term contracts
and how it is a¤ected by employment protection reforms that facilitate the use of
xed-term contracts. We focus on the change in the Portuguese EPL in 2004 that
was subsequently overturned in 2009. This reform contributed to widening the pro-
tection gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts by easing the restrictions
on xed-term contracts. More specically, it introduced a third possible renewal of
xed-term contracts up to a maximum legal duration of 6 years and extended the
conditions in which a xed-term worker could be hired.
In order to test the abovementioned hypotheses, we use exceptionally rich Por-
tuguese linked employer-employee data for the period 2003 to 2009 and estimate
an endogenous switching regression model, similarly to Loh (1994) and Amuedo-
Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2007). This has the advantage of taking into account
the possible selection bias arising from the fact that both the conversion and the
wage growth of xed-term contracts are simultaneously determined and a¤ected by
the learning process. Firstly, we test the signicance and estimate the impact of
the change in legislation on a proxy of match quality: the probability of conver-
sion of xed-term contracts into open-ended contracts. Secondly, we assess whether
the change in legislation has a di¤erent impact on wage growth experienced by
good matches, i.e., converted xed-term contracts and non-converted xed-term
contracts. Thirdly, we study the sources of the wage growth di¤erential between
13
those two groups using a threefold decomposition and evaluate how it is a¤ected by
the change in legislation.
Our results show that there is a statistically signicant increase in the wage
growth associated with the conversion of a xed-term contract into a more stable
employment relationship. Although the results suggest that match quality is negat-
ively a¤ected by employment protection reforms that ease the regulations on xed-
term contracts, the wage growth of good matches is less penalised by the change in
legislation (-0.16 pp.) than that of non-converted xed-term contracts (-0.55 pp.).
We estimate that the implementation of this type of reform contributes to increase
the wage growth di¤erential between workers who remain on a temporary contract
and those who receive an open-ended contract (15%). We argue that policy makers
should tackle labour market segmentation given that asymmetric employment pro-
tection reforms that facilitate the use of xed-term contracts may generate potential
ine¢ ciencies, such as the postponement of the conversion of the contract and the
weakening of the link between this conversion and wage growth.
The next section characterises the Portuguese EPL and describes the change
under analysis. Section 2.3 reviews some of the most relevant literature on the
role of xed-term contracts and briey discusses the measurement of match quality.
Section 2.4 presents the empirical approach and the dataset and Section 2.5 presents
the main results obtained. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Portuguese Employment Protection Legislation
The Portuguese labour market is characterised by stringent EPL on regular contracts
and by one of the largest employment protection gaps between temporary and open-
ended contracts.
Fixed-term contracts were regulated in 1976 in the Portuguese labour market
and their maximum legal duration was set at three years. In 1989 the situations
in which a worker could be hired under a xed-term contract were clearly dened
and it was established that xed-term contracts could only be renewed twice before
reaching their maximum duration. This law also entitled the worker to receive a
severance payment equal to two days for each month of work when the xed-term
14
contract ends without conversion in a permanent contract1.
Between 2003 and 2009, Portugal was the OECD country that most relaxed EPL
(Venn, 2009). During this period, the main reform aimed to promote a more exible
labour market by easing the regulations on temporary contracts; meanwhile, the
legislation on open-ended contracts was subject to little change. We examine the
e¤ect of the change to the legislation between 2004 and 2008 whereby the maximum
duration and the situations in which xed-term contracts could be used were exten-
ded. More specically, the law introduced three changes: the possibility to renew
the contract up to three times instead of just twice before reaching the maximum
legal duration; the extension of the contracts maximum legal duration from three
to six years; and the possibility to hire a worker on a xed-term contract to satisfy
temporary requirements at the rm level and notably to indirectly substitute an
employee. The 2004 legislation also made it mandatory for rms to provide training
for workers on xed-term contracts of more than six months so as to bring their
working conditions more in line with those on open-ended contracts. In 2009, the
maximum legal duration of xed-term contracts was restored to three years.
According to Eurostat, the proportion of temporary contracts in the total em-
ployment more than doubled between 1995 and 2009, reaching 22% in 2009. Given
the growing representativeness of temporary contracts and the recurrent use of such
changes in legislation on the Portuguese labour market, the impact of asymmetric
employment protection reforms and, especially, how they a¤ect workers on xed-
term contracts are major and current policy concerns.
2.3 Learning about Match Quality in Two-tier Systems
2.3.1 The Role of Fixed-term Contracts in Two-tier Systems
There is no consensus in the literature on the role of xed-term contracts in the
labour market. According to the segmented labour market theory, the labour market
1In 2004, the severance payment was equal to three days for each month of work for contracts
with less than 6 months of duration and to two days for each month of work for contracts with more
than six months of duration; this is not very di¤erent from the requirements in open-ended contracts
i.e. 30 days per year of seniority. Nevertheless, for open-ended contracts, the administrative costs
associated with a dismissal are signicantly higher as discussed by Centeno and Novo (2014).
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is composed of two segments characterised by distinct wage-setting behaviours and
di¤erent non-pecuniary conditions. The primary segment o¤ers higher wages, better
working conditions and career progress and as Dickens and Lang (1985) highlight,
tends to o¤er positive returns to schooling and experience, while the wage equation
associated with the secondary segment is at. Most xed-term contracts are found in
this secondary segment and su¤er a non-negligible wage penalty relatively to open-
ended contracts, for e.g. in France (Blanchard and Landier, 2002), Germany (Pfeifer,
2012; Hagen, 2002), Britain (Booth et al., 2002), Spain (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993)
and Great Britain, Germany, France, Sweden and Portugal (Brown and Sessions,
2005). Similarly, using a French database of young workers, Blanchard and Landier
(2002) warn that xed-term contracts lead to high turnover rates even when good
matches are formed as rms want to avoid the high ring costs associated with
permanent contracts. Hence, workers on xed-term contracts face a greater risk
of becoming unemployed (McGinnity and Mertens, 2002) and being trapped in a
chain of temporary contracts, as reported by Hagen (2002) for Germany and Gash
and McGinnity (2007) for French female workers. Specically, it is more di¢ cult for
women, youngsters and males with lower levels of education to escape from successive
temporary jobs, since they are less likely to be promoted to permanent contracts
(Alba-Ramírez, 1998). Fixed-term workers are therefore less likely to participate in
training activities (Booth et al., 2002; Arulampalam et al., 2004).
As Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) predict, the introduction of temporary con-
tracts may also make employment respond more to macroeconomic shocks. In other
words, temporary workers can be used as a bu¤er stock that allows rms to respond
to shocks more easily and at a lower cost by adjusting the employment level, espe-
cially downwards (Varejão and Portugal, 2007). This evidence is also supported by
Boockmann and Hagen (2001) who argue that the probability of hiring on xed-term
contracts increases with positive uctuations in product demand, measured by rm
turnover, and with the level of employment protection of open-ended contracts.
Another strand of the literature explaining the role of xed-term contracts rests
on the screening hypothesis. Due to the existence of imperfect information, worker-
rm matches are experience goods(Jovanovic, 1979) and xed-term contracts may
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be used to assess the quality of the match before o¤ering a permanent contract.
Hence, xed-term contracts may play a very important role by extending the pro-
bationary period and allowing rms to screen workers at a lower cost. This is
documented by the high probability of xed-term contracts to be converted into
open-ended contracts reported for some countries, e.g. in France, one third of short-
term contracts are converted at their maximum legal duration (Abowd et al., 1999),
and in West Germany, nearly 40% of temporary contracts are converted within one
year and most of them with the same employer (McGinnity and Mertens, 2002).
The use of xed-term contracts as screening devices helps explain the heterogen-
eity of the pecuniary penalty associated with this type of contract and the catch-up
with their permanent counterparts both in terms of wages and job stability as re-
ported in the literature. Boockmann and Hagen (2008) nd that the survival rate of
German xed-term contracts converges with that of open-ended contracts, although
a match initiated with a xed-term contract terminates more often in the two rst
years. Some authors using German data also argue that while the highest share of
xed-term contracts is found in the lower quartile of the wage distribution (Mertens
and McGinnity, 2003)2, the wage penalty of xed-term contracts decreases as we
move into higher quantiles (Mertens and McGinnity, 2003; Pfeifer, 2012; Mertens
et al., 2007) and it is larger for matches lasting up to two years (Pfeifer, 2012);
this supports the idea that there is a group of xed-term contracts that faces a less
severe pecuniary penalty. In line with Loh (1994) and Wang and Weiss (1998), if
xed-term contracts are used as screening devices, their wage may converge to the
level of permanent contracts when converted and, therefore, they will experience
higher wage growth (Sicilian, 1995). Accordingly, some authors such as McGin-
nity and Mertens (2002), for Germany, and Ruiz and Gomez (2009) and Amuedo-
Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2007), for Spain, nd evidence that workers with
xed-term contracts experience higher wage growth than workers with open-ended
contracts, especially those lasting more than one year and staying in the same job
(Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial, 2007) and those receiving an open-ended
contract (Ruiz and Gomez, 2009). This steeper wage growth path is generally
2Note that the results in Mertens and McGinnity (2003) refer to West Germany only.
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more marked in the case of female workers, whose wage penalty seems to be fully
reversed due to the learning e¤ect, measured by the accumulation of experience
(Pavlopoulos, 2013), whereas males seem to su¤er a more persistent wage pen-
alty (Pavlopoulos, 2013; Booth et al., 2002). For example, Gash and McGinnity
(2007) use a matching methodology to support this conclusion by showing that,
unlike men, women on xed-term contracts in West Germany experience higher
wage growth than those on permanent contracts in the two years after being hired.
Finally, Mertens and McGinnity (2003) argue that although only xed-term con-
tracts in the highest wage growth quartiles have a wage growth premium relatively
to their permanent counterparts; xed-term contracts in the lowest quartiles of the
wage distribution are more likely to experience high wage growth.
As for the Portuguese labour market, there is some evidence indicating that xed-
term contracts are used as screening devices. Varejão and Portugal (2007) argue
that even establishments with a stable employment level tend to hire more, rather
than separate more from workers on temporary contracts, which means that some
matches are continued and converted to permanent contracts. Similarly, Portugal
and Varejão (2005) contend that a signicant proportion of xed-term contracts are
converted into open-ended contracts, although workers on xed-term contracts are
more likely to switch jobs and become unemployed or inactive. In fact, the probab-
ility of conversion is low when the match is formed but tends to increase during the
two rst years of contract (Portugal and Varejão, 2009). The screening hypothesis
is also supported by the fact that workers in longer employment relationships are
less likely to move to another job (Portugal and Varejão, 2005).
Although xed-term contracts can play di¤erent roles in the labour market, they
tend to bear the adjustment cost of reforms that widen the employment protection
gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts. Using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
analysis, Centeno and Novo (2012) nd that the extension of the employment pro-
tection of open-ended contracts to rms with 11 to 20 employees has not only in-
creased the proportion of workers on xed-term contracts but also their churning
at rm level. Consequently, these workers also received lower wages, as reported in
Centeno and Novo (2014). Thus, in a segmented labour market like that of Por-
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tugal, xed-term contracts may be used as a source of both wage and employment
exibility (Centeno and Novo, 2012; Centeno and Novo, 2014).
This paper focus on the impact of legislation reforms that facilitate the use of
xed-term contracts taking into account that this type of contract may be used to
learn about match quality, which measurement is briey discussed in Subsection
2.3.2.
2.3.2 The Measurement of Match Quality
There is robust evidence of a non-negligible impact of match quality on wages
(Hersch and Reagan, 1990) and wage growth (Yamaguchi, 2010).
However, match quality contains various dimensions and can therefore be meas-
ured by several proxies. The job-search literature predicts that, after a match is
formed, better alternative matches might appear which o¤er a higher wage than the
workers reservation wage. Therefore, the starting wage is a good proxy to measure
match quality, and turnover is the mechanism used to form more e¢ cient matches.
Accordingly, some authors such as Gaure et al. (2012), Centeno and Novo (2006)
and van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) use the starting wage as an a priori measure
of match quality to study the impact of unemployment benets on match quality.
Other authors classify a match as an "experience good", whose true value is
only known a posteriori after experimentation (Jovanovic, 1979). Jovanovics job
matching hypothesis predicts that higher value matches endure and achieve higher
wages while bad matches are terminated. According to this perspective, match
quality can be measured by the duration of the employment relationship and by
the wage growth. More specically, tenure is used as a proxy of match quality by
Centeno (2004) and Centeno and Novo (2006) to study the e¤ects of unemployment
insurance on match quality, by Allgood et al. (2012) to disentangle the impact of the
expected match quality on the CEOs initial compensation and by Yankow (2009)
to study the impact of match quality on job search behaviour in urban areas.
Finally, a few authors (e.g. Ferreira and Taylor, 2011), rely on subjective indic-
ators of match quality based for example on workers satisfaction and the will to
switch jobs.
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Given that the goal of the present analysis is to assess the impact of a change
in the maximum legal duration of xed-term contracts while taking the learning
process about match quality into account, we classify a match as an "experience
good" whose quality is measured ex post. However, tenure is not a suitable measure
for our purposes since it would reect not only the learning about match quality
but also the direct impact of the reform on its upper bound. Therefore, we take
the conversion of xed-term contracts to permanent contracts and the subsequent
wage growth as measures of match quality that reect and incorporate the learning
process.
In the next section, we present the econometric methodology that we nd most
suitable to assess the impact of the change in legislation taking into account the
learning process about match quality.
2.4 Empirical Approach
According to Jovanovic (1979), a match needs to be experienced in order to eval-
uate its quality, which is a trial and error process. Therefore, xed-term contracts
could be an important tool to test di¤erent matches, learn about their quality and
terminate the bad ones easily and at a lower cost.
Workers are matched with rms and they are given xed-term contracts. The
quality of the match is unobserved before the match is experienced:
Zmt = w
0
mt! +
0
t +D
0
t + "mt, m=1,..., M and t=1,...,T. (2.1)
It is assumed that Zmt is a latent continuous random variable representing the
match quality of a certain worker-rm pair m at period t. The total number of
matches equals M and the total number of time periods equals T. As stated in equa-
tion 2.1, the value associated with a certain match m depends on a set of exogenous
variables, wmt, including the workers characteristics (age and its square, tenure,
gender, nationality, education, occupation) and rms characteristics (dimension,
region, sector of activity, share of xed-term contracts3 and capital ownership). t
3We considered the one period lagged value of the share of xed-term contracts, in order to
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includes a set of year dummies to control for time e¤ects and the annual unemploy-
ment rate to control for the business cycle. Since one of the purposes of the analysis
is to evaluate how the change in legislation impacts on match quality, a variable Dt
is also included, which is a regime dummy taking value zero in 2003 and 2009 and
one in the remaining years of the sample in which the law was in force. The impact
of the referred change in legislation is captured by .
Firms can hire a worker using a xed-term contract up to a certain maximum
legal duration, when the contract is automatically converted to permanent if the
match is continued. Over time, both parties (worker and rm) learn about the
value associated with the match and only good matches, i.e., matches yielding a
positive value, are converted to permanent contracts since this type of contract is
associated with higher labour turnover costs:
Pmt = I [Z

mt > 0] . (2.2)
Thus, Pmt is a dummy variable taking value one when the match initiated with
a xed-term contract is converted into permanent between t-1 and t and zero when
the match is continued but is not converted4, which expresses the sign of the latent
match quality. I [:] is an indicator function assuming value one when the argument is
true and zero otherwise. Thus, we assume that a good match is one that started with
a xed-term contract and was converted into a more stable employment relationship.
Nevertheless, non-converted matches cannot be considered bad matches since the
match is continued and the learning process may not yet be complete.
As Sicilian (1995) and Jovanovic (1979) argue, wage growth is a result of the
learning process about match quality. Ceteris paribus, workers in good matches
should experience higher wage growth than workers in low value matches. Accord-
ingly, employment protection reforms could have an asymmetric impact on the wage
growth of converted and non-converted matches. Since the marginal e¤ect of the
explanatory variables and the change in legislation is expected to di¤er, we should
account for endogeneity.
4Since the unit of observation is the worker-rm match and the wage is match specic, we only
considered continuing matches in order to conne the study to the wage growth on the job rather
than the wage growth resulting from job mobility.
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distinguish between the wage growth of converted and non-converted matches:
Wgt = x
0
gtg +
0
t g +D
0
tg + vgt if Pmt = 1 (2.3)
Wbt = x
0
btb +
0
t b +D
0
tb + vbt if Pmt = 0, (2.4)
where
a good match is represented by g = 1; :::; G and a non-converted match by b = 1; :::B
over t = 1; :::; T periods of time5.
The wage growth experienced by good matches between t-1 and t (Wgt) is ob-
served if the xed-term contract is converted into a permanent contract between
t-1 and t. Otherwise, we observe the wage growth of the matches that remained
with a xed-term contract between t-1 and t (Wbt). Since we intend to study the
di¤erences in the wage growth between these two groups, we introduce a set of in-
dependent variables, xgt and xbt, in order to ascertain the contribution of certain
worker and rm characteristics. We are interested in obtaining the estimates of 
and , representing the marginal impact of each covariate and the impact of the
change in legislation on the wage growth of converted and non-converted matches
respectively.
In such a scenario, where the sample is not random, using the standard OLS
estimation would produce inconsistent estimates6. We adopt an endogenous switch-
ing regression model in order to tackle the problem arising from the simultaneous
decision to convert the contract and the setting of the wage level and, thus, the non-
random sampling, and consistently estimate the impact of the explanatory variables
and the change in legislation. This type of model is an extension of the Heckman
selection model (Heckman, 1979) in which both regimes are observable. Thus, as-
suming that the error term of the selection equation ("mt) is drawn from a standard
5Note that the total number of converted (G) and non-converted (B) matches corresponds to
the whole sample dimension (M).
6E(WgtjPmt = 1; xgt;t; Dt) 6= x0gtg+
0
tg+D
0
tg and E(WbtjPmt = 0; xbt;t; Dt) 6= x0btb+

0
t b +D
0
tb since E(vgtjPmt = 1; xgt;t; Dt) 6= 0 and E(vbtjPmt = 0; xbt;t; Dt) 6= 0:
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normal distribution N(0; 1), while vgt and vbt follow a normal distribution N(0; 2g)
and N(0; 2b) respectively, and that the switch is endogenous, i.e. vgt and "mt and vbt
and "mt are signicantly correlated, we follow the two-step procedure described by
Maddala (1986, pp.223-228) in order to estimate the wage growth of both conver-
ted and non-converted matches7. The identication of the model is made not only
through the assumption of joint normality but also by the exclusion of some covari-
ates included in wmt; from xgt and xbt. Specically, we exclude two dummy variables
accounting for less than 9 years of schooling, one dummy variable accounting for the
activity sector of electricity production and distribution, and one dummy variable
accounting for rm size of more than 401 employees. Thus, it is assumed that
these variables only signicantly a¤ect the probability of conversion of xed-term
contracts and not the subsequent wage growth path8.
As such, in the rst step, equation 2.2 is estimated through maximum likelihood
as a pooled9 Probit regression in order to obtain the parameter estimates and com-
pute the estimated inverse mills ratio. In the second step, a pooled generalised least
square (GLS) estimator is used to estimate equations 2.5 and 2.6:
Wgt = x
0
gtg +
0
t g +D
0
tg + gg"
(w
0
mtb! +0tb +D0tb)
(w
0
mtb! +0tb +D0tb) + ugt if Pmt = 1 (2.5)
Wbt = x
0
btb+
0
t b+D
0
tb bb"
(w
0
mtb! +0tb +D0tb)
(1  (w0mtb! +0tb +D0tb))+ubt if Pmt = 0, (2.6)
where  and  represent the standard normal density function and the standard
normal cumulative distribution function. (w
0
mtb!+0tb+D0tb)
(w
0
mtb!+0tb+D0tb) is the inverse mills ratio in
the cases in which Pmt = 1 and
 (w0mtb!+0tb+D0tb)
(1 (w0mtb!+0tb+D0tb)) for Pmt = 0. g" stands for the
7Although maximum likelihood is a more e¢ cient estimation method, it may be computationally
burdensome (Maddala, 1986, p.224) and the two-step estimation is a valid alternative.
8These exclusions are based on the estimation of the wage growth regression for the whole
sample of xed-term contracts (results available upon request).
9The model does not include unobserved match-specic heterogeneity since most variables have
a lower within-variation than between-variation. In fact, converted matches appear only once in
the database and approximately 64% of non-converted matches appear only twice in the sample.
On average, each match is observed 1.7 times in the sample.
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correlation coe¢ cient between vgt and "mt and b" for the correlation between vbt and
"mt. ugt and ubt are the disturbances with zero mean of the wage growth regression of
converted and non-converted matches, respectively. Since we have unbalanced panel
data, each match may be observed more than once and, as such, the hypothesis of
independence across observations does not hold. Therefore, the variance-covariance
matrix of the estimators is estimated taking into account the possible correlation of
the error terms within matches by clustering observations at the match level, which
simultaneously accounts for the existence of heteroskedasticity.
Given that the independent and dependent variables are always observed, if the
match is either converted or not, and that some matches belong to both groups over
the time period considered (18,5%), there may be e¢ ciency gains accruing from the
joint estimation of both wage growth regressions Maddala (1986, p.227). For this
reason we estimate the following regression:
Wmt = x
0
gtg +
0
gt g +D
0
gtg + gg"
(w
0
gtb! +0gtb +D0gtb)
(w
0
gtb! +0gtb +D0gtb) + (2.7)
x0btb +
0
bt b +D
0
btb   bb"
(w
0
btb! +0btb +D0btb)
(1  (w0btb! +0btb +D0btb)) + umt;
in which Wmt is the wage growth of xed-term matches. All variables indexed by
g assume their real values if the match was converted and are replaced by zero
otherwise and the variables indexed by b assume their real values if the match was
not converted and are replaced by zero otherwise. umt is the error term with zero
mean.
The main parameters of interest are gg", bb", g and b. As previously
stated, good matches are expected to be associated with a steeper wage growth.
Thus, the switch is expected to be endogenous, i.e. the conversion of the xed-term
contract and the subsequent wage growth should be statistically correlated. It is also
expected that good matches are less penalised by reforms that widen the employment
protection gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts if a learning process
about match quality is in motion. In short, according to the hypothesis under
analysis, it is expected that g" 6= 0; b" 6= 0 and g > b; g; b < 0.
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2.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal
The analysis is based on Quadros de Pessoal, a Portuguese linked employer-employee
database collected every year in October by the Ministry of Employment. Quadros
de Pessoal is an exceptionally rich database suitable for develop the proposed ana-
lysis for several reasons. Firstly, it has a broad coverage and representativeness of the
population since it is mandatory for all private rms with at least one wage-earner to
provide information about the rm and all their employees. Secondly, given that the
information is reported by the rm and is publicly available the measurement error
of some variables (such as wages) is minimized. Thirdly, we can follow rms and
workers over the years and easily identify the employer-employee matches, which
are both assigned with a unique identication code.
This unique labour market database contains very detailed information on the
worker, such as gender, age, tenure, education, skills, nationality, occupation, wages
(base wage, overtime pay, regular and irregular benets) and hours worked. Inform-
ation about the contract type has been available since 2002. Firms are characterised
in terms of their location, dimension, main economic activity, age and turnover.
The unit of observation is dened as the worker-rm match, observed from 2003
until 200910. After correcting the time inconsistency in some variables such as edu-
cation and gender (Cardoso, 2004), the data was ltered according to the following
criteria (e.g. Cardoso et al., 2012). We only considered full-time workers with an
open-ended or a xed-term contract, aged between 18 and 65 years old, who earn
more than 80% of the legal minimum wage each year11 and less than 100.000 euros
(at 2009 prices) and work less than 400 hours per month. Moreover, we excluded
individuals employed in agriculture or shery, rms operating abroad and Interna-
tional Organisations.
From this sample of workers, we restrict the analysis to all matches holding a
10We only considered data up to 2009 to avoid capturing the impact of the economic and nancial
crisis.
11This boundary corresponds to the minimum wage allowed for apprentices.
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xed-term contract in a certain year t-1 that were continued in t and either remained
on a xed-term contract or were converted into an open-ended contract. As a
double check, we only considered xed-term contracts with tenure at time t-112
lower than three years in 2003 and six years in the remaining years, in accordance
with the legislation in force13. Finally, observations below the 2nd and above the
99th percentile of the wage growth distribution were excluded. After the exclusion
of the missing data on relevant variables, we end up with an unbalanced panel of
702,242 di¤erent matches observed over a 7-year period, which corresponds to a
total of 1,174,269 observations.
The workers real wage is computed on an hourly basis and corresponds to the
sum of the monthly base wage, regular benets and overtime pay divided by the
total hours worked (normal and overtime). The wage growth was calculated as the
subtraction of the logarithms of real hourly wage over two consecutive years and is
measured as a percentage. Real variables were computed using the Consumer Price
Index (2012=100) and the business cycle is accounted for by the introduction of the
annual unemployment rate reported by Instituto Nacional de Estatística. A brief
description of the remaining variables is presented in Appendix A.
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table B.1 reports some summary statistics of the sample. Between 2003 and 2009, an
average of 22.8% of xed-term contracts were converted into open-ended contracts.
In the sample of xed-term contracts, the average age of workers is 34 years,
45% are females and almost 8% are immigrants, although there is a higher share
of non-native workers among non-converted xed-term contracts. Workers on con-
verted contracts are, on average, better educated than workers with non-converted
xed-term contracts. The former are also less concentrated in unqualied occupa-
tions (11%) than the latter group of workers (14%). The larger share of xed-term
contracts is observed in the services sector and in rms located in Lisbon and in the
12Note that rms report information annually in October. Thus, for the purposes of accuracy
the exclusion is made using lagged tenure.
13While the 2004 change in legislation applies to all xed-term contracts, the change introduced
in 2009 only applies to newly created xed-term contracts.
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North region. Non-converted xed-term contracts are found more in activity sec-
tors and regions strongly a¤ected by seasonality, such as construction and Algarve.
It can be seen that more than 60% of workers on converted xed-term contracts
were converted in the two rst years of tenure, while almost 50% of workers with
non-converted xed-term contracts have only one year of tenure. Although most
xed-term contracts are concentrated in rms with less than 100 employees, conver-
ted contracts are more represented in larger rms, notably in rms with more than
400 employees. Finally, on average, workers with converted xed-term contracts
receive higher raw hourly wages and experience higher wage growth, although there
is not a signicant di¤erence in the supply of overtime hours between both types of
contract.
Similarly to Mertens and McGinnity (2003), we compare the wage and the wage
growth distributions of xed-term contracts with the distributions in a sample of
open-ended contracts. In line with their ndings, although a greater proportion of
xed-term contracts is found in the lowest deciles of the wage distribution (Table
B.2), they are also over-represented in both the lowest and the highest wage growth
deciles, with nearly 25% of xed-term contracts concentrated in the two highest
wage growth deciles vs. 19% of open-ended contracts (Table B.2).
This preliminary evidence may indicate that an underlying learning process
about match quality is associated with xed-term contracts, which may be expressed
by their conversion into open-ended contracts and their wage growth pattern. Figure
21 shows that the wage growth of converted xed-term contracts is always higher
than that of non-converted xed-term contracts from 2003 until 2009, but the gap
between them increased from 2005 until 2008, i.e. the period the change in the
legislation was in force.
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Figure 21: Hourly wage growth of converted and non-converted
xed-term contracts
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2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Determinants of the Conversion of Fixed-term to Open-ended
Contracts
In line with Boeri (2011) and Dolado et al. (2012), the results in Table 2.1 show that
the change in Portuguese EPL that relaxed the regulations on xed-term contracts
had a negative and statistically signicant impact, at a 99% condence level, on
the probability of a xed-term contract being converted into an open-ended con-
tract. In the years in which the change in legislation was in force, the probability of
conversion was 3 percentage points lower (average marginal e¤ect), ceteris paribus.
Female xed-term workers seem to be slightly more penalised by this type of reform
than males, since the probability of conversion between 2004 and 2008 was 3.2 pp.
lower for females and only 2.9 pp. lower for males (Table 2.1, columns (5) and
(4), respectively). The results in Figure 2.2, based on the estimates in Table 2.1,
column (2), indicate that this negative e¤ect can be partly explained by the fact
that the conversion of the contract during this period may have been postponed,
especially at the end of the third year of the contract (-5.8 pp.). In fact, when the
interaction between tenure dummies and the legislation dummy is considered, the
average marginal e¤ect of the change in legislation on the probability of conversion
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is negative and statistically signicant at a 5% signicance level14 in the rst four
years of contract.
Figure 22: Average marginal e¤ect of the change in legislation at
years of tenure
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Tenure has a statistically signicant and an inverse U-shaped impact on the
probability of transition to an open-ended contract, increasing up to three years and
decreasing thereafter; this is consistent with the evidence reported by Portugal and
Varejão (2005) for Portugal and Güell and Petrongolo (2007) for Spain. This may
indicate that, on average, the rst years are crucial for rms and workers to assess
the quality of the match.
As Bowlus (1995) argues, match quality is signicantly a¤ected by the business
cycle and its behaviour depends on two opposite e¤ects. During recessions, the
increasing number of unemployed workers available to ll fewer job vacancies (con-
gestion e¤ect) negatively a¤ects match quality despite the larger pool of available
workers for rms to screen (agglomeration e¤ect). Similarly to Bowlus (1995), we
nd evidence of a procyclical behaviour of match quality, proxied by the probability
14Standard error of all marginal e¤ects are available upon request.
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of conversion. Fixed-term matches are less likely to be converted in periods of higher
unemployment rates and the probability of conversion decreases by 2.1 pp. if the un-
employment rate increases by 1 pp. (Table 2.1, column (1)), which may be explained
by the rmsneed for some downwards exibility and to avoid high ring costs at
times of economic distress, which is consistent with Varejão and Portugals (2007)
ndings. Moreover, as Güell and Petrongolo (2007) predict, when unemployment
increases, rms are less willing to convert xed-contracts into open-ended contracts
since workers are less likely to quit due to the worsening of outside opportunities.
Considering that policy makers tend to implement this type of reform when
unemployment is rising (Saint-Paul, 1996), they may exacerbate the business cycles
negative impact on the probability of converting the contract. This is supported by
the results presented in column (3) of Table 2.1, where the coe¢ cient associated with
the interaction term between the regime dummy reecting the change in legislation
and the current unemployment rate (leg x unemrate) is negative and statistically
signicant. Thus, in the years in which the legislation that widened the employment
protection gap between open-ended and xed-term contracts was in force, there was
an increase in the adverse marginal e¤ect of the current unemployment rate on the
probability of conversion (from -2.2 pp. to -3.4 pp.)15. Although the direct impact of
the change in legislation is positive and statistically signicant at a 1% signicance
level when this interaction is considered, its overall marginal e¤ect is still negative
and statistically signicant (-3.2 pp.).
Regarding workerscharacteristics, the contracts of younger16, male and more
educated workers are more likely to be converted to permanent contracts. For
example, workers with a university degree are 7.1 pp. more likely to have a contract
converted into a more stable employment relationship than a worker with less than
four years of schooling, ceteris paribus. There is also some evidence of discrimination
against immigrant workers, especially in the case of male workers (on average, male
immigrant workers are 3.1 pp. less likely to receive an open-ended contract, ceteris
paribus).
15This result is robust to the use of alternative measures of business cycle, such as the unem-
ployment rate at the start of the match.
16The average marginal e¤ect of age is statistically signicant at standard signicance levels.
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There is a greater tendency for xed-term workers in management and sales
occupations to be given an open-ended contract than workers performing unskilled
tasks. This result was expected as xed-term contracts are probably used less as
a screening device for occupations requiring lower skill levels due to cost (Sicilian,
1995). Workers with xed-term contracts matched either with smaller rms or rms
with a larger percentage of xed-term contracts have a slightly smaller probability
of being given an open-ended contract. In fact, rms with a higher number of xed-
term contracts would be expected to have a greater need for exibility and, thus, be
less willing to change a xed-term contract to a permanent one.
In Subsection 2.5.2 we distinguish between the wage growth of converted and
non-converted xed-term contracts and assess the impact of the change in legislation
for both groups.
2.5.2 Wage growth of Converted and Non-converted Fixed-term Con-
tracts
Assuming that rms and workers are not able to identify the true value of the
match ex-ante, it is plausible that some matches start with xed-term contracts
and at a low wage level. However, as (Sicilian, 1995) argues, wage growth should
reect updated expectations of match quality. Therefore, while bad matches are
terminated or remain with temporary contracts, good matches initiated with xed-
term contracts should experience higher wage growth and become a more stable
employment relationship.
From the estimated coe¢ cients associated with the inverse mills ratio (Table 2.2,
column (1)) we can conclude that the error term of the selection equation and the
error term of the wage growth regression for converted xed-term contracts are posit-
ively and signicantly correlated at a 99% condence level, which supports the need
to correct for the sample selection bias. Accordingly, unobserved factors increase the
likelihood of a xed-term contract being converted into an open-ended contract and
lead to an above average wage growth. These results are in line with Sicilian (1995)
and Lohs (1994) predictions, since there seems to be a non-negligible increase in
wage growth associated with the conversion to a permanent contract that we estim-
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ate to be equal to approximately 1.3 pp.17. Nevertheless, we nd that workers on
non-converted xed-term contracts do not experience either a signicantly lower or
a higher wage growth than a random xed-term worker would. It seems that the
wage is only renegotiated when the contract is converted, which may be the result
of the higher bargaining power gained on the conversion of the contract when the
worker starts beneting from higher employment protection levels. These results
may also reect the learning process about match quality associated with the use of
xed-term contracts or could be the result of the workers integration in the rms
internal labour market.
Similarly to what we observe for the probability of conversion, the change in le-
gislation also has a statistically signicant and negative impact on the wage growth
of xed-term contracts. However, our ndings indicate that not all xed-term con-
tracts are penalised evenly by the change in legislation. Although the change has a
negative impact on the wage growth of both non-converted and converted xed-term
contracts (-0.55 pp. and -0.16 pp., respectively), the e¤ect is statistically signicant
at a 1% signicance level for the former group while only statistically signicant
at a 5% level for converted contracts. Besides there is evidence, at a 1% signic-
ance level, that the penalisation su¤ered by non-converted xed-term contracts was
greater than that of converted xed-term contracts18. The renegotiation of wages
between 2004 and 2008 may have been postponed as it was easier for rms to use
xed-term contracts for a longer period of time. Females in non-converted matches
seem to be more a¤ected by this type of change in legislation since they experience a
signicant decline in wage growth of approximately 0.71 pp. in the years the change
was in force. The negative impact of the change in legislation on the wage growth
of male workers does not seem to di¤er according to match quality19 although it is
only statistically signicant for converted xed-term contracts at a 95% condence
level.
It seems that the change in legislation a¤ects the wage growth path of xed-term
contracts directly and indirectly through the link between contracts conversion and
17Evaluated at the sample mean inverse mills ratio
18The p-value of the Wald test of the equality of coe¢ cients equals 0.0000.
19The p-value of the Wald test of the equality of coe¢ cients equals to 0.2061.
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wage growth (IMR x legislation20, Table 2.3). Specically, in the years the legisla-
tion was in force, this link was weakened for both types of contract, especially for
non-converted xed-term contracts. When this interaction is considered, the direct
impact of the change in legislation on the wage growth of non-converted matches
remains negative and statistically signicant, but for converted xed-term contracts
it becomes positive although not statistically signicant for males. In fact, the in-
direct penalisation of the change in legislation on wage growth is especially relevant
to explain the negative but non-signicant association between the probability of
conversion and the subsequent wage growth observed for females with a converted
contract (Table 2.2, column (3)). In the years the legislation was not in force, fe-
males with converted xed-term contracts experienced a statistically signicant (at
a 10% signicance level) increase in wage growth of approximately 0.78 pp.
The results also indicate that human capital variables have di¤erent returns for
converted and non-converted xed-term contracts (Table 2.2, column (1)). For both
types of match, the returns on education are increasing, but they are always higher
(at a 1% signicance level) for converted xed-term contracts, especially for levels
of higher education. For example, for converted xed-term contracts, a worker with
a university degree experience a 2.4 pp. higher wage growth than a worker with less
than nine years of schooling, while for non-converted matches this increase is only
equal to 1.1 pp., ceteris paribus.
Moreover, as Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial (2007) argue, the duration of
the contract plays an important role in the explanation of the wage growth path and
the evidence gathered shows that the moment at which the contract is converted has
important implications. Workers only experience a signicant higher wage growth
than that at the end of the contract if their contracts are converted in the second or
third year of tenure, while they face a wage growth penalisation of approximately
0.14 pp. in the fourth year of tenure if the contract is not converted.
The e¤ects of workersidiosyncratic characteristics, such as nationality, age and
gender, are not statistically di¤erent in converted and non-converted matches at
20This interaction intends to assess if the link between contracts conversion and wage growth
is di¤erent in the period in which the change in legislation was in force, as suggested in Semykina
and Wooldridge (2010) for example.
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standard signicance levels (Table 2.2). Ceteris paribus, apart from contract con-
version, older workers experience lower wage growth and the rate at which the wage
growth decreases slows with age up to about 53 and 55 years for non-converted and
converted xed-term contracts, respectively. Although native and female workers
with non-converted xed-term contracts experience lower wage growth rates on av-
erage, the wage growth rate of converted xed-term contracts does not seem to be
signicantly a¤ected by gender or nationality.
The highest wage growth rate is experienced by managers when the contract is
converted and by technicians when the contract is not converted. It is also worth not-
ing that machine operators experience lower wage growth than unqualied workers
if the contract is not converted (-0.47 pp.) and they experience neither a statistically
signicant higher or a lower wage growth if the contract is converted; this may be
due to the use of xed-term contracts to screen matches for this occupation which
requires specic training.
Contrary to what is reported for the conversion probability, the wage growth of
xed-term contracts seems to be countercyclical; this can be explained by the fact
that during recessions rms separate from a higher share of less-educated and, thus,
low-wage workers, while maintaining the employment relationship with high-wage
earners.
2.5.3 Wage Growth Di¤erential Between Non-converted and Converted
Fixed-term Contracts
The aim of this subsection is to identify the main sources of the wage growth di¤er-
ential between non-converted and converted xed-term contracts. To that end, we
adopt a threefold decomposition initially proposed by Winsborough and Dickenson
(1971). We start by decomposing the mean wage growth di¤erential (W bt W gt) into
endowment and coe¢ cient e¤ects, and the interaction of both using the estimates
of equations 3 and 4 without correcting for selectivity:
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W bt  W gt = [(xbt   xgt)0bg + (bt   gt)0b g + (Dbt  Dgt)0bg] + (2.8)
[x0gt(bb   bg) + 0gt(b b   b g) +D0gt(bb   bg)] +
[(xbt   xgt)0(bb   bg) + (bt   gt)0(b b   b g) + (Dbt  Dgt)0(bb   bg)] ,
where the rst term in square brackets on the right hand side of the equation is the
endowment e¤ect, i.e., the part of the di¤erential due to di¤erences in the character-
istics between non-converted and converted xed-term matches. The second term
in square brackets is the coe¢ cient e¤ect and corresponds to the part of the di¤er-
ential due to di¤erences in the remuneration of characteristics between both groups.
Finally, the third term corresponds to the interaction between the endowment and
coe¢ cient e¤ects. These e¤ects are computed using converted xed-term contracts
as the reference group. The results of the estimated di¤erential are in Table 2.4.
On average, workers in good matches experience a higher wage growth than
workers on non-converted xed-term contracts, which is in line with our initial pre-
dictions. The observed average wage growth associated with good matches is equal
to 4.02%, while workers with non-converted xed-term contracts experience an av-
erage wage growth of 3.20% between 2003 and 2009. Thus, the mean wage growth
di¤erential between non-converted and converted xed-term contracts is equal to
-0.81 pp., which is statistically signicant at standard signicance levels.
The results show that more than 91% of this di¤erential is due to di¤erences
in the remuneration of characteristics between both types of match. Good worker-
rm matches not only appear to be better rewarded for their characteristics but
also to have better endowments. Both e¤ects and their interaction are statistically
signicant at standard signicance levels.
However, as shown in the previous subsection, it is important to account for the
selectivity bias arising from the correlation between the conversion of the contract
and the subsequent wage growth. To do so we decompose the mean selectivity cor-
rected wage growth di¤erential (equations 5 and 6) by adapting Reimerss (1983)
methodology and estimating the contribution of the selectivity e¤ect equals to:
 bbbb" (w0mtb!+0tb+D0tb)(1 (w0mtb!+0tb+D0tb))   bgbg" (w0mtb!+0tb+D0tb)(w0mtb!+0tb+D0tb) . According to the results in Table
2.4, the selectivity e¤ect is statistically signicant and widens the wage growth di¤er-
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Table 2.4: Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential
Sample E[Wb|p=0] E[Wg|p=1] Di¤erential Endowments Coe¢ cients Interaction Selectivity
Overall 3.203 4.016 -0.813*** -0.247*** -0.742*** 0.175*** no
contribution (%) -30.32% -91.17% 21.49%
legislation 0.000 -0.144*** 0.000*
contribution (%) 0.01% -17.72% 0.05%
Overall 3.203 4.016 -0.813*** -0.418*** 0.255 0.346*** -0.997***
contribution (%) -51.39% 31.38% 42.55% -122.54%
legislation 0.000 -0.121*** 0.000*
contribution (%) 0.02% -14.86% 0.04%
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: Threefo ld decomposition w ith normalized resu lts and converted xed-term contracts
as the reference group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
ential. When this e¤ect is considered, the contribution of the characteristics (endow-
ment e¤ect) to the wage growth di¤erential increases to over 51% and the coe¢ cient
e¤ect no longer contributes signicantly to explaining the wage growth gap. If con-
verted xed-term matches had the characteristics of non-converted matches, they
would experience a decrease of approximately 0.42 pp. in their wage growth rate,
ceteris paribus.
Finally, we focus on the specic contribution of the variable accounting for the
change in legislation to the wage growth di¤erential. As expected, the endowment
e¤ect of the change in legislation does not signicantly contribute to the wage growth
di¤erential since the reform applies to all xed-term contracts. Instead, the change
in legislation contributes to increase the wage growth di¤erential through the coef-
cient e¤ect (D
0
gt(
bb   bg)). We estimate that almost 18% of the gap in the sample
period is attributed to the way both groups were a¤ected by the reform that eased
the regulations on xed-term contracts. This contribution slightly drops to approx-
imately 15% when the selectivity e¤ect is taken into account.
2.5.4 Robustness Analysis
The rst robustness check consists of assessing the sensitivity of the results to dif-
ferent wage denitions and we therefore re-estimate the second stage of the model
and the threefold decomposition using alternative and stricter wage denitions.
In Table B.3, we present results in which overtime pay is excluded and the wage is
dened as the sum of base wages and regular benets. The results seem to be robust
to this alternative wage denition since not only do good matches experience an
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increase in wage growth of approximately 1.2 pp. at the time of conversion but, when
the change in legislation was in force, converted xed-term contracts seem to have
experienced a non-signicant and lower wage growth penalisation (-0.007 pp.) than
non-converted xed-term contracts (-0.47 pp.)21. When the overtime pay component
is excluded from the wage denition, this wage growth penalisation associated with
the increase in the protection gap between the two types of contract is slightly lower,
which may indicate that workers are also penalised by the payment for these hours or
may reduce the amount of overtime hours worked when their employment protection
level decreases. The results of the wage growth decomposition are also robust: the
selectivity e¤ect and the coe¢ cient e¤ect of the change in legislation contribute to
increase the wage growth di¤erential between non-converted and converted xed-
term contracts and are statistically signicant at a 5% and 1% signicance levels,
respectively (Table B.4).
Further, we repeat the analysis considering only the growth of the hourly base
wages (Table B.5). We nd that the results are not robust to this wage denition,
since the wage growth penalty associated with the change in legislation does not seem
to di¤er signicantly between converted and non-converted xed-term contracts22.
However, this stricter wage denition still allows us to conclude that workers in
good matches are rewarded with a higher growth rate of base wages, especially
female workers. We also nd that the selectivity e¤ect and the change in legislation
no longer contribute signicantly to explain the wage growth di¤erential between
both types of matches (Table B.6). This result is not surprising since base wages are
more restricted by institutions such as minimum wage and collective bargaining and,
thus, there is less scope to the e¤ect of the change in legislation to be heterogeneous
according to match quality.
Since the construction sector is strongly inuenced by seasonality and where
the share of non-converted xed-term contracts is higher than that of converted
xed-term contracts, the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of this sector
should also be assessed (Table B.7 and Table B.8). The results were quite similar to
21The p-value of the Wald test of the equality of coe¢ cients is equal to 0.0000.
22The p-value of the Wald test of the equality of coe¢ cients is equal to 0.5580.
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those discussed in Subsection 2.5.2, with the exception that when construction is not
included in the estimation not only do workers experience an increase in wage growth
when the contract is converted (1.56 pp.), but also a wage growth penalisation when
the contract is not converted (-0.26 pp.); both are statistically signicant at a 1%
signicance level. Workers in good matches are signicantly less a¤ected by the
change in legislation than workers with non-converted contracts, although its impact
becomes slightly more negative for both groups. The contribution of the selectivity
e¤ect and the change in legislation to the wage growth di¤erential remains negative
and statistically signicant at standard levels (Table B.9).
The employment protection gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts
increased more in rms with 11 to 20 employees, since the 2004 change in legislation
also increased the employment protection of open-ended contracts for this cohort
(Centeno and Novo (2012) and Centeno and Novo (2014) study the impact of this
change in excess worker turnover and wages, respectively). By excluding these rms
from the sample, we nd that the results discussed in the previous subsections are
robust and not exclusively driven by them (Table B.10, Table B.11 and Table B.12).
Finally, the 2004 Labour Code revision introducing the change in legislation
under study also introduced a penalisation in the social security contribution for
rms that have more than 15% of the total employees on a xed-term contract
with more than four yearsduration. After converting the contract to a permanent
one, the rm can benet from a reduction in the social security contribution. Since
rms with a higher proportion of these contracts may also have had an incentive to
convert them, in Table B.13, we present the results of the Probit model estimation
considering the interaction between the one period lagged value of the proportion of
xed-term contracts and the legislation dummy. In rms with a higher proportion of
xed-term contracts, the probability of converting the contract was less penalised by
the legislation that facilitated their use. However, this e¤ect is negligible which may
indicate that this type of measure promoting the conversion of xed-term contracts
is less e¤ective when accompanied by measures increasing the exibility on their
use. The impact of the change in legislation on the wage growth of non-converted
contracts remains statistically signicant at standard levels and is more negative in
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rms with a higher proportion of xed-term contracts (Table B.14). As expected, in
these rms the legislation contributes more to increase the wage growth di¤erential
between both types of match (Table B.15).
2.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
Fixed-term contracts can play di¤erent roles in the labour market and therefore be
unequally a¤ected by asymmetric reforms that increase the employment protection
gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts. Our results show that it is rel-
evant to consider match quality to assess how a reform that facilitates the use of
xed-term contracts a¤ects their wage growth.
By estimating an endogenous regime switching model, we nd that the 2004
change in the Portuguese EPL that eased the regulations on xed-term contracts
had a negative impact on match quality, measured by the probability of conversion
of xed-term contracts. However, we nd evidence that not all xed-term contracts
are evenly a¤ected by this type of reform. Not only is the conversion of the contract
associated with a non-negligible increase in wage growth, but the wage growth ex-
perienced by workers in good matches, i.e., with converted xed-term contracts, also
seems to be less penalised by the asymmetric reform. In fact, in the years when the
change in legislation was in force, workers on converted xed-term contracts seem
to have experienced a lower wage growth penalisation (-0.16 pp.), than those on
non-converted xed-term contracts (-0.55 pp.). Moreover, the change in legislation
also had an indirect negative impact on the wage growth of both types of match,
especially for non-converted xed-term contracts, through the link between the con-
version of the contract and the wage growth; this draws attention to the potential
negative externalities of this type of employment protection reform. On average, we
nd that the change in legislation contributed to increase the wage growth di¤er-
ential between non-converted and converted xed-term contracts in approximately
15%, ceteris paribus.
This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion about the role of xed-
term contracts in the labour market and the impact of reforms that ease regulations
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on their use. We argue that the burden of the adjustment of this type of reform is not
spread homogeneously among workers on xed-term contracts. On average, less than
one fourth of xed-term contracts are converted in open-ended contracts in the Por-
tuguese labour market and employment protection reforms that facilitate their use
generate potential ine¢ ciencies by penalising and delaying the access of workers on
xed-term contracts to a more stable employment relationship. This may entail neg-
ative e¤ects on labour productivity and human capital acquisition, since workers on
this type of contract experience higher turnover rates (Centeno and Novo, 2012) and
participate less in training activities (Booth et al., 2002) than workers on open-ended
contracts. Our results also show that this type of reform contributes to increase the
wage inequality between workers on converted xed-term contracts and those who
were not able to exit temporary employment. Tackling labour market segmentation
may help to reduce inequality among workers. The future research agenda should
assess the impact of the introduction of a single contract with increasing severance
payments (Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 2012), which could contribute to increase
employment duration and decrease unemployment (Pérez and Osuna, 2014). Futher
research also needs to be conducted in order to conclude about the impact of employ-
ment protection reforms, namely on employment level and non-pecuniary aspects of
the employment relationship, such as the likelihood of promotion to a higher occu-
pational level within the rm. Indeed, conversion to an open-ended contract may
also be associated with access to career ladders, which would further amplify the
negative impact of asymmetric reforms that increase the employment protection gap
between xed-term and open-ended contracts.
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Appendix A
Description of Variables
Workers characteristics:
 Nationality: 1 dummy variable- immigrant (1 if immigrant and 0 if native),
 Gender: 1 dummy variable- female (1 if female and 0 if male),
 Education: 7 dummy variables- less than 4 years of schooling; 4 years of
schooling; 6 years of schooling; 9 years of schooling; 12 years of schooling;
Bachelor degree and University education,
 Age: continuous variable measured in years,
 Tenure: 7 dummy variables- tenure1 (1 year), tenure2 (2 years), tenure3 (3
years), tenure4 (4 years), tenure5 (5 years), tenure6 (6/7 years),
 Occupation (Portuguese Classication of Occupations 2010): 8 dummy variables-
managers, experts, technicians, administrative sta¤, salespeople, craftsmen,
plant and machine operators, unqualied workers.
Firms characteristics:
 Dimension: 5 dummy variables- dimension0 (1-10 employees), dimension1 (11-
20 employees), dimension2 (21-100 employees), dimension3 (101-400 employ-
ees), dimension4 (>400 employees),
 Region: 7 dummy variables- North, Lisbon, Algarve, Centre, Alentejo, Azores,
Madeira,
 Sector of activity: 6 dummy variables- extractive industries, manufacturing,
electricity production and distribution, construction, public administration,
services,
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 Share of xed-term contracts: 1 continuous lagged variable (proportiont 1) in
percentage of total number of employees,
 Capital Ownership: 2 continuous variables- share of foreign capital in percent-
age and share of public capital in percentage.
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Appendix B
Tables
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Non-converted FTC Converted FTC Whole Sample
Female (%) 45.04 46.00 45.26
Immigrant (%) 8.15 5.98 7.65
age (years) 34.10 33.03 33.86
(9.83) (9.27) (9.71)
Education (%)
<= 1st cycle 17.51 13.85 16.67
2nd cycle 19.69 17.14 19.11
3rd cycle 26.05 25.74 25.98
secondary education 23.32 26.62 24.07
bachelor degree 2.33 2.79 2.43
college 11.11 13.84 11.73
Tenure (%)
1 47.30 28.99 43.13
2 26.43 33.74 28.10
3 12.60 22.97 14.96
4 7.13 7.72 7.26
5 3.87 3.63 3.82
6 1.94 1.92 1.94
7 0.73 1.03 0.80
Occupation (%)
Managers 1.20 1.34 1.23
Experts 8.68 9.52 8.87
Intermediate-level technicians 10.59 11.05 10.70
Administrative sta¤ 13.86 16.29 14.42
Sellers 22.59 24.99 23.14
Craftsmen 17.08 14.26 16.44
Plant and Machine Operators 12.22 11.71 12.10
Unqualied workers 13.77 10.84 13.10
Sector of Activity (%)
Extractive Industries 0.38 0.36 0.38
Manufacturing 20.04 21.06 20.28
Electricity 0.40 0.54 0.43
Construction 14.12 9.59 13.08
Public Administration 2.22 0.37 1.80
Services 62.84 68.09 64.03
Region (%)
North 28.61 27.42 28.34
Lisbon 36.36 42.12 37.68
Algarve 6.39 4.27 5.90
Alentejo 4.78 4.22 4.65
Centre 19.31 17.11 18.81
Azores 1.70 1.85 1.74
Madeira 2.85 3.01 2.88
Firms Dimension (%)
<=10 26.47 17.56 24.44
11 to 20 12.04 9.43 11.45
21 to 100 31.21 27.25 30.31
101 to 400 17.52 21.68 18.47
>=401 12.76 24.07 15.34
real wage (log) 1.50 1.59 1.52
(0.41) (0.43) (0.42)
wage growth (%) 3.20 4.02 3.39
(11.10) (11.92) (11.29)
overtime (hours) 2.09 2.33 2.15
(9.26) (9.66) (9.36)
Observations 906,442 267,827 1,174,269
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: FTC stands for xed-term contract. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table B.2: Distribution of open-ended and xed-term contracts by
wage and wage growth decile (%)
Wage Decile OEC FTC
1 9.48 12.74
2 9.43 13.04
3 9.32 13.55
4 9.55 12.40
5 9.74 11.38
6 9.89 10.58
7 10.11 9.44
8 10.21 8.91
9 10.83 5.62
10 11.45 2.33
Wage Growth Decile OEC FTC
1 9.84 10.85
2 10.93 9.20
3 9.52 8.43
4 10.18 9.07
5 10.32 8.33
6 10.19 8.97
7 10.10 9.50
8 9.86 10.73
9 9.80 11.08
10 9.27 13.84
Observations 6,211,944 1,174,269
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: OEC stands for op en-ended contract and FTC stands for xed-term contract
(converted and non-converted).
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Table B.4: Threefold decomposition of the wage (base wages and
regular benets) growth di¤erential
Sample E[Wb|p=0] E[Wg|p=1] Di¤erential Endowments Coe¢ cients Interaction Selectivity
Overall 3.212 4.033 -0.821*** -0.254*** -0.745*** 0.178*** no
contribution (%) -30.91% -90.78% 21.68%
legislation -0.000 -0.167*** 0.000*
contribution (%) 0.00% -20.31% 0.05%
Overall 3.212 4.033 -0.821*** -0.409*** 0.129 0.343*** -0.883**
contribution (%) -49.85% 15.65% 41.71% -107.52%
legislation -0.000 -0.144*** 0.000*
contribution (%) 0.00% -17.56% 0.05%
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: Threefo ld decomposition w ith normalized resu lts and converted xed-term contracts
as the reference group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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Table B.6: Threefold decomposition of the base wage growth di¤er-
ential
Sample E[Wb|p=0] E[Wg|p=1] Di¤erential Endowments Coe¢ cients Interaction Selectivity
Overall 2.909 3.788 -0.879*** -0.319*** -0.792*** 0.231*** no
contribution (%) -36.23% -90.08% 26.31%
legislation 0.001* -0.034 0.000
contribution (%) 0.09% -3.85% 0.01%
Overall 2.909 3.788 -0.879*** -0.389*** -0.838 0.427*** -0.078
contribution (%) -44.29% -95.35% 48.55% -8.91%
legislation 0.001* -0.007 0.000
contribution (%) 0.10% -0.79% 0.00%
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: Threefo ld decomposition w ith normalized resu lts and converted xed-term contracts
as the reference group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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Table B.7: Impact of the change in legislation on probability of
conversion of the contract without rms in construction sector
Whole Sample Males Females
VARIABLES Estimates Estimates Estimates
legislation -0.103*** -0.0957*** -0.109***
(0.00451) (0.00640) (0.00636)
Constant 0.0941*** 0.0643 0.107**
(0.0305) (0.0431) (0.0432)
Region dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 1,020,643 502,932 517,711
ll -514529 -256471 -257611
Pseudo-R-squared 0.0799 0.0778 0.0834
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: P rob it regression w ith standard errors clustered in nmatch in parantheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The contro l variab les included are imm igrant, fem ale, education dumm ies, tenure dumm ies, o ccupation
dumm ies, age, agesq , rms d im ension dumm ies, reg ion dumm ies, unemploym ent rate, cap ita l ownersh ip , industry dumm ies and
year dumm ies.
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Table B.9: Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential
without rms in construction sector
Sample E[Wb|p=0] E[Wg|p=1] Di¤erential Endowments Coe¢ cients Interaction Selectivity
Overall 3.241 4.082 -0.841*** -0.229*** -0.795*** 0.183*** no
contribution (%) -27.21% -94.53% 21.74%
legislation 0.000 -0.154*** 0.000
contribution (%) 0.01% -18.32% 0.02%
Overall 3.241 4.082 -0.841*** -0.484*** 0.900*** 0.369*** -1.625***
contribution (%) -57.61% 107.04% 43.83% -193.26%
legislation 0.000 -0.131*** 0.000
contribution (%) 0.01% -15.57% 0.02%
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: Threefo ld decomposition w ith normalized resu lts and converted xed-term contracts
as the reference group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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Table B.10: Impact of the change in legislation on probability of
conversion of the contract without rms with 11-20 employees
Whole Sample Males Females
VARIABLES Estimates Estimates Estimates
legislation -0.103*** -0.0989*** -0.107***
(0.00448) (0.00609) (0.00663)
Constant 0.167*** 0.178*** 0.140***
(0.0296) (0.0393) (0.0453)
Region dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 1,039,830 566,851 472,979
ll -517749 -280464 -236574
Pseudo-R-squared 0.0834 0.0823 0.0872
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: P rob it regression w ith standard errors clustered in nmatch in parantheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The contro l variab les included are imm igrant, fem ale, education dumm ies, tenure dumm ies, o ccupation
dumm ies, age, agesq , rms d im ension dumm ies, reg ion dumm ies, unemploym ent rate, cap ita l ownersh ip , industry dumm ies and
year dumm ies.
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Table B.12: Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential
without rms with 11-20 employees
Sample E[Wb|p=0] E[Wg|p=1] Di¤erential Endowments Coe¢ cients Interaction Selectivity
Overall 3.195 4.019 -0.824*** -0.290*** -0.743*** 0.209*** no
contribution (%) -35.18% -90.19% 25.37%
legislation 0.000 -0.141*** 0.000*
contribution (%) 0.02% -17.11% 0.04%
Overall 3.195 4.019 -0.824*** -0.483*** 0.240 0.418*** -0.999***
contribution (%) -58.65% 29.15% 50.80% -121.30%
legislation 0.000 -0.118*** 0.000
contribution (%) 0.02% -14.28% 0.04%
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: Threefo ld decomposition w ith normalized resu lts and converted xed-term contracts
as the reference group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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Table B.13: Impact of the change in legislation on probability of
conversion of the contract for rms with a higher proportion of xed-
term contracts
Whole Sample Males Females
VARIABLES Estimates AME Estimates AME Estimates AME
legislation -0.122*** -0.0301 -0.131*** -0.0290 -0.114*** -0.0315
(0.00659) (0.00890) (0.00983)
proportiont 1 -0.00630*** -0.0017 -0.00659*** -0.0017 -0.00595*** -0.0017
(9.11e-05) (0.000125) (0.000134)
proportiont 1  leg 0.000320*** 0.000588*** 6.18e-05
(0.000104) (0.000143) (0.000153)
Constant 0.132*** 0.139*** 0.110**
(0.0280) (0.0371) (0.0429)
Region dummies yes yes yes
Sector dummies yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes
Observations 1,174,269 642,813 531,456
ll -581250 -316550 -263983
Pseudo-R-squared 0.0781 0.0763 0.0827
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: P rob it regression w ith standard errors clustered in nmatch in parantheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The contro l variab les included are imm igrant, fem ale, education dumm ies, tenure dumm ies, o ccupation
dumm ies, age, agesq , rms d im ension dumm ies, reg ion dumm ies, unemploym ent rate, cap ita l ownersh ip , industry dumm ies and
year dumm ies. AME stands for Average Marginal E¤ects
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Table B.15: Threefold decomposition of the wage growth di¤erential
without rms in construction sector
Sample E[Wb|p=0] E[Wg|p=1] Di¤erential Endowments Coe¢ cients Interaction Selectivity
Overall 3.203 4.016 -0.813*** -0.247*** -0.742*** 0.175*** no
contribution (%) -30.31% -91.25% 21.56%
legislation 0.000 -0.028 0.000
contribution (%) 0.01% -3.44% 0.01%
proportiont 1 -0.134*** 0.531*** 0.136***
contribution (%) -16.45% 65.33% 16.76%
proportiont 1  leg -0.003 -0.089*** -0.022***
contribution (%) -0.41% -10.95% -2.76%
Overall 3.203 4.016 -0.813*** -0.419*** 0.249 0.350*** -0.994***
contribution (%) -51.49% 30.61% 43.03% -122.15%
legislation 0.000 -0.001 0.000
contribution (%) 0.02% -0.15% 0.00%
proportiont 1 -0.186*** 0.735*** 0.189***
contribution (%) -22.82% 90.36% 23.18%
proportiont 1  leg -0.003 -0.092*** -0.023***
contribution (%) -0.33% -11.29% -2.85%
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009. Notes: Threefo ld decomposition w ith normalized resu lts and converted xed-term contracts
as the reference group. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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Chapter 3
Job Flows and Flexibility at the Margin
3.1 Introduction
One of the main priorities in the European agenda is to stimulate job creation in
order to achieve the Europe 2020 target of 75% employment among the working age
population. Since the 1980s, many European countries have attempted to foster job
creation and ght unemployment by boosting labour market exibility and especially
by easing the regulations on xed-term contracts. This type of policy helped increase
temporary employment (OECD, 2004), especially in labour markets characterised
by stringent employment protection on open-ended contracts, notably in Portugal,
Spain and France (Dolado et al., 2002; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; Blanchard
and Landier, 2002), thus, contributing to greater labour market segmentation.
Other e¤ects are reported in the literature. Extending the use of xed-term
contracts in labour markets characterised by high employment protection levels for
open-ended contracts may not contribute to lowering unemployment but may in
fact have perverse e¤ects (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay,
2002; Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Barbanchon, 2012). Also, this type of change in
legislation is shown to increase employment volatility because it has more marked
e¤ects on the dynamics than on the stock of employment and unemployment (Boeri,
2011). Therefore, focusing only on the aggregate unemployment rate can mask
very di¤erent dynamics in terms of job and worker ows (Portugal and Blanchard,
2001). Although this type of reforms is expected to boost both job creation and job
destruction, the literature o¤ers no clear prediction about which e¤ect dominates
over the other.
In this paper, our aim is to assess the impact of a change to the legislation in
Portugal in 2004 that extended the maximum legal duration of xed-term contracts
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from three to six years. This is an important reform as it targeted both new and
existing xed-term contracts but its e¤ects are yet to be analysed. Portugal is an
interesting case study since it has the most stringent employment protection on
regular contracts of all OECD countries and only mild employment protection on
xed-term contracts. Given the ndings of previous studies referred above, we focus
our analysis on the e¤ects of this change in legislation on job ows. The impact on
the job ows of xed-term contracts is expected to be greater than on open-ended
contracts, not only due to the target of the change in legislation but also because of
the higher adjustment costs of open-ended contracts; we therefore assess the e¤ect
of fostering exibility at the margin on job ows by contract type. In addition to
providing a better understanding of the adjustment process that follows a change
in EPL, the impact of exibility at the margin is not underestimated because the
focus is not only on aggregate job ows.
Empirical evidence shows that job creation and job destruction occur simul-
taneously exhibiting a persistent behaviour in a one-year period (Davis and Halti-
wanger, 1992a) and that exibility at the margin is promoted when unemployment
is rising (Saint-Paul, 1996). A exible econometric methodology must be used that
can account for the fact that exibility in the use of xed-term contracts may cause
and also be caused by job ows. A multivariate dynamic framework, such as the
reduced-form vector autoregression (VAR) model, is suitable to study the impact of
this EPL reform on job ows rates. Moreover, a VAR model is known to be a valid
approach to account for the heterogeneity between rmscharacteristics and their
interdependences (Haltiwanger et al., 2013) without imposing strong restrictions
(Canova and Ciccarelli, 2013). Finally, this empirical strategy makes it possible to
formally test for the exogeneity of changes in the exibility in the use of xed-term
contracts.
In this paper, we present an empirical within-country analysis of the impact of
an asymmetric labour market reform that facilitates the use of xed-term contracts
on job creation and destruction by type of contract. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the rst empirical study of the impact of this change in legislation on job
ows. Our analysis focuses on the period 2003-2011 and uses a rich longitudinal
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database containing information on every private employer and their employees,
thus allowing the calculation of job ows by type of contract, and the region, sector
of activity, size and age of the rm. Our study contributes to the literature in
three ways: i) it is conducted at a country level, therefore avoiding the criticisms of
cross-country studies due to comparability of variables and diversity of institutional
settings including EPL itself; ii) it uses disaggregated data, which allow us to capture
the heterogeneity among rms and to draw a more detailed picture of job ows; iii) it
uses a new index of labour market exibility at the margin, which has the advantage
of overcoming some drawbacks of the OECD EPL index and of capturing the degree
of enforcement of the changes in legislation.
The results show that in the period of analysis, an increase in the exibility at
the margin Granger causes an increase in the destruction of xed-term jobs and a
larger and more lasting decrease in the creation of xed-term jobs; meanwhile it in-
directly promotes a substitution of open-ended contracts with xed-term contracts.
Our main ndings show that during this period, in which the main change in le-
gislation was to extend the maximum duration of xed-term contracts, increased
exibility fosters the maintenance of existing xed-term contracts rather than the
creation of new ones and that there is a recomposition of job ows. These results
are mainly explained by the proportion of non-converted xed-term contracts and
more associated with sectors with negative employment growth, since we conclude
that the promotion of exibility at the margin does not seem to signicantly a¤ect
job ows in expanding sectors.
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briey describe the
EPL in Portugal, focusing in particular on the legislation on xed-term contracts.
Section 3 provides a literature review of the e¤ects of exibility at the margin. In
Section 4 we present the database and the empirical methodology. The results are
described and discussed in Section 5 and the conclusions drawn in Section 6.
3.2 The Portuguese Labour Market
According to the OECD EPL index, since 1985 Portugal has had the most stringent
empoyment protection legislation on regular contracts in the OECD and despite the
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implementation of policies promoting overall exibility, employment protection for
regular contracts is still high. By contrast, Portugal has mild employment protection
on xed-term contracts. Additionally, Portugal has the third highest proportion
of temporary contracts in Europe; they represent approximately one fth of total
employment, mainly due to the high proportion of xed-term contracts.
Since the introduction of xed-term contracts in 1976, the restrictions on their
use have been relaxed substantially. In fact, xed-term contracts may be contrib-
uting to increased job ows at the intensive (rms expansion and downsizing) and
extensive margins (new rms) as rms are able to hire a new worker on a xed-term
contract to substitute an absent employee, to satisfy seasonal or occasional activities,
in response to an exceptional increase in rms activity and to launch a new activ-
ity, rm or establishment. Fixed-term contracts can also be used to hire rst job
seekers or the long-term unemployed. In 1989, it was established that when a xed-
term contract ends without being converted to a permanent contract, the worker is
entitled to severance pay. It is, however, much easier and less costly to dismiss work-
ers on xed-term contracts than on open-ended contracts. Although the nancial
component of the dismissal costs are only slightly higher for open-ended contracts1,
there are procedural costs involved, from which xed-term contracts are exempted,
such as the notications of the workers council and unions and the possibility to
appeal to courts (Centeno and Novo, 2014).
Between 2003 and 2009, Portugal was the OECD country that most reduced the
employment protection strictness (Venn, 2009). It is in this period that one of the
most important changes was made facilitating the use of xed-term contracts, but
the legislation on open-ended contracts remained practically unchanged. Between
2004 and 2008, a third extraordinary renewal of xed-term contracts was permitted
so that the contract could have a maximum duration of six instead of only three
years. Additionally, thereafter workers could be hired on xed-term contracts to
indirectly substitute an absent employee.
1For open-ended contracts, the severance pay is equal to one month of base wage and seniority
pay for each year of tenure, while workers on xed-term contracts are entitled to receive a com-
pensation equal to three (two) days of base wage and seniority pay for each month of tenure if the
contract duration is lower (higher) than six months.
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From 2009 to 2011, xed-term contracts could still be renewed three times, but
the maximum duration of new contracts was reset to three years. The use of xed-
term contracts was facilitated again in 2012 when xed-term contracts could be
subject to two additional renewals and could last for a maximum duration of 4 and
a half years.
Herein, we study the e¤ects of the legislation facilitating the use of xed-term
contracts on job ows in the Portuguese labour market, focusing on the period
between 2003 and 2011.
3.3 Employment Protection Legislation and Job Flows
The existing theoretical models give an ambiguous prediction of the e¤ects of EPL
on aggregate employment and unemployment, since rms operating in a country
with stringent employment protection reduce not only job destruction but also job
creation as this allows them to avoid high dismissal costs in case of separation (e.g.
Addison and Teixeira, 2003). As stated in Boeris (2011) survey, most studies nd
EPL has a more signicant impact on unemployment and employment ows than
on their stock. Some empirical studies nd that higher employment protection
levels are associated with lower job ow rates (Gómez-Salvador et al., 2004; Kugler
and Pica, 2008; Messina and Vallanti, 2007) while others nd no signicant impact
(Avdagic, 2015).
Since broader employment protection reforms that decrease employment pro-
tection levels for regular contracts are politically di¢ cult to implement (Saint-
Paul, 1996), most European countries increased labour market exibility by easing
the regulations on xed-term contracts (OECD, 2004; Boeri, 2011; Kahn, 2010). As
Blanchard and Landier (2002) argue, the introduction of xed-term contracts with
lower dismissal costs than permanent contracts may fail to reduce unemployment
since it encourages higher job turnover rates for this type of contract. This kind of
reform may indeed fail to lower unemployment levels because the higher job creation
may not o¤set the higher job destruction generated by the lower incentives to convert
xed-term into open-ended contracts. This is especially relevant in labour markets
characterised by high employment protection levels for permanent contracts. The
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introduction of exibility at the margin tends to boost the proportion of xed-term
contracts in total employment (Eslava et al., 2014), increase employment volatility
(Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992) and job turnover of
xed-term contracts (Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2014), and foster the re-
placement of permanent with xed-term contracts (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Aguir-
regabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2014).
A number of theoretical frameworks have been used to simulate the impact of
introducing or easing the use of xed-term contracts (see for example Dolado et al.
(2002) for a review of the most important models). The rst strand of studies such
as Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), Sala et al. (2012), Dolado et al. (2007) extends
the Mortensen and Pissaridess (1994) matching framework with endogenous job
creation and destruction by including worker heterogeneity.
The results of Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) support Blanchard and Landiers
(2002) prediction since they show that facilitating the use of xed-term contracts
promotes an increase in job creation and job destruction, but the latter e¤ect is
stronger in countries with high employment protection levels for permanent con-
tracts. There is evidence that this type of measure has an adverse impact on unem-
ployment as workers on xed-term contracts su¤er from high job turnover when the
dismissal of workers on regular contracts implies high costs for rms. However, as
Dolado et al. (2007) argue, reducing the ring costs of less productive workers boosts
job creation and may be more e¤ective in reducing unemployment than reducing the
ring costs of high productivity workers or of all workers simultaneously, although
it increases the wage inequality between the two types of workers. Sala et al. (2012)
show that stricter rules regarding the renewal or the duration of xed-term con-
tracts increasing the probability that a xed-term contract ends may have di¤erent
e¤ects than increasing the restrictions on hiring workers on temporary contracts.
They nd that although both types of measure may help reduce the overall job
destruction rate in a typical European labour market, the destruction of temporary
jobs increases in the former case because rms avoid converting the contract to a
permanent one. However, this last e¤ect is overweighed by the lower proportion of
xed-term contracts.
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The second strand of studies draw upon a dynamic labour demand model, for
example Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997), Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), Aguirreg-
abiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992). Cabrales and
Hopenhayn (1997) advocate that the implementation of the 1984 Spanish reform
easing the regulations on xed-term contracts did not help signicantly boost the
average labour demand although it increased its volatility mainly due to the greater
volatility of job creation; on the other hand Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego
(2014), nd evidence that the introduction of xed-term contracts increased em-
ployment by 3.5%. The transitional dynamics of two-tier reforms are described by
Boeri and Garibaldi (2007). These authors argue that there is a honeymoon e¤ect
as this type of reform has a positive impact on job creation but job destruction
is bounded to the stock of temporary contracts. Therefore, there is a transitory
increase in employment, mostly due to the creation of temporary jobs. The substi-
tution of open-ended with xed-term contracts contributes to these dynamics, which
are sluggish but stronger if xed-term contracts are close substitutes for open-ended
contracts (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992).
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014) argue that a comprehensive reform
that halved the ring costs of both types of contract would have a similar posit-
ive impact on employment, but would also increase the proportion of permanent
employment and have a larger positive impact on labour productivity. In turn,
Alonso-Borrego et al. (2005) use a general equilibrium model and nd that elimin-
ating xed-term contracts in the Spanish labour market would lead to a reduction
in the unemployment rate and in the average unemployment duration because the
job destruction rate would fall and households would exert more search e¤ort be-
cause of their preference for permanent jobs. On the other hand, eliminating ring
costs would increase the job destruction rate and lower the householdssearch ef-
fort, which would lead to an increase in the unemployment rate but also to labour
productivity gains.
The lack of a signicant impact on unemployment following the introduction
or facilitating of the use of xed-term contracts may be due to their e¤ect on re-
lative wages of permanent and xed-term contracts and wage rigidities. Bentolila
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and Dolado (1994) predict that a higher proportion of xed-term contracts in total
employment may help boost job creation due to the lower average labour costs,
but this e¤ect may be reversed given the lower adjustment costs of xed-term con-
tracts and if workers on open-ended contracts gain more bargaining power and push
their wages up. In fact, empirical evidence shows that the proportion of xed-term
contracts is associated with higher wages for permanent contracts (Jimeno and To-
haria, 1993; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). Moreover, Güell (2000) and Güell and
Rodríguez Mora (2010) argue that the introduction of xed-term contracts may not
have a positive impact on the employment level if the minimum wage is too high,
since the increase in job creation is not enough to overcome the increase in job de-
struction if the wages of temporary contracts are not exible enough. This e¤ect is
more marked for low-skilled workers (Güell, 2000; Güell and Rodríguez Mora, 2010).
Empirical evidence shows that employment becomes more responsive to shocks
when rms are able to use xed-term contracts, which su¤er the burden of adjust-
ment (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007; Eslava et al., 2014).
For the Italian labour market, Cappellari et al. (2012) estimate that this type of re-
form causes a small but statistically signicant fall in aggregate employment and
does not cause an increase in the growth rate of employment with xed-term con-
tracts. Notwithstanding, the e¤ect of this type of reform is heterogeneous over the
business cycle; it is more relevant in recessions than in expansions (Bentolila and
Saint-Paul, 1992) and it depends on the role that xed-term contracts play in the
labour market2. By calibrating a matching model and assuming that match quality
is unobserved a priori, Faccini (2014) shows that there may be welfare gains in using
xed-term contracts to learn about match quality and that increasing their share
helps reduce unemployment. This occurs because when the proportion of xed-
term contracts increases, the larger creation of temporary jobs outweighs the higher
temporary job destruction. According to this authors ndings, the increase in the
2For example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Malo (2008) argue that temporary contracts are simul-
taneously used as a bu¤er stock for permanent contracts and as a screening device. The creation of
temporary jobs outweighs that of permanent jobs when establishments expect employment gains
in the short-run and employment gains and losses in the long-run. Establishments destroy fewer
temporary than permanent jobs if they expect employment gains in the short-run, but destroy
more temporary jobs if they expect employment losses in the same time horizon.
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maximum duration of xed-term contracts from two to three years does not produce
very meaningful e¤ects, since the screening process is not signicantly improved.
In fact, the employment protection gap between xed-term and open-ended
contracts may help explain the divergence in the unemployment pattern between
European countries (Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Barbanchon, 2012). For ex-
ample, according to Bentolila, Cahuc, Dolado and Barbanchon (2012), if Spain had
decreased the gap between both types of contract and had adopted the French EPL,
unemployment would have increased much less after the 2007 nancial crisis.
The literature has so far focused mostly on the Spanish experience and notably on
the e¤ects of the 1984 change in legislation that removed restrictions on the circum-
stances in which rms could hire workers on xed-term contracts. Several studies
nd that the proportion of temporary contracts increased after the reform (Dolado
et al., 2002; Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego, 2014), while the evidence on the
impact on unemployment rate is not clear (e.g. Cabrales and Hopenhayn, 1997).
However, xed-term contracts also play an important role in the employment ad-
justment process in the Portuguese labour market (Centeno and Novo, 2012; Varejão
and Portugal, 2007). The probability of an establishment adjusting its employment
increases with the proportion of the workforce on xed-term contracts and it starts
adjusting employment by using xed-term contracts, especially to make downward
adjustments (Varejão and Portugal, 2007). As Centeno and Novo (2012) report,
when the employment protection level for open-ended contracts is extended to rms
with 11 to 20 employees, the excess worker turnover of xed-term contracts in these
rms increases, but there is no signicant e¤ect on the turnover of open-ended con-
tracts. These authors also nd a positive impact of that legislation change on the
proportion of xed-term contracts, which signals the high degree of substitution
between both types of contract.
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3.4 Data and Empirical Approach
3.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal
The data source used to compute job ows is Quadros de Pessoal, a Portuguese lon-
gitudinal database collected every year in October by the Ministry of Employment.
This is a very important and detailed data source on the Portuguese labour market
and has been used to study job ows by Centeno and Novo (2012) and Carneiro
et al. (2014), for example. The survey is mandatory for all rms with at least one
employee and therefore the sample is representative of the population under study.
On average, it surveys approximately 300,000 rms employing over 2 million workers
every year.
Quadros de Pessoal assigns a unique identication code to the rm and all its
employees allowing the identication of worker-rm matches. This database has
information on the rms size, region3, main economic activity, year of constitution,
turnover and capital ownership. Quadros de Pessoal also provides information at
the establishment level, namely on region, sector of activity and size. As we do not
have information on the age of establishments, which is reported in the literature as
a crucial variable to explain the heterogeneity in job ows (Davis and Haltiwanger,
1999; Haltiwanger et al., 2013), we compute job ows using the rm as the unit
of observation. Finally, very detailed information is also available on each rms
employee, notably nationality, gender, age, education, skills, occupation, wage, hours
worked and contract type4.
The unit of observation j in this study is a narrow sector resulting from the
crossing of 14 sectors of activity, 5 regions, 6 age and 9 size groups5 at the rm
level (as in Gómez-Salvador et al., 2004; Fuchs and Weyh, 2010). This allows us
to construct panel data and to capture the heterogeneity in job ows across rms
with di¤erent characteristics. A rms entry is dened as the year in which the rm
3Since 2010 we have only had information for mainland Portugal and Madeira. As such, we
restrict the whole analysis to mainland Portugal.
4Information on contract type is only available from 2002.
5The size group is dened using the current rm size, which equals the employment average
between t and t-1. This methodology circumvents the size distribution fallacy described in Davis
et al. (1996).
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rst reports a positive number of employees and a rms exit is identied as the
last year the rm reports a positive employment level6. We have an unbalanced
panel of narrow sectors j = 1; :::; 23157 observed in t = 2003; :::; 2011. We pool all
observations for each narrow sector and obtain a micro panel with a total of 13,856
observations.
3.4.2 Measurement of Job Flows
We dene and measure job ows following Davis and Haltiwanger (1999). The job
creation at time t (JCt) is dened as the sum of the positive employment changes
(E > 0) that occurred in all rms i expanding or entering the market between t-1
and t, while job destruction at time t (JDt) corresponds to the sum of the negative
employment changes (E < 0) in all rms i that contract or exit the market between
t-1 and t.
In order to translate that measure into growth rates, JCt and JDt are divided
by a size measure corresponding to the simple average of employment level between
t-1 and t8.
The job creation and destruction rates of group j, at time t result from the size-
weighted sum of job creation and destruction growth rates of rms i belonging to j.
Therefore, denoting the employment level of rm i belonging to group j at time t
by Ei;j;t and the size of group j at time t as Zj;t = 0; 5(Ej;t+Ej;t 1), the job creation
and destruction rates for each group j are given by:
JCRj;t =
X
8i
Ei;j;t
Zj;t
if Ei;j;t > 0 (3.1)
JDRj;t =
X
8i
jEi;j;tj
Zj;t
if Ei;j;t < 0 (3.2)
6The computations for aggregate job ows are based on the 2000-2011 sample in order to avoid
overestimating the contribution of entries and exits to job ows. However, since information on
contract type is only available since 2002, this is the start year to compute job ows by contract
type.
7Note that we consider less than 3780 (14x5x6x9) narrow sectors because some of them are not
observed for more than one time period.
8Note that this procedure has the advantage of accommodating rmsentries and exits.
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Employment growth for each j is measured as the ratio between the employment
change reported by the rm between t and t-1 and the average employment between
t and t-1.
We also compute job ow rates by type of contract. The creation rate of xed-
term (permanent) jobs is dened as the ratio between the sum of positive employ-
ment changes under xed-term (permanent) contracts in all rms that increase the
number of xed-term (permanent) contracts and the average xed-term (perman-
ent) employment between t and t-1. The destruction rate of xed-term (permanent)
jobs is dened as the ratio between the sum of negative xed-term (permanent) em-
ployment changes in all rms that decrease the number of xed-term (permanent)
contracts and the average xed-term (permanent) employment between t and t-1.
3.4.3 Measurement of Flexibility at the Margin
As stated in Addison and Teixeiras (2003) survey, measuring employment protection
level is a challenging task and there are several approaches. Employment protection
is conventionally measured by the OECD EPL index (Kahn, 2010; Messina and
Vallanti, 2007) and more recently by subjective indexes (Di Tella and MacCulloch,
2005). Although the OECD EPL index captures labour market rigidity and can
disentangle the contribution of legislation on regular, xed-term and temporary
agency contracts and collective agreements, it is subject to a few caveats. Namely, it
does not account for the enforcement of legislation and may not capture all changes
in legislation, since they may not be su¢ cient to change the countrys ranking.
The index is constructed at the country-level, but EPL may vary across rms and
workerscharacteristics such as rms size and workers age, respectively (Dolado
et al., 2007). Also, a change in legislation easing the regulations on xed-term
contracts may impact across sectors and rms depending on their human resources
practices (Portugal and Varejão, 2009). To overcome some of these limitations,
Alexandre et al. (2010) propose an overall labour market exibility index computed
for each sector of activity. This index results from multiplying three standardised
components following a logistic distribution: the proportion of workers not covered
by a collective agreement, the proportion of workers with a part-time job and the
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proportion of workers earning higher than the minimum wage.
Following Alexandre et al.s (2010) methodology, we propose an alternative index
of exibility on the use of xed-term contracts computed for each narrow sector j
which has the advantage of reecting how rms and employers react to changes in
legislation promoting exibility at the margin. Additionally, it captures asymmetries
in exibility- through the use of xed-term contracts- between sectors of activity and
rms with di¤erent sizes and ages and located in di¤erent regions.
In constructing this index, we focus on the main dimensions that previous studies
have nd to be a¤ected by the promotion of exibility at the margin. Namely, our
index contains three dimensions: the proportion of xed-term contracts, the non-
conversion rate of xed-term to open-ended contracts9 and the average duration
of the xed-term employment relationship. Empirical evidence shows that coun-
tries that increase the employment protection gap between xed-term and open-
ended contracts experience a signicant increase in the share of xed-term contracts
(Kahn, 2010; OECD, 2004; Centeno and Novo, 2012), especially those with stricter
legislation on open-ended contracts such as the Portuguese case. Making it easier
to use xed-term contracts also places the adjustment burden on workers with this
type of contract since they experience higher turnover rates and their contracts are
less likely to be converted to open-ended contracts (Boeri, 2011)10. Finally, the ex-
tension of the maximum legal duration of xed-term contracts has a direct impact
on the average duration of the contract. Note that this index also has the ad-
vantage of capturing the links between regulations on both types of contract, since
the components of the index are also a¤ected by the stringency of regulations on
regular contracts. As in the Centeno and Novos (2012) study, when the employ-
ment protection for regular contracts is extended to rms with 11 to 20 employees,
the proportion of xed-term contracts in these rms and the rate of non-converted
xed-term contracts increase.
We plot the weighted average of these three variables in Figure C.1 in the Ap-
9This variable is dened as the share of workers that had a xed-term contract in t 1 and that
still have a xed-term contract in t with the same or a di¤erent employer.
10In Chapter 2, our results show that when the legislation under study was in force, the prob-
ability of conversion of a xed-term contract fell by approximately 3 pp.
76
pendix. We can observe an upward trend in the proportion of xed-term contracts
that is only reversed with the onset of the 2009 economic and debt crisis, mostly
due to the high destruction rate of xed-term jobs (see subsection 4.5). The average
tenure of workers on xed-term contracts increased over the sample period, reaching
the maximum level in 2009. This is accompanied by an increase in the proportion of
non-converted xed-term contracts. In 2010, however, there was a marked decline
in the average length of contract and in the non-conversion rate, which we attribute
to the sharp drop in the proportion of xed-term contracts and to the fact contracts
drawn up in 2004 had to end or be converted to open-ended contracts in 2010.
The composite index results from the product of these three components, which
follow a functional form F(.):
flexjt = [F ()+F (f1;jt)]:[F ()+F (f2;jt)]:[F ()+F (f3;jt)], j = 1; :::; J and t = 1; :::; T;
(3.3)
where j denotes the narrow sector and t denotes time measured in years. f1;jt is
the standardised11 share of workers on xed-term contracts in each narrow sector j
in period t, f2;jt is the standardised duration of xed-term contracts in each narrow
sector j in period t and f3;jt is the standardised share of workers with non-converted
xed-term contracts in each narrow sector j in period t. The parameters ;  and
 are the correction terms that ensure that the index is bounded and may be in-
terpreted as the relative weight of each component in the index of exibility at the
margin. Although Alexandre et al. (2010) assume that  =  =  = 0, we believe
that some components may be more important sources of adjustment than others for
labour market agents and, thus, we consider that they can be weighted di¤erently
in the index.
In order to estimate ;  and , we solve Equation 3.3 where flexjt is proxied
by legislationjt, which is equal to one if the narrow sector beneted from the 2004
change in legislation that eased regulations on xed-term contracts, i.e., has at least
11Each measure in each year is standardised by subtracting the mean value and dividing by the
standard deviation.
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one worker, in year t, with a xed-term contract and tenure of more than three
years. Therefore, we use an a posteriori measure of the implementation of the most
important change in legislation that extended the maximum legal duration of xed-
term contracts in Portugal in the period under analysis and estimate the following
model using a Generalised Least Square estimator12:
(legislationjt   f1;jt:f2;jt:f3;jt) = 0 + 1f1;jt + 2f2;jt + 3f3;jt + (3.4)
4f1;jt:f2;jt + 5f2;jt:f3;jt + 6f1;jt:f3;jt + "jt;
where  = 5,  = 6,  = 4. We have a straightforward interpretation of the
impact of the three components in our index of exibility at the margin, since the
weights are computed such that the index reects the e¤ective impact of the 2004
change in legislation in the period under analysis13.
Simlarly to Alexandre et al. (2010), we assume that the functional form F(.) is
a logistic distribution:
flexjt = (
exp()
1 + exp()
+
exp(f1;jt)
1 + exp(f1;jt)
):(
exp()
1 + exp()
+ (3.5)
exp(f2;jt)
1 + exp(f2;jt)
):(
exp()
1 + exp()
+
exp(f3;jt)
1 + exp(f3;jt)
);
Thus, the weights (see Table 3.1) are given by:
26664
exp(b)
1+exp(b)
exp(b)
1+exp(b)
exp(b)
1+exp(b)
37775 =
26664
exp(b5)
1+exp(b5)
exp(b6)
1+exp(b6)
exp(b4)
1+exp(b4)
37775 =
26664
0:5704
0:5374
0:4512
37775.
From these results, we can conclude that the component that most contributed
to exibility at the margin between 2003 and 2011 was the proportion of xed-
12We account for the possible correlation of the errors within the observations of the narrow
sector.
13Note that we abstract from the functional form of f1;jt, f2;jt and f3;jt, such that the weigths
are independent of the functional form F(.).
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Table 3.1: Estimation of the weights of the index of exibility at the
margin
VARIABLES legislation_dep
f1_j -0.477***
(0.0687)
f2_j 0.0598
(0.156)
f3_j -0.0167
(0.0673)
f1f2 -0.196
(0.242)
f2f3 0.284***
(0.103)
f1f3 0.150*
(0.0824)
Constant 0.578***
(0.0517)
Observations 19,526
R-squared 0.160
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors clustered in narrow sectors in parantheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 .
term contracts, followed by the average duration of the contract and, nally, by
the proportion of non-converted xed-term contracts. Note also that the standard-
ised proportion of non-converted xed-term contracts is associated to a negative
coe¢ cient, which indicates that there is a value up to which this variable does not
contribute positively to the index. These results are not surprising given the change
in legislation during this period. The possible impact of this change is bounded to
the stock of xed-term contracts that can have their duration extended, such that
it was potentially more benecial for sectors with a larger proportion of xed-term
contracts. At the same time, the average duration of the contract is expected to in-
crease, which is dependent on the proportion of contracts that remain as xed-term
from one year to the other and not converted to permanent contracts.
Panel a. of Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the index over time (weighted by
the share of employment in the narrow sector). In panel b., we plot the behaviour of
the standardised components of the index of exibility at the margin. The aggregate
index of exibility at the margin co-moves with the changes in legislation between
2003 and 2011. Notably, exibility at the margin increased in 2004 in line with the
decrease in the rigidity in the OECD EPL index for xed-term contracts. In 2007,
there was a drop in the exibility at the margin mostly driven by the non-conversion
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rate; this is not surprising as it was when 3 year contracts renewed in 2004 had to
be terminated or converted in open-ended contracts.
Figure 31: Index of exibility at the margin and its components
3.4.4 Econometric Methodology
We estimate a panel-data vector autoregression model to study the dynamic rela-
tionship between job ows and exibility at the margin. The model is specied as
follows:
yjt =  0 +  1yj;t 1 +	j + 
t + eit, j = 1; :::; J and t = 1; :::; T; (3.6)
where j denotes the narrow sector and t denotes time measured in years. All vari-
ables in yjt = [flexjt; jobdftjt; jobcftjt;jobdoejt; jobcoejt] are treated as endogenous.
flexjt is the index of exibility at the margin, jobdftjt; jobcftjt are the destruction
and creation rates of xed-term jobs and jobdoejt; jobcoejt are the destruction and
creation rates of permanent jobs, respectively. We also control for unobserved group
heterogeneity (	j) and year xed-e¤ects (
t). By including year xed-e¤ects we
account for aggregate and business cycle shocks. eit is a random disturbance usually
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dened as an innovation or shock to each variable in the system.
As Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) argue, when J is large and T is xed, a GMM
approach is a consistent estimation method. In order to estimate the model, the
methodology introduced by Love and Zicchino (2006) is adopted14. We rst remove
the year xed-e¤ects by subtracting the cross-sectional mean of each variable in
each period and eliminate the sector xed e¤ects by applying the Helmert trans-
formation (Arellano and Bover, 1995), which is obtained by subtracting the mean of
the subsequent values of each variable15. In order to select the model and moment
conditions, and since we estimate a just-identied model, we rely on the coe¢ cient
of determination (Abrigo and Love, 2015). We therefore select a model with one lag
and one-lagged variables as instruments, which we estimate using a GMM estimator.
A panel-VAR model also provides an adequate framework to test if the index of
exibility at the margin Granger causes and/or is Granger caused by job creation
and job destruction. One variable is said to Granger cause the other if the coe¢ cients
of the lagged values of that variable are statistically di¤erent from zero and they
therefore help predict this other variable. To draw conclusions on the causality
between the variables in the system, we perform a Wald test on the lagged values
of the variables in each equation.
After concluding about the stability of the parameters, we turn our attention
to the orthogonalised impulse response functions that show how job creation and
job destruction behave at t + h, where h = 1; :::; 6, periods after a shock in the
index of exibility at the margin. In order to identify that shock we use a Cholesky
decomposition. The rst variable in the Cholesky ordering is the index of exibility
on the use of xed-term contracts. A shock to this variable in the narrow sector
captures all forces that increase the exibility in the use of xed-term contracts,
namely legislation reforms. This variable is followed in the ordering by job ows.
Job destruction is included before job creation because the latter takes longer (not
only to open a vacancy but to screen the potential candidates) than job destruction,
which is documented by the higher volatility of job destruction than job creation
14We thank Inessa Love for making the STATA code available (Abrigo and Love, 2015).
15This procedure has the advantage of circumventing the loss of information of rst di¤erencing
in unbalanced panels.
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(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). We put the job ow rates for xed-term contracts
rst in the Cholesky decomposition because empirical evidence shows that, since
xed-term contracts have lower adjustment costs, they are used by rms to adjust
the employment level (Varejão and Portugal, 2007) and are a source of employment
exibility (Centeno and Novo, 2012), while rms are less willing to create and destroy
permanent jobs given the higher ring costs they entail16. This specic ordering
allows the index of exibility at the margin to impact not only with a lag but
also contemporaneously in the other variables in the system, while shocks in the
destruction and creation of xed-term and open-ended jobs do not reect a variation
in the index of exibility at the margin. This assumption seems reasonable since it
takes time for policy makers to understand the economic aggregate conditions and
to create new legislation and put it in force in response to those conditions. The
95% condence error bands of the impulse response functions are calculated using
Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 repetitions.
Finally, we compute the forecast error variance decompositions for a 6-year time
horizon, which gives information about the contribution of each variables shocks to
the variation in the other variables in the system.
3.4.5 Descriptive Statistics
We start by looking at the behaviour of job ows in the Portuguese labour market
between 2003 and 2011. Over this period, on average, the job destruction rate
(12.1%) was higher than the job creation rate (11.7%); therefore, there was net job
destruction of approximately 0.5%. In panel a. of Figure C.2, we can distinguish two
periods. From 2004 until 2008, there was net job creation in the Portuguese labour
market, but from 2009 until 2011, a period of deep economic, nancial and debt
crisis, the net job destruction was equal to 5%. From 2003 until 2008, on average, the
job creation rate was equal to approximately 12.8%, while the job destruction rate
was about 11%. From that moment on, we observe a decrease in the rate at which
jobs are created but also an increase in the rate of destruction. In fact, we can see
that the net job destruction in the crisis period resulted especially from the marked
16This is a common assumption in theoretical models, such as in Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002).
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increase in the destruction and the reduction in the creation of xed-term jobs (panel
b. of Figure C.2). This evidence is in line with that reported for OECD countries
(OECD, 2010, pp.21-22) and conrms that xed-term contracts are used as an
adjustment mechanism in the Portuguese labour market (e.g. Varejão and Portugal,
2007), especially during the most recent crisis (Carneiro et al., 2014). Whereas, on
average, 29.9% of xed-term jobs were created and 22.4% were destroyed before the
crisis, from 2009 onwards these gures were 23% and 35%, respectively. Therefore,
the margin of adjustment relied on the destruction of temporary jobs. As expected,
permanent job ows were lower than temporary job ows. On average, the creation
of permanent jobs decreased from 12.4% to 11.5% when the economic and nancial
crisis started, while the permanent job destruction increased from 11.6% to 13.8%.
Additionally, we compute job ows by sector of activity, region, size and age of
the rms (Tables D.1, D.2, D.3 and D.4, respectively).
Similarly to Davis et al. (1996), Centeno et al. (2007) and Lane et al. (1996),
we nd that the magnitude of job ows is larger in smaller and younger rms.
We can also see that job dynamics di¤er during the 2009 crisis in line with rms
characteristics. As in other OECD countries, net job destruction was highest in
construction, manufacturing and extractive industries (OECD, 2010, pp.20-23) and
smaller and younger rms were also in a more vulnerable position and, thus, su¤ered
a larger adjustment.
These results show that it is very important to consider the heterogeneity in job
ows between sectors of activity, regions, size and age categories. Thus, the use of
a disaggregated unit of analysis, such as the narrow sector j is justied. The main
variables are described and summarised in Table D.5 in the Appendix.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Job Flows and Flexibility at the margin
The results of the estimation of Equation 3.6 are depicted in Table D.6 in the
Appendix. The dynamic relationship between the variables in the system is captured
in one lag and the one-time lagged values of the variables in the system are adequate
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instruments for each variable. After concluding that the system is stable, we are
able to compute the impulse response functions (Figures 3.2-3.4)17.
Ceteris paribus, a one standard deviation shock in the index of exibility at
the margin Granger causes a reduction in the rate at which xed-term jobs are
created in the three periods ahead and a slight increase in the rate at which they are
destroyed in the two following years (panels b. and a. of Figure 3.2, respectively).
The latter e¤ect is only statistically signicant at a 5% signicance level and is
smaller in magnitude in absolute terms: the xed-term job destruction rate increases
by approximately 0.7pp., while the creation rate of xed-term jobs decreases by
approximately 3pp. in the year after the shock in exibility at the margin. We
can therefore observe that the e¤ects of the promotion of exibility at the margin
on xed-term job ows tend to dissipate quickly. This may be explained by the
fact that a lower (higher) creation (destruction) rate of xed-term jobs also fosters
a lower (higher) destruction (creation) rate of xed-term jobs, counteracting the
direct e¤ect of the shock in the index of exibility at the margin.
Figure 32: Response of job ows to a shock in exibility at the
margin
Although there is no direct causal e¤ect of a shock in the index on permanent
job ows, we nd an indirect e¤ect of the index of exibility on the substitution
17The impulse response functions not shown are available upon request.
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elasticity between xed-term and open-ended contracts. The lower creation rate of
xed-term jobs, caused by a shock in exibility at the margin, Granger causes an
increase in destruction of permanent jobs and a larger decrease in their creation in
the following year (Figure 3.3).This argument is in line with Bentolila and Saint-
Pauls (1992) predictions and Centeno and Novos (2012) empirical evidence, who
nd a high degree of substitution between the two types of contract.
Figure 33: Response of permanent job ows to a shock in the cre-
ation of xed-term jobs
The dynamic behaviour between the index of exibility and job ows shows that
easing the regulations on xed-term contracts, namely by increasing their maximum
legal duration, seems to stimulate the maintenance of existing contracts instead of
the creation of new ones and masks a recomposition of the two types of contract
in the workforce. The positive response of destruction of jobs with xed-term con-
tracts to exibility at the margin was expected (Sala et al., 2012). And although
the negative e¤ect on the creation of xed-term jobs is at odds with theoretical pre-
dictions, it is also found in Faccini (2014) who shows that extending the maximum
duration of xed-term contracts leads to lower overall job creation in comparison
with a reform that allows a higher acceptance rate of this type of contract.
Given the results stated above, a panel VAR model seems to be adequate to
assess the impact of exibility at the margin on job ows by type of contract, since
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there is a dynamic behaviour between the index and xed-term job ows. Our results
support the hypothesis that labour market performance, namely job creation and
destruction, triggers employment protection reforms that increase the use of xed-
term contracts, and that reverse causality should be taken into account. Notably,
there is evidence that, at the standard signicance levels, the index of exibility
at the margin is Granger caused by the creation and destruction of xed-term jobs
(Figure 3.4). A shock in the creation of xed-term jobs fosters an increase in the
index of exibility at the margin, while a shock in the destruction of xed-term
jobs has a negative e¤ect on that index. These e¤ects last for about 4 years and
were expected not only because of the way the index was constructed but also as
the exibility at the margin is direct and positively a¤ected by the pool of available
xed-term workers. The level of exibility is also higher when the contract can be
extended (for example, by allowing additional renewals or longer maximum legal
duration) and thus there is less destruction of xed-term jobs.
Figure 34: Response of exibility at the margin to a shock in job
ows
By estimating the panel VAR model using the overall job ows instead of job
ows by contract type18 (Figure 3.5), we can conclude that we might underestimate
18For this model and according to the information criteria, we select a model with one lag and
the one-time lagged values of the variables as instruments.
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the e¤ect and fail to capture the dynamics associated with the implementation of this
type of reform by focusing only on aggregate job ows. According to these estimates,
there is no causal link between overall job ows and the index of exibility at the
margin. Thus, we nd that this type of policy may in fact have a perverse e¤ect as
Blanchard and Landier (2002) predict and fail to improve labour market functioning.
Namely, in line with Cappellari et al.s (2012) ndings, improved exibility at the
margin does not seem to signicantly boost aggregate job creation and employment
growth.
Figure 35: Impulse response functions of aggregate job ows and
exibility at the margin
Finally, the results of the variance decomposition are presented in Table 3.2. In
line with the results discussed above, the index of exibility at the margin helps to
explain a non-marginal variation in the destruction and creation of xed-term jobs
one period ahead, approximately 4.9% and 5.2%, respectively. What is interesting
to note is that the contribution of the index to the variation in the creation of xed-
term jobs increases over time and after 6 years is equal to approximately 6.4%. In
turn, in the following period, 12.5% of the variation in the creation of xed-term jobs
is explained by their destruction rate. This may be due to the fact that workers on
xed-term contracts experience higher job turnover rates and that some xed-term
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Table 3.2: Variance decompositions
s ex_j_f jobdft jobcft jobdoe jobcoe
ex_j_f 1 1 0 0 0 0
jobdft 1 0.049 0.951 0 0 0
jobcft 1 0.052 0.125 0.822 0 0
jobdoe 1 0.003 0.020 0.004 0.973 0
jobcoe 1 0.016 0.00007 0.036 0.045 0.904
ex_j_f 6 0.985 0.009 0.005 0.00009 0.00002
jobdft 6 0.050 0.946 0.004 0.0004 0.0006
jobcft 6 0.064 0.130 0.803 0.0001 0.002
jobdoe 6 0.004 0.020 0.009 0.967 0.0001
jobcoe 6 0.015 0.0005 0.050 0.060 0.874
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Percent of variation in the row variab le exp la ined by column variab le in 1 and 6
p eriods after.
contracts are used for churning while others are used for screening purposes. It is
also worth mentioning that the creation of xed-term jobs explains approximately
5% of the creation of open-ended jobs in the 6 periods ahead.
3.5.2 Components of the Index of Flexibility at the Margin and Job
Flows
In order to identify the sources of the results discussed in the last subsection, we re-
estimate the model substituting the index of exibility with each of its components:
the proportion of xed-term contracts, the average duration of the contract and
the share of non-converted xed-term contracts19. The resulting impulse response
functions are presented in Figures 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, respectively.
The one period ahead negative causal e¤ect of a shock in exibility at the margin
on the creation of xed-term jobs is explained by the shock in the proportion of
xed-term contracts (-2.9 pp.) and in the proportion of non-converted xed-term
contracts (-6.4 pp.). This is quite intuitive since the more contracts that remain
xed-term, the lower the need to replace them and create new xed-term contracts.
On the other hand, a shock in the average duration of the contract has no causal
impact on the creation of xed-term jobs.
An increase of one standard deviation in the average duration of xed-term con-
19Selection criteria for the model and moment conditions hold for all models.
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Figure 36: Response of job ows to a shock in the proportion of
xed-term contracts
Figure 37: Response of job ows to a shock in the average duration
of xed-term contracts
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tracts and in the proportion of non-converted contracts Granger causes an increase
in the destruction of xed-term jobs (2.1 pp. and 4.8 pp. in the period after the
shock, respectively), which is mostly explained by the fact that the maximum dura-
tion and number of renewals is legally established in this type of contract and, once
reached, more contracts have to be terminated.
Innovations to the share of non-converted contracts produce the largest and most
lasting e¤ects (4 years) on the job ows of xed-term contracts. Therefore, we can
argue that the maintenance of the contracts seems to be explained mainly by the
shock in the non-conversion rate of xed-term contracts, which may indicate and
reect the low or ine¢ cient incentives for the conversion of xed-term into open-
ended contracts in the period in which their maximum duration was allowed to
increase20.
Figure 38: Response of job ows to a shock in the non-conversion
rate of xed-term contracts
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the destruction of open-ended jobs is negat-
ively a¤ected in the period following a shock in either the proportion of xed-term
contacts or in the share of non-converted xed-term contracts; this may support the
hypothesis of xed-term contracts being used as a bu¤er for open-ended contracts.
20Note that, during the period under analysis, there was a simultaneous change in legislation that
introduced a penalty in social security contributions for rms with more than 15% of employees
on xed-term contracts, which could be recouped if the contracts were converted.
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The shocks in the index of exibility at the margin and in the proportion of xed-
term contracts are quite persistent as the increase in these variables only vanishes
after 4 years; on the other hand, the average duration of the contract and the
proportion of non-converted xed-term contracts are the least persistent variables
(Figure C.3). This result is interesting as shocks in these two last variables fade out
in 2 years and the maximum number of renewals as well as the additional duration
of the contract was set at three years.
Regarding the variance decompositions, the proportion of non-converted xed-
term contracts is the component that explains the highest share of the variation in
job creation (15.7%), while the variation in job destruction is mainly explained by
the proportion of xed-term contracts (11.2%) in the 6 periods ahead (Table D.7
and D.8, respectively). In fact, the proportion of xed-term contracts helps explain
9.1% of the variation in the creation of xed-term jobs and 3% of the variation in
the destruction and creation of open-ended jobs after 6 years. In turn, the average
duration of the contract only explains 1.7% of the variation in the destruction of
xed-term jobs in the 6 periods ahead and a marginal percentage of the variation in
the remaining variables (Table D.9).
3.5.3 Employment growth pattern and the impact of exibility at the
margin on job ows
The e¤ects of the changes in legislation that ease regulations on xed-term contracts
may be di¤erentiated according to the stage of the rms business cycle (Bentolila
and Saint-Paul, 1992) and job ows in shrinking sectors may be more negatively
a¤ected by EPL than job ows in growing sectors (Messina and Vallanti, 2007). For
that reason, we re-estimate the model for narrow sectors with negative and positive
employment growth separately (Figures 3.9 and 3.10, respectively).
In expanding sectors, we nd that an innovation to the index of exibility at
the margin does not Granger cause job ows. Conversely, in narrow sectors with
negative employment growth, a one standard deviation in the index of exibility at
the margin causes an increase in the destruction and a decrease in the creation of
xed-term jobs for a 4-year period.
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Figure 39: Response of job ows to a shock in exibility at the
margin in shrinking sectors
Figure 310: Response of job ows to a shock in exibility at the
margin in expanding sectors
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Looking at the variance decompositions for both samples, we can conclude that
the index of exibility at the margin explains a non-negligible higher share of the
destruction rate of xed-term jobs in shrinking sectors (7.4%) than in expanding
sectors (5.4%) in the 6 periods ahead (Table D.10 and D.11, respectively). It is also
relevant to note that the destruction of xed-term jobs explains a slightly higher
percentage of the variation in job creation of xed-term jobs in shrinking sectors
than in expanding sectors (8.9% and 7.1% one period ahead, respectively), while the
destruction of open-ended jobs explains a higher share of the permanent creation
rate in expanding than in shrinking sectors (4.7% and 1.8%, respectively, in the
following year).
These results show that the promotion of exibility at the margin is especially
important for rms that are reducing jobs, since those rms adjust the composition of
job ows when a shock arises in the previous period. This is quite intuitive and is in
line with the ndings of Varejão and Portugal (2007) that show that the proportion of
xed-term contracts has a larger e¤ect on the probability of establishments adjusting
employment downwards rather than upwards. This pattern may signal that rms use
xed-term contracts longer and avoid converting them when they are in a downturn,
which is in fact evidence that xed-term contracts are also used as bu¤er stocks for
open-ended contracts in the Portuguese labour market.
Therefore, the mean e¤ect of exibility at the margin described in subsection
3.5.1 is explained by the behaviour of shrinking rather than expanding sectors.
3.5.4 Robustness Analysis
We rely on the Cholesky decomposition to identify the impulse response functions.
Although the ordering of the variables was based on stylised results found in the
literature, we test the robustness of our ndings by changing the ordering. Namely,
we reversed the ordering putting the exibility index last (Figure C.4 and C.5). The
main conclusions remain about the impact of an innovation to job ows: there is less
creation and more destruction of xed-term jobs. Moreover, a negative (positive)
response on the index of exibility at the margin is observed following a shock
in the destruction (creation) of xed-term jobs. Since the results are qualitatively
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unchanged, we are condent that they are not driven by the ordering of the variables
in the system.
The results are also unchanged if we exclude the agriculture sector, which is under
sampled in the data source used. The same also occurs if we compute the index of
exibility at the margin with the exogenous weights as proposed by Alexandre et al.
(2010) (Figure C.6 and C.7).
As discussed by Dolado et al. (2002), the relative wage of permanent and xed-
term contracts may have an impact on the new equilibrium proportion of xed-term
contracts. The introduction and facilitation of the use of xed-term contracts may
indeed increase the bargaining power of workers with permanent contracts, especially
in countries with high employment protection levels (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994).
As such, we include the relative wage of permanent workers (the ratio between the
average log hourly wage21 of workers on permanent contracts and the average log
hourly wage of workers on xed-term contracts) in the model and conclude that the
results remain qualitatively unchanged (Figures C.8, C.9 and C.10). Although the
relative wage is not caused by the innovations to job ows, a shock in the relative
wage Granger causes higher temporary job destruction, at a 5% signicance level.
This is in line with Dolado et al.s (2002) argument, since if workers on permanent
contracts can negotiate higher wages, rms may want to adjust employment by
relying more heavily on xed-term jobs that entail lower dismissal costs so as to
tackle the higher wage bill. This e¤ect may be more marked in sectors with higher
union power.
Finally, we assess the robustness of our results to the inclusion of employment
growth calculated for each narrow sector as a proxy for the business cycle at the
sector level, which captures the idiosyncratic behaviour, namely the phase of the
cycle and the future prospects of each unit j. The results in Figures C.12 and C.13
are similar to those discussed above. It is also stressed that although a shock in
exibility at the margin has a negative e¤ect on employment growth, there is no
causal relationship between the index of exibility at the margin and employment
growth (Figure C.11).
21Wage is equal to the sum of base wage, regular pay and overtime pay.
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3.6 Conclusion
Existing theoretical models predict that increasing exibility at the margin by easing
the regulations or introducing xed-term contracts has a positive impact on both
job creation and job destruction although it is not known a priori which e¤ect
dominates. The net e¤ect on job ows depends on the initial conditions and the
institutional environment, such as the stringency of employment protection on open-
ended contracts. Empirical studies that examine the e¤ects of promoting exibility
at the margin are hence called for.
This paper provides such a study by analysing the e¤ects on job ows of the
2004 Portuguese change in legislation that extended the maximum legal duration of
xed-term contracts from three to six years.
We use a new index of exibility at the margin composed of three components:
the proportion of xed-term contracts, the average duration of the contract and
the non-conversion rate of xed-term contracts, and we estimate a reduced form
panel VAR, which does not require strong assumptions, to examine the dynamic
relationship between exibility at the margin and job ows by type of contract.
Our results show that a panel VAR model is a suitable methodology to study
the impact of exibility at the margin on job ows and that it is important to
disaggregate job ows by type of contract to capture a more accurate and detailed
picture. We nd that in a segmented labour market like that of Portugal, policy
makers may not be able to boost overall job creation and increase employment
if they adopt changes in legislation that ease regulations on xed-term contracts.
Our results show that an innovation to the index of exibility at the margin has
a negative impact on the creation rate and a positive impact on the destruction
rate of xed-term jobs. The e¤ect on the creation rate of xed-term jobs is of a
greater magnitude in absolute terms and lasts for three years, while the impact on
the destruction of xed-term jobs fades out after two periods. The results also show
evidence of a recomposition of xed-term and open-ended contracts in the workforce
since we identify that the promotion of exibility at the margin has the indirect e¤ect
of increasing the destruction rate and causing a larger reduction in the creation rate
95
of open-ended jobs.
We therefore provide new evidence on the magnitude and duration of the e¤ects
of shocks in exibility at the margin on job ows in the Portuguese labour market.
We also conclude that the direction and magnitude of these e¤ects is explained pre-
dominantly by the shock in the proportion of non-converted xed-term contracts.
This is not surprising since rms are expected to use xed-term contracts longer
instead of creating new ones when the maximum legal duration is increased. Fi-
nally, our results evidence a heterogeneous e¤ect of exibility at the margin between
shrinking and expanding sectors as a statistically signicant impact is only observed
on job ows in sectors that are reducing jobs.
The conclusions stated above carry important policy implications. We advocate
that e¤ective labour market policies should be developed that aim to promote the
conversion of xed-term into open-ended contracts to counteract the negative e¤ects
of measures extending their use.
One of the limitations of this study is the fact that we use annual data. As
Portugal and Blanchard (2001) argue, EPL is shown to have a less signicant impact
on job ows when studied using lower frequency data. It would be interesting to
conduct this type of analysis on quarterly or monthly data. On the other hand, gross
job ows show high one-year persistence (Davis et al., 1996; Davis and Haltiwanger,
1992b) and, for the purposes of the paper, annual data allows us to capture persistent
changes instead of transitory job ows. This dataset may, however, underestimate
job ows, especially for xed-term contracts of short duration.
Future work is planned to complement the analysis by considering other institu-
tional variables, such as employment protection for regular contracts, unemployment
benets, wage bargaining and union density, for example, that can help understand-
ing the e¤ects of employment protection reforms easing the regulations on xed-term
contracts (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997; Avdagic, 2015). It would also be interesting
to focus on the asymmetric impact of shocks in the index of exibility at the margin
in recessions and expansions. The dataset used encompass only three years of crisis
(2009-2011), which is not enough to draw meaningful and robust conclusions about
business cycle asymmetries.
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Appendix C
Figures
Figure C.1: Proportion of xed-term contracts, non-conversion rate
and average duration of the contract
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Figure C.2: Job ows
Figure C.3: Persistence of a shock in exibility at the margin and
its components
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Figure C.4: Response of job ows to a shock in the index of exibility
at the margin with the index last in the Cholesky decomposition
Figure C.5: Response of the index of exibility at the margin to a
shock in job ows with the index last in the Cholesky decomposition
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Figure C.6: Response of job ows to a shock in the index of exibility
at the margin with exogenous weights
Figure C.7: Response of the index of exibility at the margin with
exogenous weights to a shock in job ows
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Figure C.8: Dynamic relationship between exibility at the margin
and relative wage
Figure C.9: Response of job ows to a shock in relative wage
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Figure C.10: Response of relative wage to a shock in job ows
Figure C.11: Dynamic relationship between exibility at the margin
and employment growth
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Figure C.12: Response of job ows to a shock in the index of ex-
ibility at the margin including employment growth
Figure C.13: Response of the index of exibility at the margin to a
shock in job ows including employment growth
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Table D.1: Job ows by sector of activity
Sector Job Creation Job Destruction Net Job Creation
2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011
extractive industries 8.90 6.17 12.30 13.37 -3.41 -7.20
manufacturing 8.07 6.75 10.38 12.53 -2.32 -5.77
electricity production and distribution 6.33 5.23 7.01 5.11 -0.67 0.11
construction 16.84 11.50 16.34 23.39 0.50 -11.88
wholesale and retail 12.02 9.08 10.28 12.89 1.74 -3.81
lodgind and restaurants 15.93 12.22 12.51 16.52 3.42 -4.31
transport 8.92 6.74 8.55 10.37 0.36 -3.63
nancial activities 6.23 4.85 5.92 4.54 0.31 0.31
property 19.29 12.82 12.19 16.19 7.10 -3.38
education 18.94 8.43 9.34 22.35 9.60 -13.93
health and social work 13.75 9.24 5.29 7.14 8.46 2.10
collective. social and personal services 15.56 11.57 10.32 13.44 5.24 -1.87
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2000-2011. Notes: Agricu lture and Public Adm in istration were omm itted from the tab le b ecause of
lack of sample coverage.
Table D.2: Job ows by region
Region Job Creation Job Destruction Net Job Creation
2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011
North 13.29 9.75 11.71 14.79 1.57 -5.04
Algarve 17.92 10.96 13.04 21.31 4.87 -10.35
Centre 12.11 8.98 10.58 14.08 1.53 -5.10
Lisbon 12.28 9.05 10.29 13.60 1.99 -4.55
Alentejo 14.86 11.20 12.86 16.97 1.99 -5.76
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2000-2011.
Table D.3: Job ows by rm size category
Firm size category Job Creation Job Destruction Net Job Creation
2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011
]0,4] 27.14 17.97 22.41 30.57 4.73 -12.60
[5,9] 14.38 11.05 13.38 16.81 1.00 -5.76
[10,19] 12.76 9.40 11.61 15.39 1.15 -5.99
[20,49] 10.80 8.50 9.69 13.74 1.10 -5.24
[50,99] 9.77 7.22 8.28 11.54 1.49 -4.33
[100,249] 8.87 7.02 7.49 10.00 1.38 -2.97
[250,499] 9.27 7.09 8.12 8.94 1.15 -1.85
[500,999] 8.20 7.69 6.35 8.39 1.85 -0.70
[1000,+[ 6.76 4.97 4.75 5.43 2.01 -0.46
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2000-2011.
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Table D.4: Job ows by rm age category
Firm age category Job Creation Job Destruction Net Job Creation
2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011 2003-2008 2009-2011
1 58.98 51.96 14.67 22.31 44.32 29.66
[2,5] 17.50 12.89 16.99 25.15 0.51 -12.26
[6,10] 10.70 8.12 13.69 18.03 -2.99 -9.91
[11,20] 7.86 5.60 9.35 12.39 -1.49 -6.80
[21,50] 5.55 4.56 8.75 11.19 -3.20 -6.63
[51,+[ 5.95 3.20 7.14 10.11 -1.19 -6.90
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2000-2011.
Table D.5: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Unweighted Mean Weighted Mean
ex_j_f Index of exibility at the margin in sector j 1.056 1.050
(0.371) (0.013)
proportion_j Proportion of xed-term contracts in sector j 27.864 22.241
(20.839) (2.418)
av_tenure_j Average duration of xed-term contract in sector j 1.469 1.696
(1.485) (0.092)
NC_temporary_j Proportion of non-converted xed-term contracts in sector j 51.518 53.507
(22.909) (4.421)
jobcft Creation rate of xed-term jobs in sector j 38.427 32.324
(45.612) (4.776)
jobdft Destruction rate of xed-term jobs in sector j 29.864 24.796
(34.598) (7.499)
jobcoe Creation rate of open-ended jobs in sector j 24.292 13.982
(39.700) (2.266)
jobdoe Destruction rate of open-ended jobs in sector j 14.590 11.869
(21.393) (1.182)
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Note: Weights are dened as the share of employment in each narrow sector j. Standard
deviations in parentheses.
Table D.6: Dynamic relationship between job ows and exibility at
the margin
Response of
Response to ex_j_f(t) Jobdft(t) Jobcft(t) Jobdoe(t) Jobcoe(t)
ex_j_f(t-1) 0.427*** 4.733** -10.347*** -2.435 2.569
(0.022) (2.213) (2.252) (1.494) (1.581)
jobdft(t-1) -0.001*** 0.0004 0.095*** -0.013 -0.002
(0.0001) (0.019) (0.028) (0.012) (0.013)
jobcft(t-1) 0.001*** 0.069*** -0.001 -0.043*** 0.085***
(0.0001) (0.016) (0.021) (0.011) (0.016)
jobdoe(t-1) 0.00012 -0.042 0.039 -0.058** 0.205***
(0.0003) (0.036) (0.039) (0.029) (0.040)
jobcoe(t-1) -0.00003 -0.032 0.067** 0.007 0.079***
(0.0002) (0.020) (0.027) (0.019) (0.030)
Observations 13,856
Narrow sectors 2,315
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
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Table D.7: Variance decompositions for the model with the propor-
tion of non-converted xed-term contracts
s NC_temporary_j jobdft jobcft jobdoe jobcoe
NC_temporary_j 1 1 0 0 0 0
jobdft 1 0.004 0.996 0 0 0
jobcft 1 0.150 0.102 0.748 0 0
jobdoe 1 0.000 0.015 0.001 0.984 0
jobcoe 1 0.008 0.001 0.038 0.047 0.906
NC_temporary_j 6 0.980 0.014 0.005 0.000 0.000
jobdft 6 0.005 0.989 0.005 0.000 0.001
jobcft 6 0.157 0.110 0.731 0.000 0.002
jobdoe 6 0.000 0.015 0.006 0.979 0.000
jobcoe 6 0.011 0.002 0.047 0.062 0.877
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Percent of variation in the row variab le exp la ined by column variab le in 1 and 6
p eriods after.
Table D.8: Variance decompositions for the model with the propor-
tion of xed-term contracts
s proportion_j jobdft jobcft jobdoe jobcoe
proportion_j 1 1 0 0 0 0
jobdft 1 0.111 0.889 0 0 0
jobcft 1 0.080 0.048 0.872 0 0
jobdoe 1 0.011 0.029 0.000 0.961 0
jobcoe 1 0.011 0.000 0.063 0.038 0.888
proportion_j 6 0.994 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.000
jobdft 6 0.112 0.885 0.002 0.000 0.001
jobcft 6 0.091 0.053 0.854 0.000 0.002
jobdoe 6 0.030 0.029 0.003 0.939 0.000
jobcoe 6 0.027 0.000 0.071 0.051 0.851
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Percent of variation in the row variab le exp la ined by column variab le in 1 and 6
p eriods after.
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Table D.9: Variance decompositions for the model with the average
duration of xed-term contracts
s av_tenure_j jobdft jobcft jobdoe jobcoe
av_tenure_j 1 1 0 0 0 0
jobdft 1 0.010 0.990 0.000 0.000 0.000
jobcft 1 0.000 0.093 0.906 0.000 0.000
jobdoe 1 0.004 0.017 0.001 0.978 0.000
jobcoe 1 0.001 0.001 0.045 0.047 0.906
av_tenure_j 6 0.996 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
jobdft 6 0.017 0.979 0.003 0.001 0.001
jobcft 6 0.002 0.101 0.894 0.000 0.002
jobdoe 6 0.005 0.017 0.006 0.972 0.000
jobcoe 6 0.001 0.001 0.058 0.062 0.878
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Percent of variation in the row variab le exp la ined by column variab le in 1 and 6
p eriods after.
Table D.10: Variance decompositions for shrinking sectors
s ex_j_f jobdft jobcft jobdoe jobcoe
ex_j_f 1 1 0 0 0 0
jobdft 1 0.070 0.930 0 0 0
jobcft 1 0.043 0.089 0.868 0 0
jobdoe 1 0.004 0.011 0.020 0.965 0
jobcoe 1 0.003 0.011 0.008 0.018 0.960
ex_j_f 6 0.983 0.010 0.004 0.001 0.001
jobdft 6 0.074 0.907 0.015 0.003 0.001
jobcft 6 0.058 0.087 0.840 0.006 0.009
jobdoe 6 0.006 0.014 0.021 0.947 0.012
jobcoe 6 0.015 0.015 0.036 0.048 0.885
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Percent of variation in the row variab le exp la ined by column variab le in 1 and 6
p eriods after.
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Table D.11: Variance decompositions for expanding sectors
s ex_j_f jobdft jobcft jobdoe jobcoe
ex_j_f 1 1 0 0 0 0
jobdft 1 0.054 0.946 0 0 0
jobcft 1 0.058 0.071 0.871 0 0
jobdoe 1 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.994 0
jobcoe 1 0.019 0.014 0.040 0.047 0.880
ex_j_f 6 0.991 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.001
jobdft 6 0.054 0.931 0.009 0.002 0.003
jobcft 6 0.061 0.073 0.866 0.000 0.001
jobdoe 6 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.991 0.001
jobcoe 6 0.018 0.014 0.051 0.052 0.864
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Percent of variation in the row variab le exp la ined by column variab le in 1 and 6
p eriods after.
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Chapter 4
Wage inequality between permanent and
xed-term contracts: a rm-level analysis
4.1 Introduction
It is important to understand not only how job and worker ows have been a¤ected
by the widespread implementation of employment protection reforms facilitating
the use of xed-term contracts in Europe but also what type of jobs are being
created (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). Relative wages may be considered "price
signals" that, along with "quantity signals" (eg. vacancy posting), drive employment
reallocation across sectors of activity (Moghadam and Pissarides, 1989). Thus, the
relative wage of permanent contracts may be an important determinant of their
relative demand (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992).
The present paper contributes to the literature by empirically studying the e¤ects
of a Portuguese change in legislation that facilitated the use of xed-term contracts
on the relative wage between workers on open-ended contracts and workers on xed-
term contracts. Most studies on the wage gap between both types of contract have
been conducted using worker level data (e.g. Elia, 2010; Bosio, 2014; Ordine and
Rose, 2016). This is partly due to the lack of available data on wages by type of
contract at the rm level (e.g. Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992; Bentolila and Dolado,
1994; Benito and Hernando, 2008; Cipollone and Guel, 2006; Aguirregabiria and
Alonso-Borrego, 2014). The unit of analysis of this study is the rm, since the rms
wage policy and employment exibility may be interrelated (Suleman et al., 2014).
We consider that the intra-rm wage di¤erential between both types of contract
may reect the main use that rms assign to xed-term contracts.
Chapter 2 highlights that acknowledging that rms may use xed-term contracts
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for di¤erent purposes is relevant to draw conclusions about the e¤ects of exibility
at the margin. As mentioned, xed-term contracts may play two primary roles.
They allow rms to screen matches at a lower cost, especially in labour markets
with high employment protection on regular contracts and low probationary peri-
ods (Faccini, 2014). The convergence between the wages of xed-term workers and
those of permanent workers has been considered in the literature as evidence of this
screening e¤ect (Booth et al., 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and Serrano-Padial, 2007).
Alternatively, xed-term contracts may allow rms to adjust employment after an
economic shock (Pfeifer, 2012). As argued by Pfeifer (2012), workers less likely to
being integrated in the rms internal labour market would su¤er a larger wage
penalty than workers at the top of the workerswage distribution. Moreover, the
higher the wages paid to workers on permanent contracts the higher the probab-
ility that a worker is hired under a xed-term contract and the less likely is the
conversion of the contract (Portugal and Varejão, 2009). Therefore, we consider
that the relative wage of permanent to xed-term workers may reect the way in
which rms primarily use xed-term contracts1. Firms using xed-term contracts
primarily as a bu¤er stock may pay higher relative wages to permanent workers as
argued by Pfeifer (2014). Alternatively, rms using xed-term contracts primarily
for secreening may have lower intra-rm wage di¤erentials between both types of
contract (Mertens and McGinnity, 2003). The e¤ects of exibility at the margin
may, thus, be heterogeneous for rms with di¤erent wage policies with respect to
xed-term contracts.
Finally, this paper addresses an issue disregarded in the literature so far, i.e., the
role played by xed-term contracts in promoting employment reallocation towards
the tradable sector. For price-takers rms in the tradable sector, labour adjustment
costs are potentially more binding than for rms in the non-tradable sector, given
their exposure to international competition. Therefore, these rms may take special
advantage of the use of this type of contract to reduce the rms wage costs. This
analysis is especially relevant for countries like Portugal, in which labour markets
1Note that the wage gap between permanent and xed-term contracts has been considered a
measure of labour market segmentation by some authors such as Osuna (2005).
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are characterised by nominal wage rigidity and stringent employment protection on
regular contracts. As documented by Reis (2013) and OECD (2012), there was
a decline in the manufacturing employment share between 2000 and 2006 in Por-
tugal and an increase in the employment share in nontradable sectors, especially
pronounced in wholesale and retail trade, which was also one of the sectors that
displays a large decline in productivity.
We use a rich longitudinal database on the Portuguese labour market to estimate
a panel quantile regression model with nonadditive xed e¤ects (Powell, 2016). This
is a useful econometric methodology to test whether the e¤ect of the 2004 change in
legislation and whether the tradable di¤erential are heterogeneous over the relative
wage distribution.
This paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, to the best
of our knowledge, this is the rst study on the impact of asymmetric employment
protection reforms on the distribution of the within-rm wage gap between per-
manent and xed-term contracts. Secondly, we provide original empirical evidence
on whether the e¤ect of a larger EPL gap on the intra-rm wage di¤erential is
heterogeneous between tradable and non-tradable sectors.
Our results suggest that the 2004 change in legislation increased wage inequality
between xed-term and open-ended contracts in those rms at the median and top
quantiles of the relative wage distribution by 1.6% and 1%, respectively. This result
is in line with Elia (2010), who argues that xed-term contracts are a new source
of wage inequality. We also nd evidence that although the relative wage is not
di¤erently a¤ected by the change in legislation in rms in the tradable sector, these
rms have higher within-rm wage inequality between both types of contract at the
top of the conditional relative wage distribution. The relative wage of permanent
contracts is 1.2% and 2.3% larger, at the 75th and 90th quantiles, respectively,
in rms in the tradable sector. Finally, our results suggest that xed-term and
permanent workers are close substitutes in rms at the bottom and at the median
of the relative wage distribution and are imperfect substitutes in rms where there
is higher wage inequality between both types of contract.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief characterisation of
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the Portuguese labour market and describes the change in legislation under study.
In section 3, we review the relevant literature and section 4 describes the dataset
and presents the econometric methodology. Finally, sections 5 and 6 discuss the
main results and draw conclusions about the policy implications of our results,
respectively.
4.2 The Portuguese Labour Market
The Portuguese labour market is characterised by strong rigidity of nominal wages2
and stringent employment protection on permanent contracts. Wages are determ-
ined under collective bargaining, usually held at the sector or occupation level
(Marques et al., 2010). Until 2011, collective agreements were frequently exten-
ded to all the workers and rms in a sector of activity by the Government through
extension clauses (Martins, 2015; Marques et al., 2010). Therefore, wages in the
Portuguese labour market are bound by the national minimum wage and by the
wage oor resulting from the wage bargaining (Portugal, 2008).
In such a setting, characterised by nominal wage rigidity, low ination, and low
scope for rms to adjust employment due to the high adjustment costs entailed by
open-ended contracts, xed-term contracts can be important instruments for rms
to adjust employment. The reforms promoting exibility at the margin and the strict
employment protection on open-ended contracts led to an accentuated increase in
the proportion of xed-term contracts in Portugal over the last decades and in 2012,
workers on xed-term contracts represented approximately 20% of total workforce.
After the introduction of xed-term contracts in 1976, the regulations on their
use su¤ered several changes. One of the most relevant changes occurred in 2004,
when an extraordinary renewal was introduced and the maximum duration of xed-
term contracts was extended from three to six years. This change in legislation
also allowed rms to hire workers on xed-term contracts to indirectly substitute an
absent employee. In 2009, this legislative change was overturned for new contracts
and the maximum legal duration of a xed-term contract was re-established at three
2Nominal wage cuts are not allowed by Portuguese legislation (Portugal, 2008).
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years. Although the employment protection of open-ended contracts remained quite
stable during this period, the employment protection gap between xed-term and
open-ended contracts increased also in rms with 11 to 20 employees due to the
increase in the procedural costs incurred in permanent workers dimissal for rms
of this size (Centeno and Novo, 2012).
Finally, although the Labour Code of 2003 introduced an equal treatment clause
between workers on xed-term and open-ended contracts, there is evidence of a wage
premium for the average permanent worker (Silvério, 2015).
4.3 Literature Review
Fixed-term contracts may help rms to reduce wage costs (e.g. for the Netherlands,
see Kleinknecht et al., 2006). In fact, the literature usually nds that xed-term
contracts receive, on average, lower wages than open-ended contracts (e.g. Jimeno
and Toharia, 1993; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Hagen, 2002), especially at the
bottom of the workers wage distribution for countries like Italy (Bosio, 2014) and
Germany (Mertens and McGinnity, 2003; Mertens et al., 2007; Pfeifer, 2012).
As predicted by Boeri (2011), stricter EPL on open-ended contracts increases
the wage premium of permanent over temporary contracts. However, this e¤ect
may depend on labour market tightness (Cao et al., 2010). If the job nding and
vacancy lling probabilities remain constant (no search externalities), increasing
ring costs on permanent contracts raise both the relative wage of workers on per-
manent contracts and the proportion of temporary contracts. However, if there are
search externalities, the e¤ects on wage inequality are negligible, because the pro-
portion of temporary contracts decreases although the relative wage of permanent
workers increases.
The promotion of exibility at the margin may also have important consequences
for wage setting (Jimeno and Toharia, 1993; Bentolila and Dolado, 1994) by in-
creasing wage pressure and wage dispersion (Dolado et al., 2002). As predicted by
insider-outsider theory, the existence of high labour turnover costs for insiders in-
creases their bargaining power (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Bentolila and Dolado
(1994) build upon this theory and argue that the strength of permanent contracts
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in wage bargaining is reinforced by the existence of xed-term contracts with lower
ring costs, especially in countries where the employment protection on open-ended
contracts is high. According to these authors, wages can be a¤ected by the pro-
portion of temporary contracts through the bu¤er and bargaining e¤ects3. The
higher proportion of xed-term contracts can increase the wage growth experienced
by workers on permanent contracts since the latter may be used as a bu¤er stock
for permanent contracts and decrease the probability of a worker on a permanent
contract being dismissed. The proportion of temporary employees may also increase
the bargaining power of permanent workers if the latter threaten to not cooperate
with the former. However, the bargaining power may also be reduced due to the
lower strike frequency of temporary workers. The authors nd empirical evidence
of both the bu¤er and bargaining e¤ects and estimate that the proportion of xed-
term contracts has a positive impact on the wage growth experienced by workers on
open-ended contracts and a negative impact on the average labour cost per worker.
This latter e¤ect results from the fact that workers on xed-term contracts su¤er
a wage penalty (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994), possibly due to wage discrimination,
as pointed out by Jimeno and Toharia (1993). The results of Bentolila and Dolado
(1994) hold for a panel of Spanish rms and a panel of sectors of activity in Den-
mark, France and Germany. However, the e¤ects are more signicant for countries
with strong employment protection for open-ended contracts, which suggests that
the bargaining e¤ect is lower in countries such as Denmark.
Therefore, the introduction of xed-term contracts in the Spanish labour market
may have initially contributed to decrease the wage drift4, due to the wage pen-
alty su¤ered by workers on this type of contract. However, the increasing share
of xed-term contracts may have also contributed to strengthen the insidersbar-
gaining position and eventually contributed to increase the wage drift (Bentolila
and Dolado, 1994). This empirical observation is in line with Jimeno and Toharias
(1993) ndings of a positive impact of the proportion of xed-term contracts in the
3Bentolila and Dolado (1994) also mention a composition e¤ect when the researcher is not able
to observe the wage by type of contract.
4The wage drift is the di¤erence between the wage growth dened in collective bargaining and
the observed average wage growth.
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bargained wage growth. Besides, the use of xed-term contracts as an adjustment
tool in rms where unions have a higher coverage and bargain for higher wages for
open-ended contracts is also documented by Dolado et al. (2002). These authots es-
timate that the proportion of xed-term contracts on total employment is negatively
a¤ected by the proportion of workers covered by a union.
Job matching models also provide some insights about how the relative wage
between permanent and xed-term contracts may be a¤ected by asymmetric em-
ployment protection reforms. Dolado et al. (2007) nd that decreasing the ring
costs of low-productivity workers does not have an expressive e¤ect on average wages
but increases wage inequality between high and low-productivity workers 5, while
a reform reducing the ring costs for high-productivity workers shrinks the wage
gap. Masui (2013) distinguishes the wage setting mechanism for open-ended and
temporary contracts in a job matching model - the wages of workers on open-ended
contracts are determined through collective bargaining and workers on xed-term
contracts receive a wage equal to their reservation wage. According to this model,
the wage of permanent workers is positively (negatively) a¤ected by the ring costs
on permanent (temporary) contracts. The e¤ects of ring costs of temporary work-
ers on their wages depend on the average productivity and wages of workers on
permanent contracts and on the contracts conversion.
Recent empirical evidence on the wage e¤ects of a larger employment protection
gap between open-ended and xed-term contracts is scarce. Elia (2010) estimate
that the introduction of new forms of temporary contracts (and the ease of the use
of the apprenticeship contract 6) in Italy increased the wage gap between permanent
and temporary contracts between 8.2% and 10% in the short and long-run due to
the reduction in temporary workers wage. This e¤ect is larger for skilled workers,
which as Elia (2010) argues may indicate that xed-term contracts are used as
screening devices. Likewise, Bosio (2014) nds that this e¤ect is larger for high
5As measured by the ratio of wages of high productivity workers and wages of low productivity
workers.
6The circumstances allowing to hire a worker on a xed-term contract were broadened and the
requisites for an apprenticeship contract, such as age limit and certication of qualications, were
extended.
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skilled workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. There is evidence, however,
that the introduction of new forms of temporary contracts in Italy, had a negative
e¤ect on the wage of new permanent workers (Ordine and Rose, 2016). For Italy,
there is also evidence that a 1% hiring of xed-term contracts is valued by rms
as equivalent to a reduction in permanents workerswage between 1.3% and 2.8%,
which may explain the considerable increase in xed-term contracts in Italy between
1995 and 2003 (Cipollone and Guel, 2006).
In the Portuguese labour market there is empirical evidence that xed-term
contracts facilitate employment adjustment (e.g. Varejão and Portugal, 2007) but
also serve as screening devices (e.g. Portugal and Varejão, 2009). Previous literature
nds that xed-term workers su¤er the burden of a larger employment protection
gap between open-ended and xed-term contracts. Higher employment protection
for open-ended contracts increases excess worker turnover (Centeno and Novo, 2012)
and reduces the wage of workers on xed-term contracts (Centeno and Novo, 2014).
On the other hand, extending the maximum duration of the xed-term contract
reduces and postpones the conversion of the contract and has a negative impact on
the wage growth experienced by workers on this type of contract. However, and in
line with the screening hypothesis, this negative e¤ect is especially felt by workers
whose contract was not converted to an open-ended contract (see Chapter 2).
Finally, reference should be made to the heterogeneous e¤ects of xed-term
contracts on average wages and employment among rms and sectors of activity
(Bentolila and Dolado, 1994; Kleinknecht et al., 2006). In services, where the pro-
portion of xed-term contracts is larger, the bu¤er and bargaining e¤ects are less
accentuated than in the manufacturing sector (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies addressing whether the
e¤ects of reforms increasing the employment protection gap between xed-term and
open-ended contracts are asymmetric between tradable and non-tradable sectors.
Moreover, we nd no empirical evidence of the impact of changes in EPL on the
distribution of the relative wage between open-ended and xed-term contracts at
the rm level.
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4.4 Empirical Methodology
4.4.1 Quadros de Pessoal
The analysis is conducted usingQuadros de Pessoal, an administrative linked employer-
employee database collected every year in October. This exceptionally rich data-
base on the Portuguese labour market provides information on every employer in
the private sector and their employees.
Quadros de Pessoal provides information on rms sector of activity, location,
constitution date, turnover and total number of employees. Moreover, it allows us to
match rms and workers and, therefore, to characterise the rms workforce in terms
of personal characteristics (gender, education, nationality, age) and occupation level,
tenure and type of contract. It also includes detailed information on wages and since
the information is reported by the rm and is made publicly available, misreporting
and error measurement are reduced.
We restrict the analysis to rms operating in mainland Portugal. Moreover,
similarly to Cardoso et al. (2012), we only consider full time workers with a xed-
term or an open-ended contract, aged 18 to 65, earning at least 80% of the minimum
wage7. Outliers in the workers wage distribution, i.e., workers observations below
the 2nd and above the 99th percentile of the wage distribution, are also excluded
from the analysis.
The unit of observation is the rm. After all the exclusions, we are left with an
unbalanced panel of 162,480 di¤erent rms observed between 2002 and 20118, which
corresponds to a total of 541,983 observations.
The real wage is dened in an hourly basis and equals the sum of base wages,
overtime pay and regular benets. This variable was deated using the Consumer
Price Index (2012=100). We then calculate the average wage9 paid to workers on
permanent contracts and to those on xed-term contracts for each rm and year
7Workers with missing wage or type of contract, working more than 400 hours/month and with
normal period of work lower than 120 hours are also dropped.
8Information on the contract type is only available since 2002. We restrict the analysis until
2011 to avoid capturing the e¤ects of other changes in legislation, namely another extension of the
maximum duration of xed-term contracts occured in 2012.
9We use this location measure similarly to Edo (2016).
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and compute the logarithm of their ratio.
The variable capturing the change in legislation varies over rms and time and
it is dened as follows. It is a dummy variable taking value one between 2004 and
2008 and, after that, for rms that have a worker on a xed-term contract hired
until February 2009 10. The dummy takes value zero in 2002, 2003 and for those
rms only employing workers on xed-term contracts hired after February 2009.
The tradable sectors are dened as those that are exposed to international com-
petition but the classication of rms in tradable and nontradable sectors is not
trivial (Dwyer, 1992) and several methodologies are addressed in the literature. In
this study we follow the classication in Catarino et al. (2006)11. Therefore, the
tradable sector comprises the following two-digits sectors of activity: i) agriculture
and sheries; ii) extractive industries; iii) manufacturing; iv) transports; v) nancial
activities; vi) property. The non-tradable sector includes the remaining sectors, i.e.:
i) production and distribution of electricity and water; ii) construction; iii) wholesale
and retail; iv) lodging and restaurants; v) public administration; vi) education; vi)
health and social work; vii) collective, social and personal services.
4.4.2 Econometric Methodology
Firms with di¤erent wage policies with respect to xed-term and permanent con-
tracts may use the former for di¤erent purposes, namely as screening and adjustment
devices. Thus, studying only the mean e¤ects of exibility at the margin on the re-
lative wage may provide a misleading and incomplete picture. Quantile regression
methods allow us to estimate the impact of the 2004 change in legislation over the
conditional quantile functions of the relative wage between permanent and xed-
term contracts (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). We therefore estimate the following
panel quantile regression model with rm xed e¤ects:
10Note that the change in legislation was overturned only for new contracts in 2009.
11These authors use the classication criteria developed by Dwyer (1992).
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Qwft( jxft; Eft; Legft; T radft) = ()xft + ()Eft + ()Legft + ()Tradft + t;
(4.1)
wft = Qwft( jxft; Eft; Legft; T radft) + Uft: (4.2)
Qwft( jxft; Eft; Legft; T radft) is the conditional th quantile of wft, where   (0; 1).
wft is the logarithm of the ratio between permanent and xed-term contractswages
(log(WOEC
WFTC
)) at rm f and time t12. The covariates xft includes rms size and rms
age dummies, the share of public and foreign capital, the proportion of workers by
gender and immigrant status, education and occupation levels and the average age
(in logs) of workers employed by the rm13. We also include in the model three
treatment variables and their interactions: the logarithm of the ratio of perman-
ent to xed-term number of contracts (E = log(EOEC
EFTC
)), a dummy representing the
change in legislation (Legft) and a dummy for tradable sectors (Tradft). Since the
e¤ects of the ratio of permanent to xed-term workers on relative wages may have
been shifted when the employment protection gap between both types of contracts
widened, we include the interaction between the relative employment and the legis-
lation dummy. In fact, this interaction term may capture the bu¤er e¤ect (Bentolila
and Dolado, 1994) and the composition e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage. Finally, we also allow the e¤ect of the change in legislation to dif-
fer between rms in tradable and non-trabable sectors, by including the interaction
between the legislation and tradable dummies.
The model includes both time xed e¤ects (t), which allows the distribution
of the relative wage to change over the years and rm xed e¤ects (f). Uft is an
unknown function of a rm xed e¤ect (f) and the disturbance term ("ft). Note
that in this setting it is important to include rm xed e¤ects because it accounts
12We use the log of the variables to obtain the (semi-)elasticities of the dependent variable with
respect to the independent variables. The results remain qualitatively unchanged if we did not
transformed the ratio of relative wages.
13Note that we did not include region or sector dummies because they show low within variation
in the data, which would result in lower e¢ ciency in the xed e¤ects estimation.
120
for unobserved rms characteristics, such as the relative productivity of permanent
contracts that may be arbitrarily correlated with the treatment and control variables.
This allows us to control for possible unobserved di¤erences between those rms that
beneted from the higher exibility at the margin and those that did not and may
help to mitigate possible concerns about the selection of rms with at least one
xed-term and one open-ended contract.
As Koenker (2004) states, it is not feasible to estimate a xed e¤ect for each
quantile  , thus the xed e¤ect has a location-shift e¤ect on the conditional quantile
function of the relative wage. Most quantile regression models for panel data, such
as that introduced in Koenker (2004), include additive xed e¤ects (Powell, 2016).
This technique, however, does not allow for the coe¢ cients to vary with the xed
e¤ect and their interpretation is modied since the distribution turns out to be (wft 
f )jEft; Legft; T radft; xft instead of wftjEft; Legft; T radft; xft14(Powell, 2016).
To overcome this issue, we implement the estimation method for quantile re-
gression with nonadditive xed e¤ects proposed by Powell (2016). Identication is
achieved through the within-rm variation.
As Powell (2016) argues, this method has several advantages: i) it allows the
estimated coe¢ cients to vary with some function of the xed-e¤ect and the disturb-
ance term (Uft); ii) it allows to mantain the interpretation of the coe¢ cients as
in standard cross-sectional quantile regression and iii) this method is consistent for
samples with a low number of time periods, since the xed e¤ects are not estimated.
The model is estimated using a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estim-
ator with two moment conditions as stated in Corollary 3.2 in Powell (2016). The
standard errors are clustered at the rm level15.
According to the literature presented in Section 3, we expect that, in the period
in which the change in legislation increasing the employment protection gap between
14In this setting, we would estimate the e¤ect of the treatment variables in the conditional
distribution of the di¤erence between relative wage and the unobserved characteristics of the rm.
15Note that we cannot compare the estimates over di¤erent quantiles without correcting the
standard errors. We intend to do so by bootstrapping the standard errors, which is a time consum-
ing exercise. Nevertheless, there is at least one variable for which the estimated coe¢ cients change
signs and remain statistical signicant over the distribution of the relative wage, which evidences
the suitability of the quantile regression.
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both types of contract was in force, the wage premium paid to the average permanent
worker increases, i.e. the wage ratio increases in the higher quantiles of the condi-
tional distribution of log(WOEC
WFTC
). Moreover, we expect that this e¤ect is smaller for
rms with a higher ratio of permanent to xed-term contracts (i.e., we expect that
the interaction between relative permanent employment and the legislation dummy
to be negative). Finally, we expect a higher wage inequality between workers on
xed-term and open-ended contracts in tradable sectors (i.e., a positive sign for the
coe¢ cient associated with the dummy for tradable sectors) and that these sectors
are more a¤ected by the change in legislation (i.e., a positive sign for the interaction
of the tradable dummy with the legislation dummy), especially for the higher end
of the distribution.
4.4.3 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 41 presents the graphical representation of the empirical quantiles of the
relative wage distribution (in logs) and Table 4.1 presents the characteristics of the
rms located at the mean and at the 10th, 50th and 90th quantiles of the empirical
distribution of the relative wages (in logs).
Figure 41: Quantile plot of the relative wage
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean p10 p50 p90
wageFTC 4.39 5.06 4.04 4.39
(1.95) (2.09) (1.50) (1.60)
wageOEC 5.29 4.39 4.57 7.32
(2.68) (1.82) (1.70) (2.67)
relative employment (logs) 0.61 0.40 0.68 0.82
(1.17) (1.20) (1.09) (1.26)
EFTC 5.88 3.92 5.91 7.58
(24.28) (10.42) (20.03) (30.03)
EOEC 16.31 8.78 14.09 29.48
(124.89) (62.05) (48.70) (255.65)
Firmscharacteristics
dimension (number of employees) 31.35 17.72 27.79 50.20
(194.57) (72.60) (83.64) (349.28)
age (number of years) 15.81 13.77 16.09 17.20
(20.61) (19.53) (18.74) (17.76)
tradable sectors (%) 36.92 34.43 35.96 41.57
(48.26) (47.52) (47.99) (49.29)
public capital (%) 0.49 0.30 0.31 0.83
(6.63) (5.32) (5.37) (8.64)
foreign capital (%) 3.08 1.58 1.98 6.51
(16.71) (12.07) (13.43) (23.76)
Employment composition
females (%) 43.97 41.60 42.86 42.80
(34.74) (34.40) (35.38) (30.99)
immigrants (%) 6.13 6.24 6.22 4.90
(15.99) (16.82) (15.21) (13.54)
average workersage (log) 3.60 3.60 3.60 3.61
(continued)
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(continuation)
Variables Mean p10 p50 p90
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16)
Average workerseducation
less than high school 67.74 68.85 74.35 54.62
(32.35) (32.50) (29.04) (32.63)
high school 21.91 20.82 18.80 28.56
(24.89) (25.13) (22.86) (24.82)
bachelor degree 1.97 1.86 1.35 3.34
(6.69) (6.86) (5.18) (8.28)
college degree 8.38 8.47 5.50 13.48
(17.56) (18.06) (14.07) (20.53)
Average workersoccupation
managers 4.58 4.12 3.18 7.30
(11.23) (11.37) (9.36) (12.96)
experts 6.36 6.95 4.07 9.63
(16.72) (17.80) (13.51) (19.15)
intermediate-level technicians 10.33 9.81 8.26 15.44
(19.51) (19.53) (17.10) (21.48)
admnistrative sta¤ 14.12 13.99 12.05 20.00
(21.78) (21.73) (20.06) (24.07)
sellers 21.18 19.09 22.34 15.62
(33.05) (31.33) (33.48) (27.02)
qualied workers from agriculture 1.51 1.49 1.37 1.24
(10.50) (10.41) (9.88) (9.30)
craftsmen 19.77 22.70 23.94 14.71
(31.19) (32.66) (32.88) (25.96)
machine operators 10.10 10.09 11.19 6.84
(23.21) (23.11) (23.90) (16.77)
(continued)
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(continuation)
Variables Mean p10 p50 p90
unqualied workers 11.35 11.02 12.93 8.45
(21.10) (21.00) (21.57) (16.44)
Total observations 541,983 5,419 5,420 5,420
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard deviations in parantheses.
At the mean of the relative wage distribution, the logarithm of the ratio between
permanent and xed-term wages is approximately 0.16 log points with a standard
deviation of 0.29 log points and, therefore, there is evidence of a wage premium of
0.16 log points for the average worker on an open-ended contract. For instance,
workers on xed-term contracts receive, on average, 4.39e/hour, while workers on
open-ended contracts receive approximately 5.29e/hour. Moreover, the average rm
employs approximately six workers on xed-term contracts for each sixteen workers
on open-ended contracts. Firms have an average dimension of 31 employees and
are approximately 16 years old. Almost 37% of the rms in the sample are in the
tradable sector. Female workers represent approximately 44% of the total rms
workforce and 6% are immigrants. Finally, rms workforce is characterised by a
low level of education (approximately 68% of total workforce have less than high
school education and only 8% have college education) and is allocated in low qualied
occupations (approximately 41% of the workforce are salespeople and craftsmen).
However, there is a substantial heterogeneity in rms characteristics and em-
ployment composition over the distribution of the ratio between permanent and
xed-term contractswages. The distribuition of the relative wage appears to be
symmetric (Figure 41). Firms in the 10th quantile pay a slightly higher wage to
workers on xed-term than to workers on open-ended contracts (approximately -
0.14 log points). At the median of the relative wage distribution, the wage penalty
experienced by xed-term contracts is equal to 0.12 log points, which is below the
corresponding gure at the mean. In the 10% of rms that o¤er a higher relative
wage to permanent contracts the wage gap is approximately 0.51 log points. This
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is due to the higher wage for the average worker on an open-ended contract at the
higher percentiles of the distribution, since the wage of the average xed-term worker
is in line with that at the mean of the distribution.
The rms in the bottom of the distribution are also smaller (on average 18 work-
ers) and slightly younger (approximately 14 years of activity) and have a higher
proportion of the total workforce on xed-term contracts than rms at the top
quantiles of the distribution. At the 10th quantile of the relative wage distribution,
there is also a lower proportion of workers with a college degree and a larger pro-
portion of less qualied occupations (especially craftsmen and unqualied workers)
in comparison with the 90th quantile. Finally, it is important to note that the share
of rms in the tradable sector is higher at the 90th quantile of the relative wage
distribution.
This preliminary analysis supports the necessity to use an econometric model
that allows us to study the conditional distribution of the ratio of permanent to
xed-term wages.
4.5 Results
We rst estimate the model for the conditional mean using a xed e¤ects estim-
ator16 (Table E.1). The results show that the change in legislation increased the
mean relative wage between workers on permanent and xed-term contracts in ap-
proximately 1% and this e¤ect is statistically signicant at a 99% condence level
(column (1) of Table E.1). However, if we include year dummies, the coe¢ cient of
the legislative change becomes negative and it is still statistically signicant (column
(2) of Table E.1), which may be due to the fact that the dummy accounting for the
change in legislation depends on the year. We, therefore, re-estimate the model with
a linear trend instead, and obtain similar results to those that do not control for
time e¤ects (column (3) of Table E.1). There is also evidence, at a 90% condence
level, that the wage di¤erential between both types of contract is larger in rms
16There is evidence of the existence of individual e¤ects (the p-value of the Breusch and Pagan
LM test for random e¤ects is equal to zero), and these e¤ects are xed according to the Hausman
test (p-value=0.0000).
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Table 4.2: Quantile estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between open-ended and xed-term contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0006 -0.0059*** -0.0164***
(0.0013) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0014)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls no no no no no
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs).
in the tradable sector. However, the higher wage inequality in these rms was not
statistically signicant when the change in legislation was in force 17.
One of the advantages of studying the distribution of the relative wage is to
assess whether the estimated elasticity of substitution between open-ended and xed-
term contracts di¤er between rms with high and low wage inequality. The usual
framework to obtain the elasticity of substitution between both types of contract is a
constant elasticity of substitution production function (Dolado et al., 2002; Jimeno
and Toharia, 1993; Edo, 2016). Therefore, we present the results of a quantile
regression of the relative wage on the relative employment with xed e¤ects and
without any covariates in Table 4.2.
The lack of statistical signicance of the coe¢ cients associated with the ratio of
permanent to xed-term employment for the rms in the lower and median quantiles
of the distribution supports the notion that xed-term contracts are close substi-
tutes of open-ended contracts. This result is in line with the evidence provided by
Centeno and Novo (2012). However, at the top of the distribution of the relat-
ive wages, the e¤ect of relative employment is negative and statistically signicant,
which may indicate that workers on xed-term and open-ended contracts are im-
17The p-value of the Wald test with the null hypothesis: Tradft + LegftXTradft = 0 is higher
than 0.5 for all the regressions in Table E.1. This result holds for rms with Eft 6= 0.
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perfect substitutes in these rms. As Edo (2016) argues, if wages of workers on
xed-term and open-ended contracts are not equally exible, as it may be the case
for Portugal, the estimates of the elasticity of substitution are lower bounds of the
true elasticity. This preliminary evidence shows that it is important to consider the
whole distribution of relative wages when estimating the elasticity of substitution,
since rms that o¤er higher wages to their workers on permanent contracts may
not consider workers on temporary contracts as perfect substitutes of the former 18.
Additionally, the relative wage may be informative about the role that xed-term
contracts play within the rm, since this may indicate that xed-term contracts are
potentially used as bu¤er stocks instead of screening devices for permanent workers
in rms at the higher quantiles of the relative wage distribution.
We now proceed to the analysis of the estimation results for the full model
specied in Equation (4.1) (Table 4.3).
In the period in which the change in legislation was in force, the relative wage
of permanent contracts increased, but the e¤ect is only statistically signicant, at
a 1% and 10% signicance levels, at the median and the 75th quantile of the re-
lative wage distribution, respectively. Firms at the median of the relative wage
distribution increase the ratio between permanent and xed-term contractswages
in approximately 1.6%, ceteris paribus. Note that the coe¢ cient associated with the
legislation dummy loses statistical signicance when we include the covariates in the
model19 (Table E.2). Moreover, we only capture an indirect e¤ect of the increase
in the employment protection gap through the employment composition by type of
contract in the results of the model with no covariates (except for the 90th quantile)
(Table E.2). As expected, at the median and top quantiles of the distribution, the
increase in the relative wage due to the change in legislation is lower for rms with
a higher number of permanent to xed-term contracts, which may give some hint
that xed-term contracts may be used as a bu¤er stock for open-ended contracts in
18This may be justied if xed-term contracts are allocated to less qualied occupations, for
example.
19Note, however, that the marginal e¤ect of the change in legislation is only statistically signi-
cant, at a 5% signicance level, at the 50th quantile and the 75th quantile as in the model with
covariates.
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Table 4.3: Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on the relative wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel 0.0065*** 0.0060*** 0.0069*** 0.0029* -0.0053**
(0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023)
tradable 0.0060 0.0035 0.0063 0.0118** 0.0230**
(0.0075) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0090)
legislation -0.0011 0.0028 0.0161*** 0.0096* 0.0081
(0.0080) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0058) (0.0094)
lemp_rel trad -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0037)
lemp_rel leg 0.0027 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0038*
(0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0022)
lemp_rel trad leg -0.0017 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0011 0.0035
(0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0033)
leg trad -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0038 -0.0072
(0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0055)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs). Control variab les include: rms
d im ension dumm ies and rms age dumm ies, rms cap ita l ownersh ip and employm ent composition (share of workers by education
and occupation , average workers age and prop ortion of females and imm igrants among workforce).
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these rms (Table E.2).
We also nd evidence supporting the hypothesis that rms in tradable sectors
may use xed-term contracts as a source of wage exibility. The wage premium
of open-ended contracts is larger and statistically signicant, at a 95% condence
level, for rms in the tradable sector at the top of the distribution of the relative
wage. For the 10% of rms paying a higher wage premium for permanent contracts,
those in tradable sector pay an additional premium of 2.3% (Table 4.3). However,
there is no signicant evidence that the wage ratio in rms in tradable sectors is
a¤ected by changes in legislation that widen the employment protection gap between
open-ended and xed-term contracts20.
Although the ratio of permanent to xed-term employment has a statistically
signicant e¤ect on the relative wage over the whole distribution, the economic
impact is quite low (0.01% at the 10th to 50th quantiles and -0.01% at the 90th
quantile).
We, therefore, conclude that rms at the median and at the top of the relative
wages distribution (at least at the 75th quantile) react to changes in legislation
that increase the employment protection gap between both types of contract by
increasing the wage inequality between them. This may indicate that rms paying
a wage premium to the workers on open-ended contracts are those that increase it
even further as a response to the larger employment protection gap, but not those
with the highest wage premium (at the 90th quantile of the conditional relative wage
distribution) possibly due to the lower scope to increase it even more. On the other
hand, those rms with lower wage inequality or that pay higher wages to workers
on xed-term contracts do not translate higher quantitative exibility in higher
wage inequality. The di¤erent roles of xed-term contracts in the labour market-
as screening devices or bu¤er stocks for open-ended contracts- may contribute to
explain these results.
Finally, it is important to notice that the employment composition by education
20For the model with no covariates, at the 75th and 90th quantiles, rms in tradable sector had
lower wage di¤erentials between both contracts when the change in legislation was in force. This
may be due to the fact that rms in tradable sector already have higher levels of wage inequality
between open-ended and xed-term contracts and therefore react less to the changes in legislation.
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and occupation level has negligible economic e¤ects, although they are statistically
signicant in most quantiles (Table E.3). The ratio between permanent and xed-
term contractswages seems to increase with the size of the rm in all quantiles, but
especially at the bottom of the distribution. Older rms also seem to pay a higher
relative wage to workers on permanent contracts (or a lower wage premium to xed-
term contracts) for those rms at the bottom of the relative wage distribution.
4.5.1 Estimation using an adaptiveMarkov chainMonte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm
The results discussed above were estimated using the Nelder-Mead optimisation
method. However, we cannot compare the estimated coe¢ cients over di¤erent
quantiles without correcting the standard errors. Inference methods for quantile
regression estimators are substantially studied and there are various resampling
techniques available (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).
As Powell (2016) reports, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is an adequate
numerical optimisation technique for models with a large number of treatment vari-
ables as it is the case of the model under study. We therefore re-estimate the
model using an adaptive Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm21 with 5,000 draws,
where the rst 500 were burned, and an acceptance rate of 0.4, similarly to Smith
(2015)22. The proposal distribution is a multivariate normal density as described in
Baker (2014).
In broad terms, the previous results are robust to this alternative optimisation
technique, although most of the estimates of the e¤ect of the treatment variables
are now statistically signicant (Tables 4.4 and E.4).
It is worth nothing that the e¤ect of the change in legislation that increased ex-
ibility at the margin in the Portuguese labour market is now statistically signicant
at the bottom of the relative wage distribution. These results may indicate that the
change in legislation contributes to increase the inequalities at the bottom and at the
21This is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis since we plan to alternatively bootstrap the
standard errors, but it is a less time consuming exercise that allows us to draw conclusions about
the estimates equality along the distribution quantiles.
22The initial value of the random-number seed was set to 71436018. The initial parameter values
and covariance matrix result from the cross-sectional quantile regression.
131
top of the relative wage distribution. Not only the wage disadvantage of the average
permanent worker is increased in approximately 1%, at the 10th quantile, as their
wage advantage is increased in rms with the largest relative wage for permanent
contracts in 0.6% and 1.9%, at the 75th and 90th quantiles, respectively. This e¤ect
is therefore increasing over the rmsrelative wage distribution, although rms in
the middle part of the distribution appear to be unresponsive to the change in legis-
lation. These results help to explain the negative sign of the change in legislation at
the mean of the distribution when controlling for time e¤ects (column (2) of Table
E.1). Thus, mean e¤ects of the change in legislation give us an incomplete picture
on how the relative wage distribution is a¤ected by exibility at the margin and
they are likely inuenced by the lower quantiles of the relative wage distribution.
There is evidence of higher and increasing wage inequality between workers on
both types of contract in rms in tradable sectors at the top of the conditional
relative wage distribution. However, the marginal e¤ect of the change in legislation
is negative and statistically signicant for rms in the tradable sector over the entire
distribution. This indicates that in the tradable sector the wage inequalities are only
magnied in rms at the bottom of the distribution where the average permanent
worker may receive a lower wage than the average xed-term contract. In the rms
where xed-term contracts face a wage disadvantage, the inequalities are reduced in
approximately 0.3% at the 50th and 75th quantiles and 9% at the 90th quantile23.
Finally, this Bayesian method allows us to conclude about the equality of the
estimates over the di¤erent quantiles. The non-overlapping condence intervals
of the estimates of the dummies accounting for the change in legislation and the
tradable sectors show that the e¤ects of the treatment variables are heterogeneous
over the relative wage distribution (Table E.5). A quantile regression is therefore a
suitable econometric methodology to address the research questions.
23The p-value of these Wald tests are lower than 0.05.
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Table 4.4: Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on the relative wage using an adaptive MCMC algorithm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel 0.0058*** 0.0066*** 0.0145*** 0.0044*** -0.0113***
(0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0002) (0.0004)
tradable 0.0103*** 0.0184*** 0.0171*** 0.0223*** 0.0393***
(0.0009) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0018)
legislation -0.0099*** 0.0004 0.0033 0.0058*** 0.0186***
(0.0024) (0.0007) (0.0027) (0.0006) (0.0011)
lemp_rel_trad -0.0080*** -0.0038*** -0.0025 0.0007* -0.0042***
(0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0024) (0.0004) (0.0013)
lemp_rel_leg 0.0020 0.0017*** -0.0032 -0.0057*** -0.0149***
(0.0022) (0.0006) (0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0008)
lemp_rel_trad_leg 0.0067** 0.0046*** 0.0032* 0.0057*** 0.0150***
(0.0030) (0.0007) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0013)
leg_trad -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0067*** -0.0085*** -0.0273***
(0.0009) (0.0029) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0016)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs). Control variab les include: rms
d im ension dumm ies and rms age dumm ies, rms cap ita l ownersh ip and employm ent composition (share of workers by education
and occupation , average workers age and prop ortion of females and imm igrants among workforce).
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4.5.2 Robustness Analysis
The positive e¤ect of the change in legislation on wage inequality at the rm level
may be the result of the behaviour of rms that already were employing workers on
xed-term and open-ended contracts before 2004 and/or the result of the behaviour
of rms that start hiring xed-term or open-ended contracts after that. In order to
disentangle the source of the positive sign associated with the legislation dummy at
the top quantiles of the relative wage distribution, we re-estimate the model with
only those rms that already employed at least one worker on each type of contract
in 2002 or 2003, before the change in legislation was implemented (Table E.6).
With this sample, we still observe the statistical signicant (at a 95% condence
level) and higher wage premium for open-ended contracts in rms in tradable sector
at the top of the conditional relative wage distribution. However, the coe¢ cient
on the legislation dummy loses statistical and economic signicance. This result
may be reconciled with the evidence that wages are adjusted especially for newly
hired workers rather than for insiders (e.g. Centeno and Novo, 2014; Martins and
Portugal, 2014; Carneiro et al., 2012). Note that the change in legislation extended
the maximum legal duration of xed-term contracts such that rms were allowed to
continue the employment relationship, and that nominal wage cuts are forbidden in
the Portuguese legislation. Therefore, the e¤ect of the change in legislation reported
in Table 4.3 may be potentially explained by rms that start hiring new workers
either on xed-term contracts with lower average wages or workers on open-ended
contracts with higher average wages.
Another interesting result is obtained by retrieving those rms that were ex-
cluded from the sample because the rm does not have an open-ended or a xed-
term contract in a given year, but hired them in other year(s) of the sample period.
In order to perform this analysis we substitute the missings on the average wage by
type of contract by the rms time average, which more than doubles the number of
rms retained in the sample. The results displayed in Table E.7 give further support
to the previous conclusion that the positive e¤ect of the change in legislation on the
relative wage at the top of the distribution is undermined by lower representation
of xed-term contracts in the rms employment composition. According to these
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results, the change in legislation does not have a direct signicant e¤ect on wage
inequality, but for rms with higher relative permanent employment the e¤ect of the
change in legislation is negative and statistically signicant for all quantiles, except
at the 10th. The higher permanent wage premium for rms in tradable sectors is
still observed using this alternative dependent variable.
The results are robust to the exclusion of rms in agriculture sector24 (Table
E.8). Since rms with 11 to 20 employees experienced a larger increase in the
employment protection gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts due to the
more demanding procedures to layo¤ workers on open-ended contracts, we interact
the variables of interest with a dummy identifying these rms (d1120). The results
conrm that the e¤ect of the change in legislation on the intra-rm wage gap between
both types of contract is not driven exclusively by these rms although the e¤ect
is 5% larger and statistically signicant, at a 5% and 10% signicance levels, in the
50th and 75th quantiles respectively (Table E.9).
4.6 Conclusion
We use exceptionally rich employer-employee data and estimate a quantile regres-
sion model with nonadditive xed e¤ects to study how the conditional distribution
of the within-rm wage gap between open-ended and xed-term contracts may be
a¤ected by reforms widening the employment protection asymmetries between both
types of contract. We also assess whether the relative wage and the e¤ects of employ-
ment protection reforms are heterogeneous across rms in tradable and non-tradable
sectors.
Our results suggest that xed-term and permanent workers are close substitutes
in rms situated at the bottom and at the median of the relative wage distribution.
However, we nd that, at the top quantiles of that distribution, both types of con-
tracts are imperfect substitutes. Our results show that, when the 2004 change in
legislation was in force, wage inequality between open-ended and xed-term con-
24Since the coverage of rms in agriculture sector is low in Quadros de Pessoal (some rms do
not have paid workers), the sample may not be representative of this sector.
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tracts signicantly increased, at a 90% condence level, in rms that pay a large
wage premium to permanent workers. Notably, wage inequality increased by 1.6%
in rms at the median and 1% in rms at the 75th quantile of the conditional re-
lative wage distribution. On the other hand, wage inequality does not seem to be
signicantly a¤ected by the change in legislation in rms at the bottom of the re-
lative wage distribution. We interpret this result as possible evidence that rms
attribute di¤erent uses to xed-term contracts and this is reected in their wage
policies. Namely, reforms increasing the EPL gap only put xed-term workers in
a more disadvantaged position in rms where they face a large wage penalty. By
contrast, in rms where the average xed-term worker face a lower wage penalty or
even receive a wage premium, wage inequality may not be signicantly a¤ected.
Finally, our results suggest that rms in the tradable sectors pay a higher wage
premium to permanent workers at the top of the conditional relative wage distri-
bution. This may be explained by the fact that these rms are more constrained
due to the international competition and, therefore, use xed-term contracts as a
source of wage exibility. However, they are not signicantly a¤ected by changes in
legislation extending the maximum legal duration of xed-term contracts.
This study contributes to drawing attention to the potential externalities of the
promotion of exibility at the margin. To the best of our knowledge, this study
gives the rst insights on how Portuguese rms with di¤erent wage policies for
workers on di¤erent types of contract react to changes in EPL. Another novelty of
our results is that as the relative wage of permanent contracts is higher in rms in
the tradable sector, the labour demand for xed-term contracts in these sector may
be higher than that for open-ended contracts- if they are equally productive. These
results are relevant for policy makers since they draw attention to the importance
of encouraging investment in training for workers on xed-term contracts and of
policies promoting the contracts conversion, which may be important to sustain
the necessary increase in this sectors long-run productivity.
Further research is needed to overcome some of the limitations of this study. For
instance, an important exercise would be to account for possible sample selection
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for rms that hire workers on xed-term contracts25, which may be challenging in a
quantile regression with nonadditive xed e¤ects. Note, however, that the inclusion
of xed e¤ects in the model reduces the concern about sample selection correction.
A natural extension of this study is to assess the role of xed-term contracts in
job and worker reallocation between tradable and non-tradable sectors. Finally, it
would also be interesting to analyse whether the e¤ects of the change in legislation
are due to the increase of the average wage paid to workers on open-ended contracts
or to the lower average wages of xed-term contracts and whether the probability of
conversion of xed-term into open-ended contracts plays a role in the explanation of
the heterogeneous e¤ects of changes in legislation over the relative wage distribution.
25We estimate the Heckman model at the mean of the distribution using a maximum likelihood
estimator and did not nd signicant evidence of sample selection at the standard condence levels.
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Appendix E
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Table E.1: Mean estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on the relative wage
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Mean Mean Mean
lemp_rel -0.0062*** -0.0068*** -0.0061***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
tradable 0.0075* 0.0075* 0.0075*
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043)
legislation 0.0103*** -0.0084*** 0.0107***
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0015)
lemp_rel trad -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.0028
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
lemp_rel leg -0.0041*** -0.0039*** -0.0042***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
lemp_rel trad leg 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
leg trad -0.0053** -0.0053** -0.0052**
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025)
Constant 0.2058*** 0.1775*** 1.4513***
(0.0210) (0.0231) (0.5133)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes
time e¤ects no yes linear trend
controls yes yes yes
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480
R-squared 0.0123 0.0132 0.0124
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs). Control variab les include: rms
d im ension dumm ies and rms age dumm ies, rms cap ita l ownersh ip and employm ent composition (share of workers by education
and occupation , average workers age and prop ortion of females and imm igrants among workforce).
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Table E.2: Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on the relative wage without covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel 0.0006 0.0005 0.0081*** 0.0034* -0.0080***
(0.0022) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0022)
tradable 0.0079 0.0016 0.0041 0.0090 0.0240**
(0.0079) (0.0026) (0.0043) (0.0058) (0.0097)
legislation 0.0057 0.0005 0.0302*** 0.0264*** 0.0207**
(0.0082) (0.0018) (0.0037) (0.0058) (0.0090)
lemp_reltrad 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0065*** -0.0071*** -0.0025
(0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0035)
lemp_relleg 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0069*** -0.0107*** -0.0133***
(0.0023) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0023)
lemp_reltrad leg -0.0063* -0.0010 -0.0019 0.0035 0.0077**
(0.0036) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0034)
legtrad -0.0050 0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0063* -0.0132**
(0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0060)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls no no no no no
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs).
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Table E.3: Full quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the
change in legislation on the relative wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
dimension (5-9) 0.0168*** 0.0034*** 0.0148*** 0.0165*** 0.0142***
(0.0044) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0051)
dimension (10-19) 0.0374*** 0.0161*** 0.0320*** 0.0312*** 0.0185***
(0.0058) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0042) (0.0062)
dimension (20-49) 0.0527*** 0.0315*** 0.0490*** 0.0441*** 0.0257***
(0.0073) (0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0051) (0.0074)
dimension (50-99) 0.0686*** 0.0459*** 0.0622*** 0.0513*** 0.0268***
(0.0099) (0.0042) (0.0046) (0.0066) (0.0093)
dimension (100-249) 0.0829*** 0.0586*** 0.0717*** 0.0544*** 0.0237*
(0.0163) (0.0063) (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0121)
dimension (250-499) 0.1088*** 0.0664*** 0.0707*** 0.0483*** 0.0162
(0.0251) (0.0116) (0.0095) (0.0113) (0.0187)
dimension (500-999) 0.1052*** 0.0743*** 0.0706*** 0.0423*** 0.0080
(0.0250) (0.0222) (0.0137) (0.0149) (0.0378)
dimension (>999) 0.0707 0.0733*** 0.0935*** 0.0556* 0.0032
(0.0607) (0.0257) (0.0174) (0.0293) (0.0277)
age (2-5) 0.0074* 0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0043 -0.0119**
(0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0025) (0.0038) (0.0059)
age (6-10) 0.0174*** 0.0058*** 0.0024 -0.0051 -0.0167**
(0.0050) (0.0017) (0.0032) (0.0045) (0.0074)
age (>10) 0.0285*** 0.0133*** 0.0130*** 0.0106** -0.0004
(0.0060) (0.0022) (0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0086)
cspub 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
(continued)
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(continuation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
csest 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
lemp_rel 0.0065*** 0.0060*** 0.0069*** 0.0029* -0.0053**
(0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023)
tradable 0.0060 0.0035 0.0063 0.0118** 0.0230**
(0.0075) (0.0028) (0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0090)
legislation -0.0011 0.0028 0.0161*** 0.0096* 0.0081
(0.0080) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0058) (0.0094)
lemp_rel trad -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0011
(0.0028) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0037)
lemp_rel leg 0.0027 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0020 -0.0038*
(0.0020) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0022)
lemp_rel trad leg -0.0017 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0011 0.0035
(0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0033)
leg trad -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0038 -0.0072
(0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.0034) (0.0055)
workers_females 0.0002* 0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0004*** -0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
workers_immigrant 0.0005*** 0.0002*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
workers_highsch -0.0000 0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0005*** 0.0007***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
workers_bachelor -0.0006* 0.0002** 0.0009*** 0.0008*** 0.0019***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
workers_college -0.0014*** -0.0002* 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
(continued)
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(continuation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
workers_managers -0.0002 0.0008*** 0.0034*** 0.0054*** 0.0070***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
workers_experts -0.0011*** -0.0003*** 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0010***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
workers_intermediate -0.0005*** -0.0001*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0012***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
workers_administrative -0.0005*** -0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.0010***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
workers_sellers -0.0000 -0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0002*** 0.0002*
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
workers_qual_agric -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
workers_craftsmen -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001* -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
workers_machine -0.0002 -0.0001*** -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
age_workers -0.0614*** -0.0091*** 0.0426*** 0.0262*** 0.1155***
(0.0099) (0.0029) (0.0061) (0.0083) (0.0152)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
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p<0.1. The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs). Base cateogories are: d im ension(<5
workers), age(1 year), education(share of workers w ith less than high school), o ccupation(share of unqualied workers).
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Table E.4: Quantile estimates of the elasticity of substitution
between open-ended and xed-term contracts using an adaptive
MCMC algorithm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0060*** -0.0162***
(0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0008)
(-0.0022 , 0.0005) (-0.0000 , 0.0001) (-0.0014 , 0.0003) (-0.0071 , -0.0049) (-0.0178 , -0.0147)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls no no no no no
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, and 95% condence intervals in parantheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs).
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Table E.5: 95% Condence Intervals of the quantile estimates using
an adaptive MCMC algorithm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
dimension (5-9) (0.0361 , 0.0395) (0.0084 , 0.0090) (0.0234 , 0.0268) (0.0167 , 0.0210) (0.0055 , 0.0119)
dimension (10-19) (0.0738 , 0.0778) (0.0317 , 0.0344) (0.0617 , 0.0627) (0.0543 , 0.0566) (0.0265 , 0.0293)
dimension (20-49) (0.1075 , 0.1155) (0.0643 , 0.0675) (0.0921 , 0.0948) (0.0779 , 0.0802) (0.0360 , 0.0410)
dimension (50-99) (0.1260 , 0.1365) (0.0870 , 0.0922) (0.1138 , 0.1167) (0.0757 , 0.0849) (0.0362 , 0.0445)
dimension (100-249) (0.1507 , 0.1547) (0.0994 , 0.1124) (0.1438 , 0.1446) (0.1069 , 0.1076) (0.0374 , 0.0419)
dimension (250-499) (0.1974 , 0.2239) (0.1444 , 0.1495) (0.1362 , 0.1589) (0.0772 , 0.0958) (0.0167 , 0.0220)
dimension (500-999) (0.1832 , 0.2023) (0.1332 , 0.1343) (0.1428 , 0.1653) (0.1053 , 0.1086) (0.0189 , 0.0305)
dimension (>999) (0.1463 , 0.1639) (0.1549 , 0.1767) (0.1614 , 0.1963) (0.0786 , 0.1001) (0.0388 , 0.0587)
age (2-5) (0.0252 , 0.0355) (0.0042 , 0.0120) (-0.0031 , 0.0047) (-0.0117 , -0.0078) (-0.0308 , -0.0279)
age (6-10) (0.0523 , 0.0593) (0.0194 , 0.0239) (0.0109 , 0.0193) (0.0008 , 0.0028) (-0.0230 , -0.0186)
age (>10) (0.0716 , 0.0760) (0.0279 , 0.0344) (0.0249 , 0.0337) (0.0174 , 0.0237) (-0.0035 , -0.0008)
cspub (0.0002 , 0.0008) (0.0005 , 0.0008) (0.0004 , 0.0006) (0.0002 , 0.0003) (0.0005 , 0.0005)
csest (0.0006 , 0.0007) (0.0005 , 0.0008) (0.0009 , 0.0009) (0.0010 , 0.0010) (0.0012 , 0.0012)
lemp_rel (0.0042 , 0.0074) (0.0031 , 0.0100) (0.0111 , 0.0179) (0.0041 , 0.0047) (-0.0122 , -0.0105)
tradable (0.0086 , 0.0121) (0.0149 , 0.0220) (0.0146 , 0.0197) (0.0217 , 0.0229) (0.0358 , 0.0429)
legislation (-0.0145 , -0.0053) (-0.0010 , 0.0019) (-0.0019 , 0.0085) (0.0046 , 0.0070) (0.0165 , 0.0207)
lemp_reltrad (-0.0108 , -0.0052) (-0.0044 , -0.0032) (-0.0071 , 0.0022) (-0.0001 , 0.0016) (-0.0067 , -0.0017)
lemp_relleg (-0.0023 , 0.0062) (0.0006 , 0.0028) (-0.0072 , 0.0007) (-0.0076 , -0.0039) (-0.0165 , -0.0133)
lemp_reltrad leg (0.0009 , 0.0125) (0.0033 , 0.0059) (-0.0000 , 0.0065) (0.0027 , 0.0088) (0.0126 , 0.0175)
legtrad (-0.0150 , -0.0116) (-0.0190 , -0.0076) (-0.0090 , -0.0043) (-0.0103 , -0.0067) (-0.0304 , -0.0241)
workers_females (-0.0000 , 0.0001) (-0.0001 , -0.0001) (-0.0004 , -0.0003) (-0.0007 , -0.0007) (-0.0010 , -0.0010)
workers_immigrant (0.0003 , 0.0003) (0.0002 , 0.0002) (0.0001 , 0.0001) (0.0001 , 0.0002) (0.0004 , 0.0005)
workers_highsch (-0.0000 , 0.0001) (0.0002 , 0.0004) (0.0006 , 0.0006) (0.0011 , 0.0011) (0.0014 , 0.0014)
workers_bachelor (-0.0015 , -0.0013) (-0.0001 , 0.0001) (0.0015 , 0.0020) (0.0034 , 0.0035) (0.0037 , 0.0039)
workers_college (-0.0016 , -0.0015) (-0.0001 , 0.0002) (0.0011 , 0.0012) (0.0022 , 0.0022) (0.0030 , 0.0030)
workers_managers (-0.0004 , -0.0000) (0.0005 , 0.0006) (0.0029 , 0.0030) (0.0053 , 0.0055) (0.0073 , 0.0075)
workers_experts (-0.0019 , -0.0018) (-0.0005 , -0.0005) (0.0001 , 0.0002) (0.0010 , 0.0010) (0.0019 , 0.0019)
workers_intermediate (-0.0007 , -0.0005) (-0.0002 , 0.0000) (0.0008 , 0.0010) (0.0016 , 0.0017) (0.0024 , 0.0025)
workers_administrative (-0.0004 , -0.0003) (-0.0001 , 0.0001) (0.0009 , 0.0011) (0.0015 , 0.0016) (0.0018 , 0.0019)
workers_sellers (-0.0001 , 0.0001) (-0.0001 , 0.0000) (0.0000 , 0.0003) (0.0002 , 0.0003) (0.0002 , 0.0003)
workers_qual_agric (-0.0008 , -0.0007) (-0.0002 , -0.0001) (-0.0002 , 0.0000) (0.0001 , 0.0002) (0.0004 , 0.0005)
workers_craftsmen (-0.0004 , -0.0003) (-0.0003 , -0.0002) (-0.0002 , -0.0001) (-0.0002 , -0.0002) (-0.0003 , -0.0002)
workers_machine (-0.0003 , -0.0002) (-0.0005 , -0.0004) (-0.0006 , -0.0004) (-0.0008 , -0.0008) (-0.0010 , -0.0009)
age_workers (-0.1007 , -0.0846) (-0.0221 , -0.0130) (0.0062 , 0.0294) (0.0753 , 0.0862) (0.1408 , 0.1537)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in
logs).
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Table E.6: Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on the relative wage for rms with xed-term contracts before 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel 0.0065** 0.0064*** 0.0072*** 0.0043** -0.0039
(0.0026) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0021) (0.0030)
tradable 0.0075 0.0062 0.0105** 0.0151** 0.0206**
(0.0091) (0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0066) (0.0105)
legislation 0.0039 0.0019 0.0032 0.0032 0.0015
(0.0188) (0.0059) (0.0077) (0.0115) (0.0174)
lemp_rel trad -0.0025 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0014
(0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0041)
lemp_rel leg -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0025
(0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0019) (0.0030)
lemp_rel trad leg -0.0021 -0.0007 0.0016 0.0022 0.0049
(0.0033) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0038)
leg trad -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0033 -0.0058 -0.0100
(0.0046) (0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0065)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 288,807 288,807 288,807 288,807 288,807
Number of groups 60,190 60,190 60,190 60,190 60,190
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs). Control variab les include: rms
d im ension dumm ies and rms age dumm ies, rms cap ita l ownersh ip and employm ent composition (share of workers by education
and occupation , average workers age and prop ortion of females and imm igrants among workforce).
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Table E.7: Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on an alternative variable of the relative wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel 0.0027*** 0.0031*** 0.0054*** 0.0043*** -0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0011)
tradable 0.0028 0.0026 0.0045** 0.0074** 0.0115**
(0.0045) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0033) (0.0053)
legislation -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0022 0.0000 0.0069
(0.0045) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0038) (0.0062)
lemp_rel trad 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0022
(0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0017)
lemp_rel leg -0.0011 -0.0023*** -0.0032*** -0.0031*** -0.0040***
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0009)
lemp_rel trad leg -0.0005 0.0006 0.0012* 0.0013 0.0015
(0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0015)
leg trad -0.0017 -0.0004 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0031
(0.0025) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0032)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1,206,913 1,206,913 1,206,913 1,206,913 1,206,913
Number of groups 200,350 200,350 200,350 200,350 200,350
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs), where the average wage by typ e of
contract is rep laced in a given year by the resp ective rms average wage over the sample p eriod when there are no workers on xed-
term or op en-ended contracts. Control variab les include: rms d im ension dumm ies and rms age dumm ies, rms cap ita l ownersh ip
and employment composition (share of workers by education and occupation , average workers age and prop ortion of females and
imm igrants among workforce).
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Table E.8: Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on the relative wage excluding agriculture
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel 0.0067*** 0.0061*** 0.0069*** 0.0029* -0.0053**
(0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0023)
tradable 0.0065 0.0041 0.0066 0.0133** 0.0272***
(0.0074) (0.0029) (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0087)
legislation 0.0011 0.0024 0.0162*** 0.0097* 0.0081
(0.0078) (0.0023) (0.0038) (0.0054) (0.0084)
lemp_rel trad -0.0017 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0029) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0035)
lemp_rel leg 0.0032* 0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0038*
(0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0022)
lemp_rel trad leg -0.0016 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0012 0.0036
(0.0031) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0033)
leg trad 0.0028 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0040 -0.0078
(0.0043) (0.0016) (0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0055)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 529,427 529,427 529,427 529,427 529,427
Number of groups 158,445 158,445 158,445 158,445 158,445
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs). Control variab les include: rms
d im ension dumm ies and rms age dumm ies, rms cap ita l ownersh ip and employm ent composition (share of workers by education
and occupation , average workers age and prop ortion of females and imm igrants among workforce).
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Table E.9: Quantile estimates of the e¤ect of the change in legislation
on the relative wage interacted with a dummy for rms with 11 to 20
employees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quantile 10 25 50 75 90
lemp_rel 0.0063*** 0.0057*** 0.0065*** 0.0024 -0.0060**
(0.0022) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0025)
tradable 0.0030 0.0025 0.0061 0.0109* 0.0282***
(0.0076) (0.0028) (0.0042) (0.0057) (0.0095)
legislation 0.0051 0.0022 0.0155*** 0.0039 0.0078
(0.0080) (0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0056) (0.0085)
lemp_rel trad -0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0005
(0.0033) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0040)
lemp_rel leg 0.0032 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0015 -0.0034
(0.0023) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0024)
lemp_rel trad leg -0.0030 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0033
(0.0035) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0037)
leg trad 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0030 -0.0067
(0.0047) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0062)
d1120lemp_rel 0.0013 0.0013 0.0022 0.0022 0.0027
(0.0037) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0037)
d1120tradable 0.0115 0.0047 0.0015 0.0007 -0.0021
(0.0076) (0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0062) (0.0099)
d1120legislation 0.0058 0.0020 0.0048** 0.0052* 0.0014
(0.0038) (0.0018) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0054)
d1120lemp_rel  trad 0.0014 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0016
(0.0059) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0072)
d1120lemp_rel  leg -0.0033 -0.0021 -0.0023 -0.0025 -0.0011
(0.0040) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0045)
d1120lemp_rel  trad leg 0.0055 0.0025 0.0029 0.0034 -0.0003
(0.0065) (0.0031) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0080)
d1120leg  trad -0.0086 -0.0040 -0.0058 -0.0044 -0.0019
(0.0086) (0.0037) (0.0050) (0.0072) (0.0115)
rm xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
time xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
controls yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983 541,983
Number of groups 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480 162,480
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2011. Notes: Standard errors, c lustered at rm level, in parantheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1 . The dep endent variab le is the ratio of p ermanent wages to xed-term wages (in logs). Control variab les include: rms
d im ension dumm ies and rms age dumm ies, rms cap ita l ownersh ip and employm ent composition (share of workers by education
and occupation , average workers age and prop ortion of females and imm igrants among workforce).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
This Chapter intends to sum and discuss the main conclusions of the three essays
that compose this thesis and to present a few policy implications and suggestions
for further research.
We study the e¤ects of the promotion of exibility at the margin on the Por-
tuguese labour market, using up to date econometric techniques and an exceptionally
rich database.
During the period in which the maximum legal duration of xed-term contracts
was allowed to increase from three to six years: i) the probability of conversion of the
xed-term contract decreased; ii) xed-term workers experienced a slower real wage
growth; iii) wage inequality between permanent and xed-term workers became
more pronounced; iv) the maintenance of the xed-term contract was promoted
through a lower xed-term job creation; and v) there was an indirect substitution
of open-ended contracts for xed-term contracts.
Our results suggest that xed-term contracts can play di¤erent roles in the Por-
tuguese labour market and that this should be considered when analysing the e¤ects
of the promotion of exibility at the margin. Namely, we nd evidence that xed-
term contracts are used as a screening devices, given that there is a signicant
correlation between the likelihood of a xed-term worker be given an open-ended
contract and experiencing an above average wage growth. Besides, workers with con-
verted xed-term contracts face a lower reduction in wage growth than workers that
remained with xed-term contracts in the years in which the contract was allowed
to be extended for a longer period of time. Furthermore, this legislative change did
not signicantly impact the intra-rm wage inequality between both types of con-
tracts in rms where the average xed-term worker faces a lower wage disadvantage.
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However, we also nd evidence that xed-term contracts are used as bu¤er stocks
for permanent workers, given that in some rms the average xed-term worker faces
a high wage penalty relatively to the average permanent worker and in these rms
the elasticity of substitution is negative and statistically signicant, which supports
the idea that in these cases both types of contract are imperfect substitutes.
Therefore, we show that the 2004 change in legislation that facilitated the use of
xed-term contracts had heterogeneous e¤ects across workers and rms, which may
be at least partly explained by the di¤erent roles played by xed-term contracts.
However, by facilitating the use of xed-term contracts for a longer period of time,
policy makers may shift the incentive towards the use of xed-term contracts as
bu¤er stocks rather than as screening devices. According to Faccinis (2014) model, if
we consider that xed-term contracts are screening devices, extending the maximum
duration of the contract from two to three years is unlikely to have very signicant
e¤ects since it does not greatly improve the learning about match quality.
Besides failing to foster employment growth, this legislative change generated
important ine¢ ciencies. Firstly, it not only reduced the probability that a worker on
a xed-term contract could be promoted to a more stable employment relationship
but also postponed the conversion of the contract. By doing so, and according to our
results, it contributed even further to increase wage inequality between workers on
di¤erent contractual arrangements. The results reported in Chapter 2 and Chapter
4 show that there are mainly two sources of the increased wage inequality between
both types of contract in the period in which the legislative change was in force. Not
only does the average xed-term worker face a higher relative wage penalty when
compared to the average permanent worker, especially in rms at the top of the
relative wage distribution, but he also experiences a lower wage growth rate when
compared to the newly permanent workers that were converted from a xed-term
contract.
As documented in Chapter 3, the share of non-converted xed-term contracts
may also help to explain the job dynamics that follow an increase in exibility at
the margin. Not only did the extension of the maximum duration of xed-term
contracts increase the xed-term job destruction in the two following periods, but it
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also decreases the rate at which they are created until 3-years ahead. We, therefore,
advance that the main e¤ect of the 2004 change in legislation has been to promote
the maintenance of the existing contracts, while the overall employment growth did
not seem to be signicantly a¤ected. We found that it is the non-conversion of xed-
term contracts that primarily accounts for these results. In addition, the existence
of a higher wage gap between both types of contracts may contribute to explaining
the lack of a signicantly positive e¤ect of the change in legislation on employment
growth. Namely, we nd evidence that the change in legislation promoted an indirect
substitution of permanent workers for xed-term workers (Chapter 3). In particular,
this could be especially relevant for the rms with lower wage di¤erentials between
the average permanent worker and the average xed-term worker where both types
of contract may be considered closer substitutes (Chapter 4).
The analysis conducted over the three essays provides new evidence on the role
of xed-term contracts in the Portuguese labour market and helps understand the
main e¤ects that the promotion of exibility at the margin may have. We show that
exibility at the margin has a signicant impact on major labour market outcomes.
The main message of this thesis is that asymmetric employment protection reforms
entail externalities, such as the postponement of the conversion of the xed-term
contract and higher inequality between not only permanent and xed-term contracts
but also between workers that receive an open-ended contract and those that were
not able to get a stable employment relationship. Workers on xed-term contracts
are a¤ected not only in terms of wages (in the short and long-run), but also in terms
of employment opportunities and prospects. However, these costs are not spread
homogeneously among them, given that the contract may serve di¤erent purposes.
These e¤ects may be attenuated if the contract is used mainly as a screening device,
promoting a more e¢ cient labour allocation. Designing e¤ective policy measures
is, therefore, very important. We formulate some suggestions of policy implications
suggested by the results obtained.
Policy Implications
According to the OECD Employment Outlook "(...) policy makers are increas-
ingly aware of the risks for e¢ ciency and social cohesion of relying solely on tempor-
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ary contracts for labour market adjustments" (OECD, 2014, p. 145). Our ndings
suggest that policy makers should tackle labour market segmentation through the
reduction of employment protection on open-ended contracts or the increase in the
restrictions on the use of xed-term contracts. Although the former is politically
more di¢ cult to implement (Saint-Paul, 1996), the high levels of unemployment ex-
perienced during the economic and economic and nancial crisis of 2008-9 combined
with the increasing proportion of xed-term contracts and their lower conversion
probability may originate the necessary political support to implement it in Portugal
(e.g. Saint-Paul, 1993). According to Lindbeck and Snower (2001) and Lindbeck and
Snower (2002), in a labour market with high labour turnover costs for open-ended
contracts, only large labour market reforms may be e¤ective in boosting employ-
ment. Therefore, we advocate the need to promote a structural reform that reduce
segmentation, which might improve labour market functioning (OECD, 2012).
According to our results, one of the most relevant policies should be to design
e¤ective incentives to promote the conversion of xed-term contracts. This policy
could have positive e¤ects on employment dynamics, namely by increasing job cre-
ation of xed-term contracts. Although the extension of the contract was accom-
panied by a penalisation in the social security contribution for rms with more than
15% of the workforce under a xed-term contract, the results show that the measure
was not e¤ective in promoting the conversion of the contract. A potential alternative
would be to implement measures encouraging the conversion of the contract in rms
that penalise more xed-term contracts, for example, in terms of wages. According
to our results, these rms are those that potentially react more to changes in labour
costs and that in general may use xed-term contracts for rotation more intensively.
Another way to promote the conversion of matches started with a xed-term
contract would be to increase the mandatory hours of relevant training and to in-
crease the monitoring of the compliance of this type of change. The mandatory
training for xed-term contracts was introduced in the Labour Code of 2003, but
our results give preliminary evidence that it did not have a su¢ ciently positive e¤ect
to mitigate the negative e¤ects of exibility at the margin on wage inequality and
contracts conversion.
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Understanding the role played by xed-term contracts in the Portuguese labour
market and the e¤ects of reforms that widened the employment protection asym-
metries between xed-term and regular contracts may also contribute to the ongoing
discussion about the introduction of a single employment contract (e.g. Pérez and
Osuna, 2014; Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno, 2012). Though the results provided in
this thesis do not allow drawing a grounded conclusion about this alternative, we
believe that some light was shed on the fact that its benets and costs have to be
evaluated considering each countrys institutional setting and taking into account
the way in which labour market agents use xed-term contracts.
Limitations and Further Research
The analysis reported here has some limitations that should be addressed in the
future. We should be careful in extrapolating the results of this thesis to countries
with di¤erent institutional frameworks and to other periods of time. For instance,
the results give a good hint about the e¤ects of the increased exibility at the margin
in Portugal in 2012 and 2013, but as Kahn (2010) argues, this type of reform is likely
to have stronger e¤ects on temporary employment during recessions than expansions.
This may be partly explained by the fact that the value of a temporary contract is
larger during the former phase of the cycle (Kahn, 2010). The results are, therefore,
dependent on the institutional context and the economic environment of Portugal
in the sample period. Nevertheless, this last concern is mitigated since the e¤ect
of the business cycle is controlled for in all regressions. We believe that the results
pinpoint important hints on how to conduct the analysis of asymmetric employment
protection reforms in the future, at least in countries characterised by high labour
market segmentation, such as Spain or France. Other relevant institutions, such as
unemployment benets and wage setting mechanisms, may interact with exibility
at the margin and contribute to increase its e¤ects. Therefore, future studies should
also consider these interactions to better characterise those e¤ects on wages, job
ows and other labour market outcomes.
Further research on these topics should take into account that the match quality
threshold at which xed-term contracts are converted into open-ended contracts
may have also been a¤ected by the change in legislation. A priori, we would expect
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that this threshold increases, given that rms can experiment the match longer.
Besides, in Chapter 2, the sample only included continuing matches, i.e., matches
whose quality was high enough such that the match survived. The analysis could be
improved if we considered also those matches that did not survived. However, we
consider that these limitations do not hinder the results, which are treated as lower
bounds of the true e¤ect. In the future, we intend to estimate the match quality
cuto¤ points at which xed-term contracts are continued and converted and how
the change in legislation shifted them.
It would also be interesting to test the robustness of the results in Chapter 2
to an alternative simultaneous estimation method such as maximum likelihood or
GMM instead of the two-step procedure proposed.
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 4 could also be extended by estimating the
model with an alternative dependent variable: the wage ratio of entrants to xed-
term workers, where entrants are workers on permanent contracts with less than one
year of tenure. This is especially relevant given the results previously found in the
literature showing that entrantswages may also be negatively a¤ected by reforms
increasing the EPL gap between xed-term and open-ended contracts, namely for
Portugal (e.g. Centeno and Novo, 2014) and Italy (e.g. Ordine and Rose, 2016).
Finally, the study of the e¤ectiveness of scal incentives to convert xed-term
contracts in open-ended contracts implemented in some European countries has
been neglected so far. Our results suggest that this type of measure is likely to
be innefective when implemented with measures allowing the extension of the con-
tract. Further research on this issue is thus called for, given that according to our
conclusions, policies aiming to promote the conversion of the contract may help
to attenuate the negative e¤ects of the increasing segmentation of the Portuguese
labour market.
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